Ohhhh! Go to school and learn and stop being the idiot you are. Even your only employment in your life - the military, you still do not understand, so go figure. >From: Ebou Jallow <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: [log in to unmask] >To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list ><[log in to unmask]>, [log in to unmask] >Subject: [>-<] IMF does not rule the Gambia >Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 18:36:16 -0700 (PDT) > >Musa Jeng, > >Relax the hype...the world is not going to end tomorrow my brother. Jammeh >appointed some people to run the Central Bank and they evidently failed >their duties to the Gambia. Consequently, Jammeh applied the rule of law >on this very issue, and today some admitted guilt to corruption charges in >a court of law and none of them mentioned Yaya Jammeh's name in court. The >Gambia is a sovereign state with a democratically elected president who is >accountable to the Gambian people and not the IMF. The Gambian >constitution grants him the rights of executive privilege on matters of >national security, state secrets and the execution of the people's business >which is none of the IMF's or any damn auditor's business. >Some of you simply live in Laputa and love creating a storm out of a >teacup. Even if Jammeh steals from the Gambia Government ( which I doubt >has ever happened) you fools shall never ever know about it. > >Monsieur Dieng, I suggest you focus on raising some nickles/dimes for your >desperate/dysfunctional party the PPP aka NADD. Better still you might try >begging the Gambian opposition's friend Monsieur Wade for some of his loot >from the Senegalese people. > > >Ebou Jallow > > > > > > >Musa Jeng <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >Joe: > >In layman's parlance, what this report simply put is that APRC has >mismanaged the Gambian economy and everything in the country. Folks, they >have stolen our country's resources and anyone who really believe that the >APRC can seriously develop our country, I am the owner of the Brokyln >Bridge and I would not mind to sell it to you. Now, I know some of you >support them for some crazy reason, but bottom line they will never be able >to put it together, and I mean never. > >Thanks > >Musa Jeng > > > > From: Joe Sambou > > Date: 2005/09/27 Tue PM 05:44:11 EDT > > To: [log in to unmask] > > Subject: IMF on Gambia > > > > Below is the IMF report on Gambia. I wonder how they accounted for Lang >and > > Jammeh's heist from the Bank. > > > > "The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV > > consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The > > Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of >reference > > agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a >special > > audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These >audits > > have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls >at > > the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard >Assessment > > mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general >ledger > > balances for external reserves for various test dates between >end-December > > 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the > > originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer > > indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and >2002 > > accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several > > foreign exchange transactions." > > > > Simply put, they cooked the books. Nothing has changed and the theft >will > > continue as long as Yaya is presiding over the criminal activity. Please > > read on. > > > > > > Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/121 > > September 8, 2005 International Monetary Fund > > 700 19th Street, NW > > Washington, D.C. 20431 USA > > > > > > > > IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with The >Gambia > > Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to >promote > > transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments >and > > policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs >are > > issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations >with > > member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional >level, > > of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member >countries > > with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after >Executive > > Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by >the > > Executive Board in a particular case. The staff report for the Article >IV > > consultation with The Gambia may be made available at a later stage if >the > > authorities consent. > > > > > > On July 18, 2005, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund > > (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with The Gambia.1 > > > > Background > > > > The Gambia's economic performance since the mid-1980s has been uneven >owing > > to exogenous shocks, macroeconomic and structural policy slippage, poor > > governance, and weak institutions. The economy's vulnerability to shocks > > stems from a lack of economic diversification. In addition, economic > > performance has been constrained by policy distortions and by recurrent > > weaknesses in fiscal policy. Expansionary policies have increased the > > government's recourse to domestic bank financing, which, in turn, has >raised > > real interest rates, increased the domestic debt burden, and tended to >crowd > > out private investment. > > > > In 1998, the authorities entered into a three-year program under the > > Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which was converted into >a > > Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement. In July 2002, >the > > Board approved a new three-year PRGF arrangement (See News Brief No. >02/74 > > and Press Release No. 02/32), but the first review was not completed >because > > of weak policy implementation and governance problems. It was discovered >in > > 2003 that The Gambia had misreported to the Fund net international >reserves > > by US$38.8 million at end-December 2001 and failed to record US$28.5 >million > > in government expenditures. The Executive Board concluded that The >Gambia > > had received two noncomplying disbursements, equivalent to SDR 3.435 >million > > each in July and December 2001 (See Press Release No. 04/49). The > > authorities repaid these disbursements in 2004 in four equal >installments, > > with the last payment made ahead of schedule. > > > > The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV > > consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The > > Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of >reference > > agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a >special > > audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These >audits > > have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls >at > > the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard >Assessment > > mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general >ledger > > balances for external reserves for various test dates between >end-December > > 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the > > originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer > > indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and >2002 > > accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several > > foreign exchange transactions. > > > > Macroeconomic performance has strengthened over the past 18 months, > > particularly through end-2004, in response to strong financial policies. > > Despite an increase in groundnut production, real GDP growth slowed in >2004 > > to 5.1 percent (from 6.9 percent in 2003) due to lower growth in >industry > > and services. Inflation reached 18 percent at end-2003 and declined to 5 > > percent by March 2005. The central bank's rediscount rate (policy rate) >was > > reduced by 5 percentage points from September 2004 to 29 percent in >March > > 2005. > > > > The overall fiscal deficit (including grants and on a commitment basis) > > increased to 5¾ percent of GDP in 2004 from 4¾ percent in 2003, mainly >due > > to much higher externally-financed capital expenditures. However, the >basic > > primary surplus more than doubled to 9½ percent of GDP, indicating a > > significant tightening in domestic fiscal operations. Broad money growth > > declined from a peak of 43 percent on a 12-month basis in 2003 to 18 >percent > > in 2004. The nominal exchange rate has been stable since 2003 when it > > depreciated by 25 percent in U.S. dollar terms. > > > > The relatively high interest rates that were necessary to reverse the > > deterioration in the macroeconomic environment have, however, placed a >heavy > > burden on domestic debt service, and on credit markets. The total >domestic > > debt stock increased from around 25 percent of GDP in 2003 to 31 percent >in > > 2004 and domestic interest payments have risen from 4½ percent in 2003 >to 5¼ > > percent of GDP in 2004. The tightening in domestic financial policies >has > > also severely depressed credit to the private sector. In 2004, the stock >of > > such credit is estimated to have fallen by 6 percent. > > > > The external current account deficit (including official transfers) > > deteriorated from 5 percent of GDP in 2003 to 12 percent in 2004, partly > > reflecting the worsening in the balance of trade, as strong import >growth > > was driven by the recovery in output, the surge in donor-financed >capital > > expenditures, foreign direct investment, and higher international oil > > prices. Gross international reserves rose by more than US$22 million or >by > > over 30 percent in 2004 as increased foreign inflows and a stabilizing > > exchange rate allowed the central bank to increase its purchases in the > > interbank market. > > > > Policies, however, weakened in the first quarter of 2005. There have >been > > significant fiscal slippages owing primarily to unbudgeted expenditures >of D > > 101 million (¾ percent of GDP). These expenditures have led to a >substantial > > increase in the net debt of the government. Accommodating policies by >the > > central bank led to excessive growth in monetary aggregates. Prospects >for > > 2005 are further jeopardized by the decision to license a monopoly > > quasi-public enterprise, the Gambian Agricultural Marketing Corporation > > (GAMCO), to market and process groundnuts. This has had a near >disastrous > > effect on exports of processed groundnuts, as GAMCO has been unable to >raise > > the finances to purchase what was a bumper harvest for groundnuts. The > > mission estimates that a substantial proportion of groundnut exports >could > > be lost in the 2004/05 crop season. > > > > After a long delay, the authorities recently completed the first annual > > progress report of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper covering the >period > > July 2002-December 2003. Progress on structural reforms has been mixed. >The > > authorities have fallen behind in their schedule to privatize the Gambia > > Groundnut Corporation. On the fiscal side, the National Emergency Fiscal > > Committee (NEFCOM) had some positive effects in ensuring greater control > > over expenditures. Further, steps are being taken to strengthen the >public > > expenditure management system. A new organic budget law has been passed >and > > the financial regulations are currently being implemented. The >authorities > > are in the process of developing a statistical strategy to be presented >to > > donors. However, basic macroeconomic statistics remain weak. > > > > Executive Board Assessment > > > > Executive Directors observed that The Gambia's economic performance in > > recent years was marked by inconsistent implementation of sound > > macroeconomic policies, poor governance, exogenous and policy-induced > > shocks, and inappropriate policy responses to those shocks. Directors > > concurred that the main medium-term challenge for The Gambia is to make >a > > decisive break from the past "stop-go" policies, and embark on a > > comprehensive economic program that would establish the conditions for > > sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Key elements of such a program > > should include measures to preserve macroeconomic stability and to >achieve > > debt sustainability. The program should also incorporate reforms aimed >at > > promoting faster growth and poverty reduction through improvements in >the > > investment climate, and the strengthening of public expenditure >management, > > governance, and accountability. > > > > In this context, Directors commended the authorities for their > > implementation of strong financial policies over the past 18 months, >which > > has led to an improvement in the basic primary fiscal surplus, a >reduction > > in inflation, the stabilization of the exchange rate, and the rebuilding >of > > international reserves. Directors noted that the improved macroeconomic > > conditions had paved the way for the recent easing in interest rates. > > > > While welcoming this progress, Directors expressed disappointment with >the > > fiscal slippage—stemming from extrabudgetary expenditures—that occurred >in > > the first quarter of 2005. They urged the authorities to address it by >fully > > implementing the proposed quarterly ceilings on nondiscretionary > > expenditure, improving cash management, and enforcing the public > > enterprises' repayment of government loans. In this process, it will be > > important to avoid adverse effects on pro-poor spending. Directors also > > urged the authorities to phase out the subsidization of petroleum >products > > by adjusting prices and enforcing the terms of the petroleum price > > mechanism, bearing in mind the social implications of the adjustment. In > > addition, they recommended strengthening revenues by improving tax > > administration, and broadening the tax base by phasing out tax >exemptions. > > > > Directors were encouraged by the recent implementation of reforms to >promote > > enhanced fiscal transparency. They welcomed the passage of the organic > > budget law and encouraged the authorities to finalize implementation of >the > > supporting financial regulations. They also noted the progress being >made in > > auditing the government accounts, and urged the authorities to intensify > > efforts to bring the accounts up to date. > > > > Directors commended the progress made in reducing inflation, and >stressed > > that further fiscal consolidation would provide room for easing monetary > > policy and permit further reductions in interest rates. Directors >concurred > > with the use of broad money as a nominal anchor for prices. They >welcomed > > the progress made to enhance the conduct of monetary policy, and >encouraged > > the authorities to move ahead with the introduction of new instruments > > designed to separate monetary operations from the financing of the >budget, > > and by adopting other key recommendations made by recent Fund technical > > assistance missions. Also, Directors welcomed the increased attention >being > > paid to better coordination of fiscal and monetary management, and saw >the > > creation of the Monetary Policy Committee and Treasury Bill Committee as > > important first steps in this regard. Efficient use of Fund technical > > assistance in public expenditure management and in the domestic and >foreign > > operations of the central bank, together with the strengthening of the > > authorities' statistical capacity, should help to further improve The > > Gambia's macroeconomic management capacity. > > > > Directors expressed disappointment with the continued weaknesses in >internal > > controls at the Central Bank, and stressed the need for the prompt and > > effective implementation of appropriate remedial measures. In this >regard, > > they welcomed the recent adoption by the Central Bank of an Action Plan >to > > strengthen internal controls drawing on the report of the new external > > auditors. The establishment of an Audit Committee, drafting of >guidelines > > for foreign reserves management, as well as the recent reorganization of >the > > Bank were also welcomed. In addition, Directors encouraged the >authorities > > to fully implement the recommendations from the recent Safeguards > > Assessment, including the passage of the revised Central Bank Act >designed > > to strengthen the Bank's operational independence. > > > > Directors observed that the fundamentals of the financial sector appear > > sound with adequate capitalization and high profitability and liquidity > > ratios. They welcomed the reduction in nonperforming loans, and urged >the > > authorities to pursue the further deepening of the financial sector, > > including by enhancing the legal framework and reinforcing creditor >rights. > > > > Directors agreed that the current level of the real effective exchange >rate > > is appropriate, and that improvements in external competitiveness should >be > > addressed through the removal of structural bottlenecks, which currently > > constrain productivity. > > > > Directors concurred that The Gambia's external competitiveness and >growth > > prospects would be enhanced by the adoption of a comprehensive >structural > > reform strategy designed to reduce the costs and risks of doing business >in > > the country, and removing key structural bottlenecks in the agricultural > > sector. They encouraged the authorities to accelerate the privatization > > program, and enhance the investment climate through fiscal, judicial, >and > > legislative reforms, as recommended by the Foreign Investment Advisory > > Service and the World Bank's Diagnostic Assessment of the Investment >Climate > > in The Gambia. In this connection, strengthening institutions and >improving > > governance would be major priorities. In the groundnut sector, Directors > > expressed disappointment with the decision to license a public monopoly, >The > > Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation to market and process >groundnuts. > > They noted that the authorities had agreed to license firms to compete >with > > the Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation, but emphasized that it >will > > be essential to avoid further government intervention and accelerate > > implementation of the sectoral strategy agreed with major donors. >including > > the privatization of the Gambia Groundnut Corporation. > > > > Directors concurred that clear steps would be needed as part of a > > staff-monitored program (SMP). Directors agreed with staff that the main > > elements of an SMP should include implementation of an action plan to > > address the external auditor's recommendations to improve internal >controls, > > and in that regard they welcomed the authorities' intention to conduct > > quarterly audits of the Central Bank's foreign reserve balances. They >also > > agreed that emphasis will need to be placed on public financial >management > > and accountability. Successful performance under an SMP could be >expected to > > lead to a new PRGF arrangement and debt relief under the HIPC >Initiative. > > > > Directors welcomed the ex post assessment report and generally agreed >with > > its main findings. They identified as key lessons to be learned for >future > > program design the importance of structuring conditionality so as to >give > > greater emphasis to the resolution of problems in public expenditure > > management and in the internal controls at the central bank. A few >Directors > > noted the authorities' view that over ambitious targets may have >contributed > > to program failures, and they saw a possible need for greater realism >and > > streamlining of program conditionality. Directors also observed that > > governance problems and insufficient commitment to reforms had hampered > > program implementation over the course of the last two arrangements with >the > > Fund and emphasized the need to continue strengthening transparency in >the > > use of public resources. > > > > > > > > > > The Gambia: Selected Economic Indicators > > > > > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > 2001 > > 2002 > > 2003 > > 2004 > > > > > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > (Annual Percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated) > > > > Domestic economy > > > > Real GDP > > 5.8 > > -3.2 > > 6.9 > > 5.1 > > > > Nominal GDP > > 21.8 > > 12.3 > > 36.1 > > 20.1 > > > > GDP deflator > > 15.2 > > 16.1 > > 27.4 > > 14.3 > > > > Consumer price index (period average) > > 4.5 > > 8.6 > > 17.0 > > 14.2 > > > > Groundnut production > > (in thousands of metric tons) > > 151.0 > > 71.5 > > 92.9 > > 120.5 > > > > > > (In percent of GDP) > > > > External sector > > > > Current account balance > > > > Excluding official transfers > > -10.1 > > -13.4 > > -13.6 > > -21.6 > > > > Including official transfers > > -2.6 > > -2.8 > > -5.1 > > -11.8 > > > > > > (Annual percentage changes, unless otherwise) indicated) > > > > Exports, f.o.b. (in U.S. dollars) > > -19.4 > > 7.1 > > -7.6 > > 25.8 > > > > Imports, c.i.f. (in U.S. dollars) > > -19.9 > > 12.8 > > -6.2 > > 46.2 > > > > > > Money and credit (end-of-period stocks) > > > > Broad money > > 19.4 > > 35.3 > > 43.4 > > 18.3 > > > > Credit to the private sector and public enterprises > > 12.8 > > 72.3 > > 48.0 > > -15.1 > > > > Reserve money > > 21.0 > > 34.1 > > 62.7 > > 11.0 > > > > Treasury Bill rate (in percent; end-of-period) > > 15.0 > > 20.0 > > 31.0 > > 30.0 > > > > > > (In percent of GDP) > > > > Central government budget 1/ > > > > Balance, excluding grants > > -16.0 > > -9.1 > > -7.2 > > -10.2 > > > > Balance, including grants > > -13.9 > > -4.6 > > -4.7 > > -5.7 > > > > Total expenditure and net lending > > 31.1 > > 25.4 > > 22.9 > > 31.2 > > > > Domestic revenue > > 15.1 > > 16.3 > > 15.7 > > 20.9 > > > > Stock of domesti debt > > 38.1 > > 36.6 > > 25.2 > > 30.7 > > > > > > (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) > > > > Current account balance > > > > Excluding official transfers > > -42.2 > > -49.6 > > -48.0 > > -86.7 > > > > Including official transfers > > -10.8 > > -10.4 > > -18.0 > > -47.1 > > > > > > Gross official reserves 2/ > > 63.0 > > 67.2 > > 62.3 > > 84.6 > > > > In months of imports, c.i.f. > > 5.0 > > 4.5 > > 4.4 > > 4.1 > > > > > > (In percent of exports and travel income) > > > > External debt service 3/ > > 16.4 > > 16.9 > > 8.5 > > 15.9 > > > > > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Sources: The Gambian authorities; and IMF Staff estimates. > > 1/ Adjustment have been incorporated for previously unrecorded public > > spending and borrowing in 2001, financed by the Central Bank of The >Gambia. > > 2/ Adjustments have been incorporated for previously unrecorded >depletion of > > foreign exchange reserves in 2001-03, as reported by the authorities on > > October 28, 2003. > > 3/ Servicing of public external debt after HIPC grants in percent of >exports > > and travel income. In 2001, the increase in debt service reflects in >part > > payments to Alimenta. Any accumulation of arrears is excluded. > > > > > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 1 Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds > > bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team >visits > > the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses >with > > officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to > > headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for > > discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion, >the > > Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of > > Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's > > authorities. > > > > > > > > > > > > IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT > > Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: 202-623-6278 > > Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: 202-623-6772 > > > > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > > To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the >Gambia-L Web interface > > at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > > > > To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: >http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/CGI/wa.exe?S1=gambia-l > > To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: > > [log in to unmask] > > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > > > >¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface >at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > >To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: >http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/CGI/wa.exe?S1=gambia-l >To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: >[log in to unmask] >¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around >http://mail.yahoo.com ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/CGI/wa.exe?S1=gambia-l To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤