LJD,

Thanks for sharing Alagi Yorro Jallow's piece. Interesting read.

Best,
Mboge

On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 at 11:37 PM, Lamin Darbo <[log in to unmask]>wrote:

> All
>
> A sober, fair, pragmatic and topical perspective on Pan Africanism and the
> African governance debate by Alagi Yorro Jallow
>
>
>
>
> LJDarbo.
>
>
> Pan African Debate: Comparative Study of Leadership and Governance by
> Africa’s Founding Fathers:
> March 8, 2013 - News <http://gainako.com/?cat=1> - no comments<http://gainako.com/?p=248#respond>
> *[image: untitled]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/untitled1.png>
> *
> *By Alagi Yorro Jallow*
> *An Examination of Their Contributions, Policies and Philosophies*
> As founding fathers, the first generation of nationalist leaders—Kwame
> Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, Jomo
> Kenyatta and Leopold Senghor—all enjoyed great prestige and high honor.
> They were seen to personify the states they led and swiftly took advantage
> of their positions to consolidate their control. From the outset, most
> sought a monopoly of power, and most established a system of personal rule
> and encouraged personality cults. They saw themselves as the “elected of
> God through the people.” Conversely, Sir Seretse Khama, Sir Seewoosagur
> Ramgoolam, and Nelson Mandela  led their nations democratically when they
> could have aggregated personal power.
> [image: kwame_nkrumah]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/kwame_nkrumah.jpg>Apart
> from Mandela, Khama and Ramgoolam, African leaders and elites did not
> establish political systems that bore any resemblance to indigenous
> systems. They inherited an authoritarian colonial state at independence,
> and though they could have dismantled it and returned Africa to its roots,
> they did not. Instead, these leaders strengthened the unitary colonial
> state apparatus and expanded its scope–especially the military.
> By the end of the 1980s, not a single African head of state in three
> decades had allowed himself to be voted out of office. Out of some 150
> heads of state who had trodden the African stage, only six had managed to
> voluntarily relinquish power. Among these were Senegal’s Leopold
> Senghor,after twenty years in office,Cameroon’s Ahmadu Ahidjo,after twenty
> years in office,and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere,after twenty-three years in
> office. The Gambia’s Sir Dawda Jawara was in power for 30 years and was
> then booted out by the military. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela served
> only one term in the presidency, whereas some African leaders clung to
> power until death and others declared themselves presidents for life.
> [image: Kenyatta]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Kenyatta.png>
> One of the greatest common characteristics of the founding fathers of
> Africa is that all of them attended prestigious universities in Africa,
> America, Europe or the Soviet Union and attained advanced degrees. Some of
> them became politicians by design because most of them had their
> professional careers.Moreover, most of them also authored books about their
> diverse political, economic and social philosophies.
> Most African political systems have exhibited various shades of the “Big
> Man” patrimonial rule. Three distinct types of leadership surfaced in the
> post-colonial era. The first type was the charismatic leadership style,
> which was associated with such leaders as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Jawara, Kaunda,
> Khama and Kenyatta.Their support was based largely on popular appeal of
> their appeal of their  role in the decolonization struggle . As Chazan et
> al. (1992) put it, “Charismatic personalities tended to emerge in
> situations of political uncertainty and social fluidity. The political
> style fostered is consequently autocratic. Leaders of this sort chose to
> dominate rather than compromise, to dictate rather than to reconcile.
> Charismatic leaders in Africa therefore bore the external trappings of
> omnipotence. In the case of Nkrumah of Ghana, it was exaggerated to the
> point of endowing the leader with godlike attributes” (162). Africa has its
> democrats and democracies, its despots and despotisms, a few kings (and no
> queens), some military rulers, and soldiers who have become born-again
> democrats (Rotberg, 2007).[image: Mandela]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Mandela.png>
> The second type of political leadership was the patriarchal, exemplified
> in such leaders as Jomo Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda, Khama, Senghor Jawara
>  and Nkrumah.They acted as the “father of the nation,” and their style was
> that of adjudicator, conciliator, instigator and peacemaker. As fatherly
> figures, they expected to be revered. Although they seldom became embroiled
> in the conspiracies of daily political maneuvering, they could play one
> group against another to their advantage and even co-opt opposition
> members. In the initial stages of their rule, they were trusted and
> accorded a godlike devotion because it was assumed by the general populace
> that whatever they did was in their country’s best interest.
> The third type of leader, revolutionary or populist prophetic also emerged
> as near-perfect clones of earlier-day charismatic leaders. They were
> impatient and angry at the appalling social misery, economic mismanagement
> and flagrant injustices in their countries. Examples of this type of leader
> are,Nkrumah,Nyerere,Kenyatta,Kaunda, Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia and John
> Rawlings of Ghana. As Chazan et al. (1992) noted, African dictators chose a
> method of rule that was domineering and, at times, sultanic. The state was
> their private domain—the people and resources were at their disposal. There
> was no distinction between private ambitions and public goods. Anyone who
> opposed their political stronghold was eliminated; repression and violence
> replaced entreaties, cajolery, or emotional fervor. These leaders
> maintained and enjoyed a strongman image—warriorlike, defiant and
> ultimately invincible (167).[image: Biko]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Biko.png>
> In one country after another, African leaders acted in contempt of
> constitutional rules and agreements they had sworn to uphold to enhance
> their own power. Constitutions were either amended or rewritten or simply
> ignored. Checks and balances were removed. Kwame Nkrumah’s first amendment
> to the constitution—the abolishing regional assemblies—was introduced only
> two years after the country had gained independence.
> In these African leaders’ quest for greater control, the device they
> commonly favored was the one-party system. In some cases, one-party systems
> were achieved by popular vote. In East Africa, Nyerere’s Tanganyika African
> National Union won all open seats in parliament in 1960. In other nations,
> one-party systems were arranged by negotiation, where opposition parties
> accepted a merger with ruling parties. In Kenya in 1964, Kenyatta persuaded
> opposition politicians from the Kenya African Democratic Union to cross the
> floor and take up prominent posts in the government. There were many other
> examples, however, of instances where one-party systems were imposed simply
> by suppressing opposition parties, as occurred in Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia
> and Zambia. When opposing parties did exist, one-party domination was
> sustained by the incumbent using state resources and various control
> mechanisms to stay in power—suppressing the opposition, rigging elections
> and altering the country’s constitution. Institutional failure of stable
> and genuine multi-party systems to take root presents one of the most
> serious challenges to democratic politics in Africa. The forces which favor
> authoritarianism and one-party domination are very strong.
> There were many arguments used to justify the one-party system. New states
> facing so many challenges, it was said, needed strong governments, which
> were best served by concentrating authority to a single, nationwide party.
> Multi-party politics, it was argued, usually deteriorated into competition
> between tribal blocs and alliances. Some African leaders argued that
> opposition parties were in fact alien to African practice and that a
> one-party system, if properly managed, provided a democratic outlet just as
> adequately as did a multi-party system.
> Julius Nyerere was one of the most eloquent advocates of a one-party
> system. He maintained that the two-party system had evolved in the West as
> a result of competition between socioeconomic classes. But since African
> society was essentially classless, there was no basis for two parties, and
> parliamentary systems of the kind bequeathed to Africa by Europe’s
> departing colonial powers were misplaced. Nyerere was widely regarded as a
> leader of outstanding ability whose personal integrity and modest lifestyle
> was in sharp contrast to the extravagance and corruption for which other
> African presidents had generally become known. He possessed both genuine
> concern for egalitarianism and intense dislike for all forms of elitism. He
> dressed simply, took no interest in the spoils of leadership or possession
> and pursued his objectives with missionary zeal. His intellectual energy
> was formidable. Articulating his socialist ideals with great clarity, he
> became the most influential thinker and writer in Africa of his time.
> Throughout Nyerere’s tenure as president, few in Tanzania questioned the
> course on which he had embarked. It was held to be a matter of ideological
> faith. Under Nyerere’s one-party system, parliament remained important, but
> the press was muzzled. Nyerere himself was by no means averse to using
> Tanzania’s Preventive Detention Act to silence political critics, and
> Tanzania for many years remained high on the list of African countries with
> political prisoners.
> Nyerere claimed his socialist ideology was based on African cultural
> traditions. He castigated capitalism, or the money economy, because he
> believed it encouraged individual acquisitiveness and economic competition.
> He insisted that Tanzania be transformed into a nation of small-scale
> communalists. Nyerere conceived *“Ujamaa*” as a sort of extension, into
> the national and even international realm, of the traditional African
> extended family. Unfortunately, *Ujamaa *became a failed economic
> philosophy that brought unparalleled poverty to the people of Tanzania.
> In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah’s ambition soared above that of all others. Having
> successfully challenged the might of British rule in Africa and opened the
> way to independence for a score of other African countries, he saw himself
> as a messianic leader destined to play an even greater role. At home he
> wanted to transform Ghana into an industrial power, a center of learning, a
> model socialist society which other states would want to emulate. He also
> dreamed of making Africa a giant—in economic, political and military
> terms—as united and as powerful as the United States or the Soviet Union,
> with himself as leader. Believing himself to posses unique ability, capable
> of achieving for Africa what Marx and Lenin had done for Europe and Mao
> Tse-tung for China, he created an official ideology, calling it *
> Nkrumahism*. *Nkrumahism* was a complex political and social philosophy
> to which Nkrumah would add from time to time. After a few years, it was
> said to be based on “*scientific socialism*” (Martin,2005).
> A proliferation of socialist ideologies emerged in postcolonial Africa in
> the early 1960s. Doctrinaire socialism, however, was eschewed. Many African
> leaders spurned becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union or China.
> Socialism in Africa was to be a distinctive ideology based on the
> continent’s unique social and cultural traditions. Nkrumah of Ghana is
> widely regarded as the father of African socialism. Kaunda also espoused
> his own model of socialism, called *“Christian socialism*,” and humanism.
> Dawda Jawara too created his own philosophy, “*Tesito,*” meaning
> self-reliant. Leopold Senghor came up with another philosophy*, Negritude*,
> or cultural liberation.
> In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda’s regime was more benign, but he was equally
> adamant about the merits of one-party rule and his own leadership, despite
> a catastrophic record of economic mismanagement over twenty-five years in
> office. When Kaunda came up for reelection in 1988, a former minister,
> Sikota Wina, complained: “It is impossible to run against Kaunda. It is a
> watertight system to produce one candidate. There is no way in which anyone
> can actually challenge the president” (Martin,2005). An emotional man,
> Kaunda was prone to weeping in public and habitually carried a white linen
> handkerchief woven tightly between his fingers of the left hand. His
> speeches were laced with quotations from the Bible and he constantly
> referred to his philosophy of* Humanism*, on which he published two
> volumes. But while espousing deep Christian principles, he was not averse
> to detaining dissidents without trial. A U.S. State Department report on
> human rights in Zambia noted: “There are credible allegations that police
> and military personnel have resorted to excessive force when interviewing
> detainees or prisoners. Alleged abuses, include beatings, withholding of
> food, pain inflicted on various parts of the body, long periods of solitary
> confinement and threats of executions” (p.381).
> Jomo Kenyatta’s career as a political activist had been one of the most
> adventurous of all nationalist leaders in Africa. Born in about 1896,
> educated by missionaries at the Church of Scotland headquarters near
> Nairobi, he had taken sundry jobs before becoming a full-time general
> secretary of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), a  pressure group of
> Kikuyu nationalists established to campaign over land grievances.
> Kenyatta’s forceful personality, his powers of oration and his flamboyant
> manner soon captivated the crowds who flocked to listen to him. His aim was
> to develop the KAC into a truly national movement. His leadership had won
> the favor of the largely Kikuyu tribe. He was another dictator with utmost
> power; he was ruthless in dealing with any challenge to his authority. Once
> a Moscow-trained revolutionary himself, he accused Oginga Odinga’s faction
> of harboring communist allegiances. Kenyatta, like his Pan-African
> colleagues, portrayed the opposition as subversive and tribalistic. In 1960
> Odinga was arrested and his party banned. Once again Kenya became a
> one-party state. Kenyatta’s regime, like those of Kaunda and Nkrumah,
> resorted to the killing and elimination of political opponents just to
> entrench his rule.
> Kenyatta’s capitalist strategy aroused fierce dissension within Kenya’s
> one-party system. A former Mau Mau leader, Bildad Kaggia, attacked the
> government for allowing land to pass into the hands of individual Africans,
> some of whom were able to amass considerable landholdings. In spite of his
> training in Moscow, Kenyatta adhered to capitalist policies, encouraging
> both indigenous private enterprise and foreign investment. In the fifteen
> years that he presided over Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta enjoyed immense authority.
> Even critics of his government accorded him due respect. In his old age he
> ruled not so much by exercising direct control over the government as by
> holding court with an inner circle of loyal ministers and officials,
> predominantly Kikuyu from his home district of Kiambu, whom he entrusted
> with the administration of the country. He was accused of being a betrayer
> to those who fought for the liberation of Kenya.  In his book *suffering
> without Bitterness*, published in 1968 when he was president, he was even
> more forthright in denouncing the Mau Mau.
> Jomo Kenyatta delighted in displays of dancing, and he spent many evenings
> watching entertainers dancing. He himself performed expertly as a dancer
> until he suffered from a heart attack in 1972, six years before his death.
> In his appreciation for music and dance, he can only be compared to Nelson
> Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, and also President Leopold Senghor, who really
> cherished cultural folk music.
> Following in Ghana’s, Zambia’s, and Kenya’s footsteps, Britain’s other
> territories in West Africa—Nigeria, Sierra Leone and even the tiny sliver
> of land known as The Gambia, a miniature colony consisting of little more
> than two river banks—made their way up the independence ladder. For more
> than a quarter of a century, The Gambia was one of sub-Saharan Africa’s
> longest-standing multiparty democracies. It was perceived (along with
> Botswana and Mauritius) as an “exception” on an African continent where
> authoritarianism and military regimes have been the norm. Apart from the
> aborted coup of 1981, the Gambia had enjoyed relative peace and stability
> since it attained independence from Britain in 1965. Unfortunately, the
> Gambia became a political casualty when a military coup led by 29-year-old
> Lt. Yahya Jammeh ended the oldest democracy, headed by Dawda Jawara, in
> 1994.
> Dawda Jawara was unlike Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and Seretse Khama,
> who had hailed from noble families, sons of tribal chiefs or kings. Jawara,
> on the other hand, had his origin as a member of a cobbler caste, the
> lowest caste in the Gambia. Nevertheless, because of his humble beginnings,
> he was looked upon favorably by some within the party and the electorate
> who claimed to, or in fact did,come from royal background . Thus, the issue
> of caste became less important because Jawara was among the few educated
> Gambians with a university degree at that time. He also originated from the
> largest Mandinka tribe.
> Post-independence politics in the Gambia is inextricably tied into the
> life and personality of Dawda Jawara, the first president. On assuming
> leadership of the Gambia, Jawara built up a political system based on a
> free-market capitalist economy, which was also founded on democratic
> principles of protection of human rights and freedoms. Jawara also crafted
> a pro-Western foreign policy which generated a great deal of respect for
> him within the international community. Moreover, he brought in a
> substantial amount of much-needed foreign aid. Functioning with a
> multiparty legislature, the Gambia under Jawara evinced all the
> characteristics of a formal democracy. There were opposition parties, an
> independent and free press, an independent judiciary, a parliament with
> freely and fairly elected representatives, and a large private sector in
> the economy.
> When analyzed, it could be said that the Gambia’s political history under
> the leadership of Jawara was smooth, but with occasional volcanic
> eruptions. Despite its democratic reputation and impressive human rights
> records, the country’s socioeconomic performance under Dawda Jawara was
> poor; living standards were some of the lowest in the continent (ranking
> 165 out of 177). Politics in Africa, especially during the 1960s and 1970s
> and early 1980s, tended to be dominated by one-party dictatorship and
> repressive military regimes, yet The Gambia under Dawda Jawara always
> maintained multi-party democracy,respect for rule of law and the protection
> of human rights and regurarity of elections.Sir Dawda’s liberal oligarchies
> and bourgeouis democracy,rampant corruption  and over stayed in power
> dented his record in sharp contrast to Khama and Mandela.
> Under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama, multiparty democracy in
> Botswana, contrary to the claims by Jomo Kenyatta, Nyerere, Nkrumah and
> Kaunda, did not degenerate into “tribal politics.” Rather Botswana, unlike
> many African nations, enjoys political stability. Yet this stability was
> not engineered by a military dictator or by declaring the country to be a
> one-party state. Botswana is a parliamentary democracy based upon a
> multi-party system. The main political parties are the ruling Botswana
> Democratic Party, the Botswana National Front, and the Botswana People’s
> Party.
> Botswana has pursued strikingly prudent economic policies, allowing
> pragmatism, rather than emotional rhetoric, to prevail. The Botswana
> government under Seretse Khama is committed to a mixed economy which has
> not been directed toward nationalization—no such takeovers have
> occurred—but rather towards the provision of good infrastructural support.
> Seretse Khama ‘s legacy was similar to that of Dawda Jawara, but in
> contrast to that of Neyerere, Kaunda and Nkrumah, it was characterized by
> openness and a vibrant press, and there was a refreshing absence of
> corruption (unlike the Gambian government under Dawda Jawara). Botswana has
> been the bane of many African regimes. It has a lively free press and
> freedom of expression. The local publications are not subject to
> censorship, unlike in Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana, where the government
> controlled the private and public media and the public media is used as a
> government propaganda tool. Botswana can find solutions to its economic
> problems because it permits free debate and freedom of expression. By
> contrast, the rest of Black Africa is mired in an economic quagmire because
> of the want of ideas and solutions to extricate itself. Intellectual
> repression prevents those with ideas from coming forward. With the
> exception of Botswana, Senegal and the Gambia, the remaining African states
> cannot tolerate freedom of expression and criticism of foolish government
> policies. Sir Seretse, because of his background as a son of a traditional
> African chief, ensured that Botswana’s indigenous roots were maintained.
> Furthermore, in Botswana, chiefs still exercise considerable local
> authority and influence, which can act as a check on too-precipitate action
> by the government and can even swing local elections. This is in stark
> contrast to most African countries, where chiefs saw their powers and
> authority reduced after post-colonial independence.
> Seretse Khama, like Dawda Jawara, and Ramgoolam, preached the gospel of
> inclusive democracy, and he aptly showed his commitment to democratic
> principles. Khama had no intention of adopting dictatorial methods of
> leadership. His brand of democracy was rare in all of Southern Africa. He
> proved that the claim made by colonial governments that Africans do not
> understand the importance of democratic practices was false. One of the
> values of Seretse Khama that is different from those of his colleagues is
> that he utilized the principles of inclusiveness in the process of
> designing national policy and implementing national programs. He is also
> different from those of his colleagues who don’t tolerate divergent views
> and ideas, as he values diversity of ideas and tolerance of different
> points of view on national issues.
> Dr.Kenneth Kaunda, twice jailed by the British authorities, referred
> proudly to the fact that independence in Zambia had been achieved without
> bitterness. Kwame Nkrumah was also jailed by the British because they
> suspected him of committing subversive activities, and Jomo Kenyatta was
> jailed for inciting violence during his alleged involvement in the Mau Mau
> movement. Seretse Khama was not jailed by the British, but he was banished
> from Buchuanaland because of his marriage to an English woman. When he
> became president of Botswana, he was deeply attached to the British. Sir
> Dawda Jawara and Sir Seretse Khama were both knighted by the British in
> 1966. Kenyatta has one of the most poignant statements about the British,
> “Our law, our system of government and many other aspects of  our daily
> lives are founded on British principle and Justice.(Martin,2005).
> Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the first leader of Mauritius, operated under
> the same internalized leadership codes as Sir Seretse. Ramgoolam was more
> explicit in charting his vision, however—much in the manner of Lee Kuan Yew
> of Singapore. Ramgoolam was able to give Mauritius a robust democratic
> beginning that has been sustained by a series of wise successors from
> different backgrounds and parties (Rotberg ,2007). Both Khama and Ramgoolam
> could have emulated many of their contemporaries in establishing strong,
> single-man, kleptocratic regimes. They refused to do so, in the process
> demonstrating that positive leadership does make a difference.
> Likewise, without Nelson Mandela’s capable leadership, South Africa after
> 1994 would have emerged from the cauldron of apartheid more fractured and
> autocratic. Mandela’s vision dictated vigorous adherence to a comprehensive
> rule of law, a broadening of the essential services  and a slow shift away
> from the existing command economy toward one that was market driven
> (Rothberg, 2007). Nelson Mandela’s era of presidency was a moment of
> liberation that was felt around the world. Mandela was once asked how
> different was the man who emerged from prison after twenty-seven years. He
> replied, with characteristic brevity, “I came out mature” (Martin,2005).
> Mandela disliked talking about himself and allowed few glimpses into his
> personal thoughts or emotions. The years of imprisonment had turned him
> into an intensely private person.
> Mandela was determined never to lose sight of the goal of nonracial
> democracy, believing that whites’ fear of Blacks in government positions
> could eventually be overcome. The example he set was of profound
> importance. He emerged from prison and insisted on reconciliation, which
> undermined the demands of those seeking revenge and retribution. His
> generosity of spirit also had a profound impact on his white adversaries,
> earning him measures of trust and confidence that laid the foundations for
> political stability. His inspired leadership proved critical both in
> launching a new society atop the ashes of the old and in implanting a
> culture of good governance and democracy (Rothberg, 2007). It was Mandela’s
> leadership that many attributed to achieving liberation. The transfer of
> power was accomplished in an atmosphere of much goodwill and brought with
> it the closing of an era of three centuries of white rule.
> South Africa could not have moved so rapidly to a democracy without
> Mandela’s instinctive, open gift for harmony over disorder and democracy
> over authoritarianism (Rothberg 2007). If Mandela had not set South Africa
> firmly on a path toward good governance, it is possible that Mbeki’s
> centralizing tendencies would have unraveled the concord between classes
> and colors that Mandela had forged during his presidency.
> Though their styles of leadership were vastly different, these African
> leaders, riding the crest of popularity, all stepped forward with energy
> and enthusiasm to tackle the task of development and nation-building.
> Ambitious plans were launched, and expectations were high. The march of
> African nationalism seemed invincible. Leadership that emerged after
> independence was characterized by pretentious, megalomaniacal venality. In
> other places the leadership dogmatically embraced alien revolutionary
> ideals, assumed the trappings of foreign cultures, and misperceived the
> process of development. The irony was that many African leaders came to
> assume some of the very same characteristics they so loudly denounced in
> the colonialists, imperialists, and those who were racist. There were only
> a few men—namely Mandela, Khama and Ramgoolam—who became servants of their
> people by addressing the needs and aspirations of their people without
> contempt and putting the needs and wishes of their people above their own
> desire for power.
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