Edrissa
A review carry with critical objective and unobjective analysis. A lot more have to with governance. We have an elite class deeply intolerance and moreso if you are attch their shortfall you are label with all unimaginable. Hassan and Jawara are great to write their political memo and lot much in the West do the same because politic is not a perfect game. Lot more about PPP IS ASSOCIATED WITH Corruption but not erosion of rule of law and human right. It is what put us into North Africa-like regime in West Africa. Any who think that violent overthrown of that system is jsutifiable is wrong with current folding of state criminalisation. Hassan Jallow was able to write numerous chapters about his experience but Many Minister who come under Yahya Jammeh's Gambia  cannot ever put a chapter of their memo. I will come later to discourse in the review.
> Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2013 21:30:45 -0500
> From: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Fw: Fw: [G_L] A REVIEW OF JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE by HASSAN B JALLOW
> To: [log in to unmask]
>
> Thank you Brothers, sounds to me the debate is getting us somewhere.
> PEACE
> and all the best in the new year.
>
> Farang.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lamin Darbo <[log in to unmask]>
> To: GAMBIA-L <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Wed, Jan 2, 2013 5:32 pm
> Subject: Fw: Fw: [G_L] A REVIEW OF JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE by HASSAN B
> JALLOW
>
> ----- Forwarded Message -----
> From: Abou Jeng &lt;[log in to unmask]&gt;
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Sent: Wednesday, 2 January 2013, 15:08
> Subject: Re: Fw: [G_L] A REVIEW OF JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE by HASSAN B
> JALLOW
>
>
> Lamin,
>  
> Season's Greetings!
>  
> Thank you ever so much for your continued interest in the search for
> answers to our miserable national predicament. Your review of Alhaji
> Hassan's Journey for Justice is a testament of your commitment.
>  
> Your analyses raise a number of questions that I privately battled with
> especially in relation to my on-going enquiry into the origin of our
> national troubles and prospects for the future. I share your reading of
> both Kairaba and Journey for Justice within the context of a dominant
> PPP and the dysfunctionality it symbolised. Although I am yet to
> complete reading Alhaji Hassan's book, I'm beginning to convince myself
> that beyond the reservoir of information, both his and that of Jawara's
> Kairaba are ironically indictments of the scale of naivety of the PPP
> leadership and the dysfunctionality of its governance structures. The
> PPP had 30 years to rule, govern, stumble, rectify and change Gambia
> for good. It ruled and stumbled many times, but never rectified and
> probably changed very little or nothing at all. I remain disappointed
> though, that neither Jawara nor Alhaji Hassan has gone any nearer to
> taking responsibility for presiding over a process and a regime that
> actively suppressed national ambitions, devalued individual autonomy,
> and slowly and painfully steered our country into a big fat mess that
> came in July 22, 1994. Often, we are told that Jawara and the PPP
> brought peace, promoted human rights and allowed Gambia to be both free
> and safe. Well this may be true, but only in relation to a margin of
> 12% of the elitist population -- the chosen few. For the neglected
> majority, Gambia was far from peaceful, let alone free and safe.
>  
> True, there was peace without violence, but social and structural
> violence were steeped in Gambian society. Though less visible than
> direct physical violence, the type of social and structural violence
> that operated during the PPP held our country captive, deprived people
> the basic means of livelihoods, denied individuals the ability and joy
> to dream about their futures, forced families -- particularly rural
> folks -- to resign to a condition of 'harr yalla or mbey Allah batula,'
> consolidated falsities in our national and social relations, distorted
> the capacity and potential of the country, promoted laziness in minds
> and deeds, and above all, implanted a hopeless sense of existence. For
> instance, what was peace when over 60% of children and teen-agers had
> to walk for miles to get to the nearest school? What was peace when 88%
> of the population was impoverished and neglected? What was peace when
> there was no equality of life chances -- where the talented majority
> from impoverished social backgrounds were forced to have their dreams
> crushed or at best sought comfort in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for
> Godot, while the generally talent-starved few grabbed all facilities
> and privileges? What was peace when a majority of the population was
> less likely to celebrate their 55th birthdays? What was peace when 80%
> of the population had no access to basic health care, clean
> water and more likely to die from a mosquito bite than a teen-ager in
> London would from a knife attack? What was peace when the majority of
> the roads were virtually impassable? What was peace when the prospect
> for a better life was extinguished at birth? What was peace when the
> people in the coastal towns of Tanjeh, Gunjur, Brufut etc had no
> meaningful commercial benefit from fish stocks? To my mind, part of the
> problem seems to be that the PPP was more interested in ruling than
> governing. Yet both Jawara's and Alhaji Hassan's books give a
> romanticised -- and in some ways nostalgic -- impression of a party
> political system that was good at governing and proud of ruling.
>  
> But for me though -- and this is where I tend to differ from many
> people -- the dysfunctionality of the PPP era is at the centre of our
> present national crises and dilemmas. No matter how distant the PPP
> days seem now, the APRC's crises of governance are fundamentally linked
> to the dysfunctional PPP and the criminally-under-ambitious collective
> psyche of Jawara and his cabinet. So to better understand why Jammeh
> violates Gambians, it is important to understand what the PPP did or
> did not do. Let me elaborate. One of the primary functions of
> a Government is to maintain law and order as well as provide the
> platforms and resources from which people can pursue their dreams and
> shape their destinies. An important part of this for post-independence
> nation-states is the conception and consolidation of a national
> narrative and identity. This provides the reference point upon which
> the mechanics of a future can be outlined, one that allows people to
> negotiate their spaces for freedom, individual personalities, family
> structures etc. Neither the PPP as a dominant political entity nor
> Jawara as a larger-than-life President came any closer to shaping a
> national identity or narrative. Such a flaw in the PPP's leadership and
> governance culture meant that Gambians had to fall back to a localised
> cultural set up whose philosophical underpinnings -- muunge and maslaha
> -- were and remain deeply disempowering. And history is replete with
> examples to suggest that when individuals in society are not at ease
> with themselves or do not have a formidable reference point to align
> their daily struggles, aspirations and futures, they would ultimately
> remain culturally shackled, politically
> unfree, normatively dysfunctional and collectively resigned to whatever
> tragedy that befalls them. This will only change when dreams become
> ordinary. 
>  
> The omission of a national narrative or identity for Gambia
> becomes even more serious when you compare with our Senegalese cousins.
> When Senghor came to power, he set out as one of his first priorities,
> to formulate a narrative for Senegal and an identity for the
> Senegalese. The former took the shape of building a Senegal that:
> (1) took pride in itself; (2) desirous to be innovative and
> enterprising; (3) open and free. For the individual Senegalese, Senghor
> implanted: (1) spirited discipline -- 'fasjom'; (2) hard work --
> 'dandolleh'; (3) duty of care -- 'terral ak terraleh'. When combined,
> the national narrative of Senegal and the identity of the
> Senegalese provided reference points for the people and the country to
> negotiate what they wanted and how they were to achieve these. This is
> why every Senegalese tends to behave and act like any other Senegalese
> (hardworking, open, free, and articulate, as well as proud of being
> Senegalese) partly because they share a sense of purpose, direction and
> ambition. Gambians had no such leadership and philosophical
> offering post-independence. Jawara governed as if he was operating a
> Kebab shop. There was also no sense of urgency, purpose or
> direction (one newspaper advert carried a press release from Jawara's
> office in 1967: 'Could the person who left reading glasses in the Prime
> Minister's Office please go and collect them'). The pace of life was
> slow and both the leadership and the people had this grand illusion
> that God loves Gambians more than any other. When bad governance and an
> impoverished political imagining arose in the late 70s and early 80s,
> the best the PPP came up with was the mantra of 'Tesito'. Of course
> this was an ill-conceived throw-back at the scale of austerity in the
> wake of social and economic destabilisation. And so to this day, nobody
> knows what Gambia's identity or national narrative is. Jawara may say
> 'Friendship With The World'. But that sounds more like the opening note
> of a bad karaoke song than a national narrative. Some may say what's
> the fuss? Well the fuss is unless we have an identifiable national
> narrative and identity we will continue to live in falsehood. And it is
> our falsehood that makes us culturally shackled, politically unfree,
> normatively dysfunctional and collectively resigned to whatever tragedy
> that comes our way.
>  
> So, it is good that you have, Lamin, raised questions and alarm bells
> from both Kairaba and Journey for Justice especially in the nature of
> the dysfunctionality and lack of vision of the PPP. With all the
> disagreements I have with Halifa as regards our current constitutional
> setting, I think he was very instrumental in exposing the falsities
> that dogged the PPP and the hopeless direction of our country under
> Jawara particularly at the beginning of the 1980s onwards. The price
> Halifa and his colleagues paid was the barrage of an increasingly
> dismissive Jawara who painted Foroyaa as an instrument for mischief
> rather than an outlet engaging important national
> issues. Unfortunately, there seems to be attempts to gloss-over the
> catalogues of sins under the PPP in both Kairaba and Journey for
> Justice. Increasingly also, BB Darboe has been doing the rounds with
> the online outlets, telling people how great times were under the PPP
> and how much great was still ahead of Gambia. Well he has a point.
> Times were great for the chosen few, but utterly miserable for the
> neglected majority. And when it was put to him that corruption was
> rife, BB became tetchy, angry and even raised his voice to lecture the
> interviewer on the ethics of journalism. Like Jawara and Alhaji Hassan,
> BB is also yet to take responsibility for our national mess. But the
> denial seems even broader and can sometimes be very proximate. I have
> uncles and cousins, aunties and neighbours who served in the highest
> echelons of the PPP regime. My grandpa too was very close to Jawara and
> served as a Chief from 1952 upto his death in 1985. All of them saw the
> PPP as the regime that made Gambia a Shangri-La. Fanciful! Fortunately,
> the history they are attempting to re-write is not so distant a
> history. Some do remember and many lived through it. It was far from
> pleasant. It is also unfortunate that the resurgence of these PPP
> ayatollahs are coming at a time when Gambia is vulnerable and its
> people going through a painful process of soul-searching. But I only
> hope that people do not start to visualise the PPP with nostalgia
> or possible alternative however imaginary. Informative as these
> books are, history won't be so kind to the PPP irrespective of how bad
> the APRC messes up. The PPP and its leadership were good at ruling but
> miserable with governance. They remain a fundamental part of our
> on-going national problems. For a disgruntled me, I just want someone
> to say sorry and leave us alone!
>  
> Many thanks once again, Lamin.
>  
> With warm regards,
>  
> Abou
>  
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ------------------------------------------------
>  
>  
>  
>        
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 2, 2013 at 7:09 AM, Lamin Darbo
> &lt;[log in to unmask]&gt; wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>                            Book Title:      Journey for Justice,
> 632pages, AuthorHouse
>       
>                             Author:       Hassan B Jallow
>  
>  
>  
>                       Review by LaminJ Darbo
>  
> Rather poignantly, Journeyfor Justice commenced at the end of Hassan B
> Jallow’s (Hassan) all-lifecareer as a Law Officer, specifically as
> Chief Law Officer in his capacity asAttorney General and Minister of
> Justice. That this magisterial work also closedwith the overthrow of
> the PPP government underscores the significance of theseismic event
> that was 22 July 1994.
>
>
> From chapter one, “July 1994 – Coup D’etat”, the reader isconfronted
> with the question of PPP’s fitness to preside over Gambian public
> affairsIn the main, and in so far as the coup d’etat, those questions
> centre on who, withingovernment, knew what about the events culminating
> in the by then predictableintervention of the military in Gambian
> governance.
>
>
> Occupying the middleten years separating independence to 1984 and 1994
> to 2012 – the publicationyear of Journey for Justice - therecord
> suggests that Hassan’s tenure as Chief Law Officer easily makes him
> themost productive and distinguished Attorney General so far. There is
> nothing per se magical about the years inquestion, only that Hassan’s
> president had the good judgement to leave him inpost for a decade, and
> he himself the ability and vision to productively engagewith his
> responsibilities. Herein the significance of Journey for Justice as
> avital perspective on a contentious period in Gambia’s public life.
>
>
> From the onset, therelurks in the background the disturbing issue of a
> government so divided, and,or, incompetent, as to prove incapable - on
> any objective analysis - ofadequately protecting national security.
> There was the controversial issue ofHassan’s assignment by then Vice
> President, Saihou Sabally (Sabally), to meet thePresident, Sir Dawda
> Jawara (President Jawara) at the airport on return fromoverseas.
>
>
> Inextricably linked tothis assignment was the unsettled question of
> what Sabally, and Hassan, knewabout the political thunderstorm that was
> to hit their government on 22 July.Sabally skipped the airport meeting
> on the excuse he had “to go to Farafeni toattend the funeral of a
> relative” p.17. Inexplicably, Sabally spent that very nightof 21 July
> in Banjul and was in his office at the State House quite early
> thefateful next day. “It is now established that Saihou Sabally was
> back in Banjulthat night, or early morning and in his office in the
> morning of July 22nd1994” p.17. Why was Sabally’s movement specifically
> red-flagged when Hassanneglected to offer an explicit view on the
> question?
>
>
> On his part, and thisaccording to President Jawara in his
> autobiography, Kairaba, Hassan brokeaway from the presidential convoy
> without explanation. He neither briefed his Presidentabout the state of
> affairs in the country, nor followed his convoy to StateHouse. And even
> whereas Hassan dealt with the briefing issue, he avoided thecritical
> protocol oversight of abandoning the presidential convoy as it headedto
> the island of Banjul, that potential trap in times of public
> uncertainty andconflict.
>
>
> In the chaotic earlymoments of military intervention in Gambian public
> life, some ministers admittedhearing inklings of something akin to 22
> July a whole two weeks prior. Ratherextraordinarily, others heard
> nothing! Even when the noose was tighteningaround Banjul, the boss of
> the National Security Service was assuring Cabinet ministersall was
> well. In Kairaba, Sir Dawda claimed he was unaware of the presence
> ofthe American naval vessel, US La Moore County in Gambian territory.
> He pointedthe finger of suspicion at Sabally! However viewed, this was
> quiteextraordinary, and the evidence, admittedly circumstantial,
> appears to suggestthe PPP Government was actively self-canibalising in
> its sunset months, weeks,and days!
>
>
> And so it happened thatministers in the country, along with some
> security chiefs, were held captivecommencing that fateful day when a
> thirty year government spectacularlycollapsed like a house of cards.
> President Jawara and other senior figures wereafloat on national waters
> headed for lands beyond our shores. What aninglorious, and some may
> say, fitting end, to three decades of a generally do-nothingand
> tremendously corrupt government. It was in this climate that the
> AFPRC’s irreverentSana Bairo Sabally, if only briefly, set to work
> traumatising former ministersand the unlucky that crossed his path.
>
>
> In Chapter two, “Early Years”, Hassan dealt with hisBansang beginnings
> through high schools at Saint Augustine’s, and Gambia High,in Banjul,
> and to Tanzania to “read for the LL.B. degree at the University
> ofDar-Es-Salaam” in 1973 p. 42, from where he graduated “with an LL.B
> (FirstClass Honours Degree)” in May 1976. His educational journeys
> continued throughthe Nigerian Law School in Lagos in October 1976 from
> where he “passed the Barfinals” in May 1977 p. 47. In September 1978,
> Hassan entered the UK on aBritish Council scholarship to study “for the
> Master of Laws Course atUniversity College London” p. 58, returning
> “exactly a year to the day” he leftBanjul, and having specialised in
> public international law. At the tender ageof 28, Hassan graduated from
> rural childhood in Bansang, high school and urbanchildhood in Banjul,
> and higher education at institutions in the great andexciting cities of
> Dar-Es-Salaam, Lagos, and London. His permanent career wasto commence
> and end at the AG’s Chambers where he worked since 1976.
>
>
> In Journey for Justice, Hassan discussed the African (Banjul) Charteron
> Human and Peoples Rights and its interface with OAU politics (chapter
> 3),and dealt with The Special Criminal Court Act 1979, at chapter 4.
> Chapter 5 dealtwith Kukoi and his 30 July 1981 incident, and chapter 6
> dilated on the politicallyexpedient Senegambia Confederation. In
> chapter 7, Hassan became SolicitorGeneral, and entered the big league
> as Attorney General and Minister of Justicein chapter 8. As Chief Law
> Officer, Hassan embarked on systematic reform of law(chapter 9), and
> did what he could to enhance operations in the chronically
> inefficientGambian judicial system (chapter 10).
>
>
> In chapter 11, Integrity in Public Life, Hassan extensivelydiscussed
> the single issue that ultimately sunk the PPP, i.e., rampantcorruption.
> Chapter 12 dealt with governance and not only undertook a
> comparativeanalysis of the 1970 and 1997 constitutions, but lauded the
> democraticcredentials of President Jawara and the PPP, and in chapter
> 13, Hassan discussedhis “Early Political Duties” as amember of the
> Cabinet. Chapter 14 dealt with overall party political tapestryand
> elections, and in chapter 15, he tackled the famous and watershed Fifth
> PPP National Congress at Mansakonko,and chapter 16 dealt with his
> Government’s last general elections in 1992.Chapter 17 dealt with the
> gathering storm that already undermined the castle ofsand that was the
> PPP Government as its incompetent hubris was about to catchup with
> destiny. As earlier mentioned, Journeyfor Justice ended, at chapter 18,
> with “1994Coup D’etat – Postcript”.
>  
> Viewed in the round, Journey for Justice is an excellent bookespecially
> in terms of the sheer volume of cogent factual information. From
> apurely intellectual perspective, the analysis equally passes muster,
> but here thereader must remain alert to Hassan’s understandable
> partiality. In the face ofoverwhelming evidence of runaway corruption,
> Hassan consistently questions thevalidity of any such contention.
> Indeed, the Bishop of Banjul, the Rt ReverendMichael Cleary, attacked
> “bribery”, “corruption”, “greed” and “an appallinglack of
> accountability ... fast taking root in the country” p594-6. In
> hiswords, there were “disturbing signs that the good name which the
> country hasfor upholding justice is being rapidly eroded. Hardly a week
> passed by withoutreports of a financial scandal in government,
> parastatal bodies or businesscircles”. 
>  
> Outside PPP circles, BishopCleary’s view was the consensus in the
> country.  and the evidence supporting it wasoverwhelming. But Hassan
> thought otherwise. “As a lawyer when I spoke ofcorruption I did so in a
> technical legal sense which is different from the offencesof theft or
> embezzlement of public funds and property”. p597. He continued:
>           
> Iam mindful that the opposition NCP and others made much noise about
> corruption
> andits rising levels. But when challenged to identify specific cases to
> the policeor
> theAttorney General they were noticeably short of any concrete
> information. One
> developedthe impression that the opposition, in order to discredit the
> Government,
> merelylatched onto this popular anti-corruption slogan p.597-8
>  
> Contrary to Hassan’scontention elsewhere in Journey forJustice, it is
> irrelevant whether Government leadership was involved incorruption or
> not. Indeed, there was evidence of leadership-level corruptionyears
> before 1994, including in the Sanna Manneh saga. In any case,
> theGovernment had oversight responsibility for the public purse! There
> wascompelling evidence that Hassan’s government had no serious
> commitment to rootingout corruption.
>
>
> For example, when theAsset Evaluation Commission was launched by Fafa
> Mbai as Attorney General, hewas hounded out of Cabinet and himself
> dragged before the Commission. Accordingto Hassan, of the complaints
> lodged with the Commission, only Fafa’s came fromthe State House. “I
> believe all the complaints submitted to the Commissionerother than the
> one in respect of Fafa, which was forwarded by the office of
> thepresident, were filed by two individuals whose identity eventually
> became amatter of public knowledge in Banjul. With the result that they
> became theobject of private criminal prosecutions. And great dislike”
> p.300..  The two were charged with the now viral offenceof “giving
> false information to a public servant”, a PPP-era law!
>
>
> Who lodged Fafa’s file withthe President’s Office and why were two
> citizens prosecuted for doing the biddingof the Commission within its
> established operational framework? This was aperverse abuse of the
> Commission framework which was based on information fromthe public.  It
> stands to reason thatmembers of the public who volunteered information
> must be protected and asAttorney General, Hassan was duty bound to
> block the malicious privateprosecutions via the agency of the police
> power of the state.
>
>
> In explaining why thescheme was ultimately scrapped, he had this to
> say: “As time went on theCommission began to be faced with a
> credibility problem as the society, rightlyor wrongly, began to
> perceive the exercise as being manipulated and used as apolitical
> weapon targeted principally against the urban elite of a
> particularethnic group”. p. 300 Hassan offers no personal thoughts on
> this allegation ofwitch hunting but there was no question it was
> founded on utter fabrication.The victim “urban elite of a particular
> ethnic group” controlled the governmentand masterminded the sacking and
> subsequent humiliation of Fafa.
>
>
> Regardless of Hassan’sperspective, the PPP era was inseparable from the
> widespread corruption thattook such firm root in the country that
> ill-gotten gain was flaunted as thenorm. When the Special Criminal
> Court Bill was tabled in Parliament in 1979,then Attorney General M L
> Saho stated: “It is not alarming to say that thiscountry will be
> destroyed if this cancer is not arrested now. Me make noapologies for
> this Bill ... No stone would be left unturned in the fight toprotect
> the interest of the public from the rapacious mafia withinour society”
> p. 298. In 1980, “one Member of Parliament expressed the view thatmore
> stringent measures such as hand amputation ought to beintroduced” to
> stem the tide of runaway corruption. “A Parliamentary
> Secretary,addressing Government accounting personnel, was reported by
> the Gambia NewsBulletin of 10th July, 1980 to have suggested the
> firingsquad for embezzlers” p. 298.
>
>
> It was in this climateof mass disaffection with a do-nothing government
> that Kukoi emerged in 1981,and in which Fafa M’bai, Attorney General in
> 1982, shepherded the Evaluation ofAssets and Prevention of Corrupt
> Practices Bill” which “came into force on the31st of December 1982 as
> Act No. 17 of 1982” p.298. We know whathappened to Fafa and his Act
> when the “rapaciousmafia” went to work on him.  It is noteven
> persuasive to contend that the “society” perceived “the exercise as
> beingmanipulated and used as a political weapon targeted principally
> against theurban elite of a particular ethnic group”. It was clearly a
> case of jaalo singo bey forango kang and this particulardevelopment was
> an utter stain on PPP’s willingness and, or, ability toeffectively
> discharge its responsibilities as overall manager of our public purse.
>
>
> Aside the PPPGovernment’s principal and ultimately fatal albatross of
> runaway corruption, therewere other instances of illiberal conduct that
> continue to negatively impactGambian public life some two decades after
> its demise.
>
>
> As Attorney General,Hassan embarked on extensive and useful law reform
> (see chapter 9 generally)but also came across as a man wedded to the
> law and order school, as someonewith a conservative philosophy of
> justice. It was ill-advised of the Governmentto sanction the “private
> prosecution” of the two individuals who providedinformation to the
> Commission regarding certain corrupt individuals. They appearto have
> acted within the framework established by the Government. And what
> wasthe charge? The now notorious offence of “giving false information
> to a public servant”that Professor Jammeh’s APRC government is
> utilising with reckless abandon againstthe innocent (see p 299). 
>
>
> There was also thesmall matter of Sana Manneh’s prosecution on
> allegations of criminallibel for fingering four ministers as corrupt.
> “I felt that this libelwas not an entirely private affair with the
> victims being left to instituteprivate legal proceedings to defend
> their integrity. They had been libelled intheir official capacity and
> it would be unfair to leave them on their own. Idecided to institute a
> case of criminal libel...” see p. 302-10 generally. Soundsfamiliar?
> Absolutely! Criminal libel/defamation is now apotent weapon against the
> journalism profession. Ala Hassan, Sana Mannehultimately won “on a
> technicality”. What is law without its “technical”baggage! As we say,
> process is everything!
>
>
> In the legislativedomain, there was the treason regime that excluded
> the overt act requirementand introduced the elastic conspiracy element
> thus creating vast room forabuse. “Thus it was that on the 26th of
> March, 1986 I moved theHouse for a second reading ... There was no
> debate on the Bill, I supposethe members were satisfied by my
> explanation of its contents. It wentthrough Committee stage and its
> third reading, received the Presidential Assentand came into force as
> Act No. 8/86” p. 234. Extraordinary considering theHouse just passed
> the ultimate political offence without a word of debate! Whendealing
> with a parliament of this nature, an Attorney General placed as
> Hassan,was duty bound to utilise a heighten regime of self-restraint.
> That was notevident in the treason legislation when parliament
> completely dropped the ball!
>
>
> On the issue ofpersonal law affecting Muslim inheritance, he oversaw
> the legislative scrapping(see section 30 of the Wills Act 1992) of the
> laudable Court of Appeal decisionin Saidy v Saidy “that a Muslim
> whomakes a will in the English form in contravention of the Islamic
> rules ofinheritance is deemed to have opted out of the Islamic law of
> succession”, andthat “his will must thus be given effect, despite the
> conflict with hispersonal law” p. 247.
>
>
> Other instances of thisapparent law and order fixation manifested
> themselves in the relationshipbetween politicians and the army. In June
> 1991, there was a mutiny by a“contingent of soldiers of The Gambia
> National Army” staged at MacCarthy Squareover payment of allowances for
> peacekeeping operations in Liberia whichincident the government
> regarded “as a gross act of indiscipline” p 426-27.  Colonel Ndow Njie
> was consequently retired p.428, Major Maba Jobe was put in charge, and
> Nigerian soldiers under Major Dadawere brought in. “In a separate
> development, the IGP Sidney Riley called me onMonday 5th August 1991 to
> tell me he too had been requested to leave...” p. 429. President Jawara
> didn’t bother to inform his Cabinet about Rileyand the Nigerians!
>
>
> A similar mutiny, andover the same complaint of unpaid allowances
> occurred on 03 February,1992.  Hassan was away in Bansang butwhen he
> returned, he agreed, on a phone conversation with Sir Dawda “on theneed
> for firm action to be taken this time against the mutineers.
> Somedeterrent action was called for to discourage a recurrence and put
> an end tothis serious and dangerous indiscipline within our armed
> forces” p. 479-80. “Fourmonths after the Army incident in February, the
> Acting Army Commander MajorMaba Jobe was compulsorily and prematurely
> retired from the Army at the tenderage of 30!” p. 481. I wonder how the
> Government thought that “discipline” wastheirs to impose on the
> restless and officially armed segment of society.
>
>
> Journeyfor Justice is some 632 pages of vital factual andanalytical
> tour de force. There isplenty of material on internal PPP politics,
> including candidate selection forgeneral and other elections. The
> frequent cross carpeting from other parties tothe PPP is the clear
> culprit for the disgraceful section 91 (1) (d) of the
> 1997Constitution.  And there is a lot of informationon the MansaKonko
> Congress and the confusion occasioned by President Jawara’s
> bizarreannouncement of not standing as a candidate for president in
> 1992. It was utterchaos with grown men behaving as though no person in
> the party was capable of succeedingJawara. In government, it triggered
> the ill-informed and sycophantic ao-called CivilService memo on
> presidential succession.
>  
> There was the ruthless parliamentarymanoeuvring that, via a
> constitutional amendment, expelled P S Njie, and BubaBaldeh, from the
> House in 1972, and 1985 respectively p. 389. And the unfairelection
> processes that allowed use of government resources for
> politicalcampaigns, and made the Permanent Secretary of Local
> Government as Supervisorof Elections. Hassan kindly gave us his
> thoughts on presidential term limits,and considered the Daily Observer
> at the height of its glory as “subversive”.Poetic justice then that
> Kenneth Best was deported by the political authoritythat replaced the
> PPP. He gave us information on the banning and unbanning ofMOJA(G).His
> recollection conflicts with that of President Jawara on the issueof an
> amnesty for Kukoi! There is extensive literature on the
> SenegambiaConfederation but absent a perusal of the governing
> instrument, Hassan’sassertion that it did not trigger a referendum must
> be approached with some caution.
>
>
> Singaporisation? p. 564.A dream pure and simple considering Gambia and
> Singapore attained statehood thesame month of the same year, with
> virtually identical chances of surviving inthe global milieu they were
> born into. Lee Kuan Yew documented Singapore’s extraordinaryjourney in
> his memoirs From Third World to First. WhatSingaporisation required was
> way beyond the mediocre capacity of Hassan’sGovernment. What utter joke
> that was!
>
>
> Notwithstanding that Journey for Justice ended with the PPP’soverthrow,
> Hassan exceptionally touched on the controversial recent
> prisonerexecutions in light of the PPP’s abrogation of the death
> penalty in 1993. Herecalled the parliamentary debates on the issue:
>
>
>           The member forNiamina, Lamin Waa Juwara, supported the motion
> and then
> propheticallyproposed that while Sir Dawda, an acknowledged humanist
> was still
> around, it was bestthat the abolition of the death penalty be
> entrenched into the
> Constitution, lestsome future leader of a different inclination were to
> reactivate
> its application.How prophetic indeed!p. 347
>    
> What a difference inWaa Juwara’s perspectives between 1993 and 2012!
>
>
> Not to succumb to WaaJuwara’s firepower in the prophecy department,
> Hassan, in final chapterreflections, mused on the teachings of the
> ArabSpring:
>          
> Thepolicy of opposition to unconstitutional changes of government,
> commendable
> andnecessary as it is, is not meant to provide a licence or sanctuary
> and security
> todictatorship. If one important lesson is to be drawn from the ‘Arab
> spring’ –largely
> playedout on African soil in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it is this: that
> no amount
> ofintimidation, repression and security systems can forever deny the
> peoplesyearning
> forjustice, freedom and respect for human rights and that in the face
> ofpersistent
> systematicoppression and dictatorship, the people will, in the absence
> of effective
> avenuesfor redress, exercise their ultimate right of rebellion against
> dictatorship p. 619.
>  
> Howvery true!
>  
> Comparedto what replaced it, the PPP Government was quite mild compared
> to itsreplacement. Would we still have the PPP in one form or the other
> without 22July? It is entirely possible but that would be a degrading
> prospect for anindependent country. No matter how tragic our present
> condition, who says lifeis an easy passage. A government that collapsed
> so spectacularly without somuch as a shot fired did not deserve to be
> saved. Good riddance PPP!
>  
> Without question,Hassan belongs to that rare breed of Gambian lawyer
> whose preoccupation is not merelywith black letter law and its
> technical application, i.e., theft as offence,its elements, and
> questions of guilt or innocence.  From my reading of Journey for
> Justice, his understanding of law and its publicpurpose is far deeper
> and more visionary. This is not to say Hassan’sphilosophical window on
> public life as of 1994 represents my ideal standard. Thereis ample room
> for reasonable people to analytically disagree from reading thesame set
> of factual circumstances. And it is imperative we remember the PPP
> eraas belonging more in the contemporary sphere than in ancient
> history,especially for those Gambians who were in secondary school as
> of 1994.
>
>
> Nevertheless, Journey for Justice assures that Hassan’swill remain
> among the abiding public voices on the PPP era. He is a third of
> atriumvirate of higher level political operatives within the PPP
> Government whosesolid intellectual credentials will remain a challenge
> to contrasting views onthe era. The other one is President Jawara
> himself! Isn’t the third obvious?
>
>
> Although there isindeed a lot of it, Journey for Justiceis not merely
> about law. It is more of a political memoir with the law therein
> arguablyincidental to Hassan’s career as a Law Officer from 1976, and
> as Chief LawOfficer between 1984 and 1994. Do not merely congratulate
> Hassan for writing Journey for Justice. Purchase this significantbook
> on Gambian public life.
>
>
> I recommend it highly!
>
>
> Among other outlets, Journey for Justice can be purchasedfrom the
> publisher, AuthorHouse, and from Amazon
>  
>
>
>
>
> Lamin J Darbo
>
>
> 01 January 2013 
>
>
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