LJD, Thanks for sharing Alagi Yorro Jallow's piece. Interesting read. Best, Mboge On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 at 11:37 PM, Lamin Darbo <[log in to unmask]>wrote: > All > > A sober, fair, pragmatic and topical perspective on Pan Africanism and the > African governance debate by Alagi Yorro Jallow > > > > > LJDarbo. > > > Pan African Debate: Comparative Study of Leadership and Governance by > Africa’s Founding Fathers: > March 8, 2013 - News <http://gainako.com/?cat=1> - no comments<http://gainako.com/?p=248#respond> > *[image: untitled]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/untitled1.png> > * > *By Alagi Yorro Jallow* > *An Examination of Their Contributions, Policies and Philosophies* > As founding fathers, the first generation of nationalist leaders—Kwame > Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, Jomo > Kenyatta and Leopold Senghor—all enjoyed great prestige and high honor. > They were seen to personify the states they led and swiftly took advantage > of their positions to consolidate their control. From the outset, most > sought a monopoly of power, and most established a system of personal rule > and encouraged personality cults. They saw themselves as the “elected of > God through the people.” Conversely, Sir Seretse Khama, Sir Seewoosagur > Ramgoolam, and Nelson Mandela led their nations democratically when they > could have aggregated personal power. > [image: kwame_nkrumah]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/kwame_nkrumah.jpg>Apart > from Mandela, Khama and Ramgoolam, African leaders and elites did not > establish political systems that bore any resemblance to indigenous > systems. They inherited an authoritarian colonial state at independence, > and though they could have dismantled it and returned Africa to its roots, > they did not. Instead, these leaders strengthened the unitary colonial > state apparatus and expanded its scope–especially the military. > By the end of the 1980s, not a single African head of state in three > decades had allowed himself to be voted out of office. Out of some 150 > heads of state who had trodden the African stage, only six had managed to > voluntarily relinquish power. Among these were Senegal’s Leopold > Senghor,after twenty years in office,Cameroon’s Ahmadu Ahidjo,after twenty > years in office,and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere,after twenty-three years in > office. The Gambia’s Sir Dawda Jawara was in power for 30 years and was > then booted out by the military. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela served > only one term in the presidency, whereas some African leaders clung to > power until death and others declared themselves presidents for life. > [image: Kenyatta]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Kenyatta.png> > One of the greatest common characteristics of the founding fathers of > Africa is that all of them attended prestigious universities in Africa, > America, Europe or the Soviet Union and attained advanced degrees. Some of > them became politicians by design because most of them had their > professional careers.Moreover, most of them also authored books about their > diverse political, economic and social philosophies. > Most African political systems have exhibited various shades of the “Big > Man” patrimonial rule. Three distinct types of leadership surfaced in the > post-colonial era. The first type was the charismatic leadership style, > which was associated with such leaders as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Jawara, Kaunda, > Khama and Kenyatta.Their support was based largely on popular appeal of > their appeal of their role in the decolonization struggle . As Chazan et > al. (1992) put it, “Charismatic personalities tended to emerge in > situations of political uncertainty and social fluidity. The political > style fostered is consequently autocratic. Leaders of this sort chose to > dominate rather than compromise, to dictate rather than to reconcile. > Charismatic leaders in Africa therefore bore the external trappings of > omnipotence. In the case of Nkrumah of Ghana, it was exaggerated to the > point of endowing the leader with godlike attributes” (162). Africa has its > democrats and democracies, its despots and despotisms, a few kings (and no > queens), some military rulers, and soldiers who have become born-again > democrats (Rotberg, 2007).[image: Mandela]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Mandela.png> > The second type of political leadership was the patriarchal, exemplified > in such leaders as Jomo Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda, Khama, Senghor Jawara > and Nkrumah.They acted as the “father of the nation,” and their style was > that of adjudicator, conciliator, instigator and peacemaker. As fatherly > figures, they expected to be revered. Although they seldom became embroiled > in the conspiracies of daily political maneuvering, they could play one > group against another to their advantage and even co-opt opposition > members. In the initial stages of their rule, they were trusted and > accorded a godlike devotion because it was assumed by the general populace > that whatever they did was in their country’s best interest. > The third type of leader, revolutionary or populist prophetic also emerged > as near-perfect clones of earlier-day charismatic leaders. They were > impatient and angry at the appalling social misery, economic mismanagement > and flagrant injustices in their countries. Examples of this type of leader > are,Nkrumah,Nyerere,Kenyatta,Kaunda, Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia and John > Rawlings of Ghana. As Chazan et al. (1992) noted, African dictators chose a > method of rule that was domineering and, at times, sultanic. The state was > their private domain—the people and resources were at their disposal. There > was no distinction between private ambitions and public goods. Anyone who > opposed their political stronghold was eliminated; repression and violence > replaced entreaties, cajolery, or emotional fervor. These leaders > maintained and enjoyed a strongman image—warriorlike, defiant and > ultimately invincible (167).[image: Biko]<http://gainako.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Biko.png> > In one country after another, African leaders acted in contempt of > constitutional rules and agreements they had sworn to uphold to enhance > their own power. Constitutions were either amended or rewritten or simply > ignored. Checks and balances were removed. Kwame Nkrumah’s first amendment > to the constitution—the abolishing regional assemblies—was introduced only > two years after the country had gained independence. > In these African leaders’ quest for greater control, the device they > commonly favored was the one-party system. In some cases, one-party systems > were achieved by popular vote. In East Africa, Nyerere’s Tanganyika African > National Union won all open seats in parliament in 1960. In other nations, > one-party systems were arranged by negotiation, where opposition parties > accepted a merger with ruling parties. In Kenya in 1964, Kenyatta persuaded > opposition politicians from the Kenya African Democratic Union to cross the > floor and take up prominent posts in the government. There were many other > examples, however, of instances where one-party systems were imposed simply > by suppressing opposition parties, as occurred in Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia > and Zambia. When opposing parties did exist, one-party domination was > sustained by the incumbent using state resources and various control > mechanisms to stay in power—suppressing the opposition, rigging elections > and altering the country’s constitution. Institutional failure of stable > and genuine multi-party systems to take root presents one of the most > serious challenges to democratic politics in Africa. The forces which favor > authoritarianism and one-party domination are very strong. > There were many arguments used to justify the one-party system. New states > facing so many challenges, it was said, needed strong governments, which > were best served by concentrating authority to a single, nationwide party. > Multi-party politics, it was argued, usually deteriorated into competition > between tribal blocs and alliances. Some African leaders argued that > opposition parties were in fact alien to African practice and that a > one-party system, if properly managed, provided a democratic outlet just as > adequately as did a multi-party system. > Julius Nyerere was one of the most eloquent advocates of a one-party > system. He maintained that the two-party system had evolved in the West as > a result of competition between socioeconomic classes. But since African > society was essentially classless, there was no basis for two parties, and > parliamentary systems of the kind bequeathed to Africa by Europe’s > departing colonial powers were misplaced. Nyerere was widely regarded as a > leader of outstanding ability whose personal integrity and modest lifestyle > was in sharp contrast to the extravagance and corruption for which other > African presidents had generally become known. He possessed both genuine > concern for egalitarianism and intense dislike for all forms of elitism. He > dressed simply, took no interest in the spoils of leadership or possession > and pursued his objectives with missionary zeal. His intellectual energy > was formidable. Articulating his socialist ideals with great clarity, he > became the most influential thinker and writer in Africa of his time. > Throughout Nyerere’s tenure as president, few in Tanzania questioned the > course on which he had embarked. It was held to be a matter of ideological > faith. Under Nyerere’s one-party system, parliament remained important, but > the press was muzzled. Nyerere himself was by no means averse to using > Tanzania’s Preventive Detention Act to silence political critics, and > Tanzania for many years remained high on the list of African countries with > political prisoners. > Nyerere claimed his socialist ideology was based on African cultural > traditions. He castigated capitalism, or the money economy, because he > believed it encouraged individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. > He insisted that Tanzania be transformed into a nation of small-scale > communalists. Nyerere conceived *“Ujamaa*” as a sort of extension, into > the national and even international realm, of the traditional African > extended family. Unfortunately, *Ujamaa *became a failed economic > philosophy that brought unparalleled poverty to the people of Tanzania. > In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah’s ambition soared above that of all others. Having > successfully challenged the might of British rule in Africa and opened the > way to independence for a score of other African countries, he saw himself > as a messianic leader destined to play an even greater role. At home he > wanted to transform Ghana into an industrial power, a center of learning, a > model socialist society which other states would want to emulate. He also > dreamed of making Africa a giant—in economic, political and military > terms—as united and as powerful as the United States or the Soviet Union, > with himself as leader. Believing himself to posses unique ability, capable > of achieving for Africa what Marx and Lenin had done for Europe and Mao > Tse-tung for China, he created an official ideology, calling it * > Nkrumahism*. *Nkrumahism* was a complex political and social philosophy > to which Nkrumah would add from time to time. After a few years, it was > said to be based on “*scientific socialism*” (Martin,2005). > A proliferation of socialist ideologies emerged in postcolonial Africa in > the early 1960s. Doctrinaire socialism, however, was eschewed. Many African > leaders spurned becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union or China. > Socialism in Africa was to be a distinctive ideology based on the > continent’s unique social and cultural traditions. Nkrumah of Ghana is > widely regarded as the father of African socialism. Kaunda also espoused > his own model of socialism, called *“Christian socialism*,” and humanism. > Dawda Jawara too created his own philosophy, “*Tesito,*” meaning > self-reliant. Leopold Senghor came up with another philosophy*, Negritude*, > or cultural liberation. > In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda’s regime was more benign, but he was equally > adamant about the merits of one-party rule and his own leadership, despite > a catastrophic record of economic mismanagement over twenty-five years in > office. When Kaunda came up for reelection in 1988, a former minister, > Sikota Wina, complained: “It is impossible to run against Kaunda. It is a > watertight system to produce one candidate. There is no way in which anyone > can actually challenge the president” (Martin,2005). An emotional man, > Kaunda was prone to weeping in public and habitually carried a white linen > handkerchief woven tightly between his fingers of the left hand. His > speeches were laced with quotations from the Bible and he constantly > referred to his philosophy of* Humanism*, on which he published two > volumes. But while espousing deep Christian principles, he was not averse > to detaining dissidents without trial. A U.S. State Department report on > human rights in Zambia noted: “There are credible allegations that police > and military personnel have resorted to excessive force when interviewing > detainees or prisoners. Alleged abuses, include beatings, withholding of > food, pain inflicted on various parts of the body, long periods of solitary > confinement and threats of executions” (p.381). > Jomo Kenyatta’s career as a political activist had been one of the most > adventurous of all nationalist leaders in Africa. Born in about 1896, > educated by missionaries at the Church of Scotland headquarters near > Nairobi, he had taken sundry jobs before becoming a full-time general > secretary of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), a pressure group of > Kikuyu nationalists established to campaign over land grievances. > Kenyatta’s forceful personality, his powers of oration and his flamboyant > manner soon captivated the crowds who flocked to listen to him. His aim was > to develop the KAC into a truly national movement. His leadership had won > the favor of the largely Kikuyu tribe. He was another dictator with utmost > power; he was ruthless in dealing with any challenge to his authority. Once > a Moscow-trained revolutionary himself, he accused Oginga Odinga’s faction > of harboring communist allegiances. Kenyatta, like his Pan-African > colleagues, portrayed the opposition as subversive and tribalistic. In 1960 > Odinga was arrested and his party banned. Once again Kenya became a > one-party state. Kenyatta’s regime, like those of Kaunda and Nkrumah, > resorted to the killing and elimination of political opponents just to > entrench his rule. > Kenyatta’s capitalist strategy aroused fierce dissension within Kenya’s > one-party system. A former Mau Mau leader, Bildad Kaggia, attacked the > government for allowing land to pass into the hands of individual Africans, > some of whom were able to amass considerable landholdings. In spite of his > training in Moscow, Kenyatta adhered to capitalist policies, encouraging > both indigenous private enterprise and foreign investment. In the fifteen > years that he presided over Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta enjoyed immense authority. > Even critics of his government accorded him due respect. In his old age he > ruled not so much by exercising direct control over the government as by > holding court with an inner circle of loyal ministers and officials, > predominantly Kikuyu from his home district of Kiambu, whom he entrusted > with the administration of the country. He was accused of being a betrayer > to those who fought for the liberation of Kenya. In his book *suffering > without Bitterness*, published in 1968 when he was president, he was even > more forthright in denouncing the Mau Mau. > Jomo Kenyatta delighted in displays of dancing, and he spent many evenings > watching entertainers dancing. He himself performed expertly as a dancer > until he suffered from a heart attack in 1972, six years before his death. > In his appreciation for music and dance, he can only be compared to Nelson > Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, and also President Leopold Senghor, who really > cherished cultural folk music. > Following in Ghana’s, Zambia’s, and Kenya’s footsteps, Britain’s other > territories in West Africa—Nigeria, Sierra Leone and even the tiny sliver > of land known as The Gambia, a miniature colony consisting of little more > than two river banks—made their way up the independence ladder. For more > than a quarter of a century, The Gambia was one of sub-Saharan Africa’s > longest-standing multiparty democracies. It was perceived (along with > Botswana and Mauritius) as an “exception” on an African continent where > authoritarianism and military regimes have been the norm. Apart from the > aborted coup of 1981, the Gambia had enjoyed relative peace and stability > since it attained independence from Britain in 1965. Unfortunately, the > Gambia became a political casualty when a military coup led by 29-year-old > Lt. Yahya Jammeh ended the oldest democracy, headed by Dawda Jawara, in > 1994. > Dawda Jawara was unlike Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and Seretse Khama, > who had hailed from noble families, sons of tribal chiefs or kings. Jawara, > on the other hand, had his origin as a member of a cobbler caste, the > lowest caste in the Gambia. Nevertheless, because of his humble beginnings, > he was looked upon favorably by some within the party and the electorate > who claimed to, or in fact did,come from royal background . Thus, the issue > of caste became less important because Jawara was among the few educated > Gambians with a university degree at that time. He also originated from the > largest Mandinka tribe. > Post-independence politics in the Gambia is inextricably tied into the > life and personality of Dawda Jawara, the first president. On assuming > leadership of the Gambia, Jawara built up a political system based on a > free-market capitalist economy, which was also founded on democratic > principles of protection of human rights and freedoms. Jawara also crafted > a pro-Western foreign policy which generated a great deal of respect for > him within the international community. Moreover, he brought in a > substantial amount of much-needed foreign aid. Functioning with a > multiparty legislature, the Gambia under Jawara evinced all the > characteristics of a formal democracy. There were opposition parties, an > independent and free press, an independent judiciary, a parliament with > freely and fairly elected representatives, and a large private sector in > the economy. > When analyzed, it could be said that the Gambia’s political history under > the leadership of Jawara was smooth, but with occasional volcanic > eruptions. Despite its democratic reputation and impressive human rights > records, the country’s socioeconomic performance under Dawda Jawara was > poor; living standards were some of the lowest in the continent (ranking > 165 out of 177). Politics in Africa, especially during the 1960s and 1970s > and early 1980s, tended to be dominated by one-party dictatorship and > repressive military regimes, yet The Gambia under Dawda Jawara always > maintained multi-party democracy,respect for rule of law and the protection > of human rights and regurarity of elections.Sir Dawda’s liberal oligarchies > and bourgeouis democracy,rampant corruption and over stayed in power > dented his record in sharp contrast to Khama and Mandela. > Under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama, multiparty democracy in > Botswana, contrary to the claims by Jomo Kenyatta, Nyerere, Nkrumah and > Kaunda, did not degenerate into “tribal politics.” Rather Botswana, unlike > many African nations, enjoys political stability. Yet this stability was > not engineered by a military dictator or by declaring the country to be a > one-party state. Botswana is a parliamentary democracy based upon a > multi-party system. The main political parties are the ruling Botswana > Democratic Party, the Botswana National Front, and the Botswana People’s > Party. > Botswana has pursued strikingly prudent economic policies, allowing > pragmatism, rather than emotional rhetoric, to prevail. The Botswana > government under Seretse Khama is committed to a mixed economy which has > not been directed toward nationalization—no such takeovers have > occurred—but rather towards the provision of good infrastructural support. > Seretse Khama ‘s legacy was similar to that of Dawda Jawara, but in > contrast to that of Neyerere, Kaunda and Nkrumah, it was characterized by > openness and a vibrant press, and there was a refreshing absence of > corruption (unlike the Gambian government under Dawda Jawara). Botswana has > been the bane of many African regimes. It has a lively free press and > freedom of expression. The local publications are not subject to > censorship, unlike in Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana, where the government > controlled the private and public media and the public media is used as a > government propaganda tool. Botswana can find solutions to its economic > problems because it permits free debate and freedom of expression. By > contrast, the rest of Black Africa is mired in an economic quagmire because > of the want of ideas and solutions to extricate itself. Intellectual > repression prevents those with ideas from coming forward. With the > exception of Botswana, Senegal and the Gambia, the remaining African states > cannot tolerate freedom of expression and criticism of foolish government > policies. Sir Seretse, because of his background as a son of a traditional > African chief, ensured that Botswana’s indigenous roots were maintained. > Furthermore, in Botswana, chiefs still exercise considerable local > authority and influence, which can act as a check on too-precipitate action > by the government and can even swing local elections. This is in stark > contrast to most African countries, where chiefs saw their powers and > authority reduced after post-colonial independence. > Seretse Khama, like Dawda Jawara, and Ramgoolam, preached the gospel of > inclusive democracy, and he aptly showed his commitment to democratic > principles. Khama had no intention of adopting dictatorial methods of > leadership. His brand of democracy was rare in all of Southern Africa. He > proved that the claim made by colonial governments that Africans do not > understand the importance of democratic practices was false. One of the > values of Seretse Khama that is different from those of his colleagues is > that he utilized the principles of inclusiveness in the process of > designing national policy and implementing national programs. He is also > different from those of his colleagues who don’t tolerate divergent views > and ideas, as he values diversity of ideas and tolerance of different > points of view on national issues. > Dr.Kenneth Kaunda, twice jailed by the British authorities, referred > proudly to the fact that independence in Zambia had been achieved without > bitterness. Kwame Nkrumah was also jailed by the British because they > suspected him of committing subversive activities, and Jomo Kenyatta was > jailed for inciting violence during his alleged involvement in the Mau Mau > movement. Seretse Khama was not jailed by the British, but he was banished > from Buchuanaland because of his marriage to an English woman. When he > became president of Botswana, he was deeply attached to the British. Sir > Dawda Jawara and Sir Seretse Khama were both knighted by the British in > 1966. Kenyatta has one of the most poignant statements about the British, > “Our law, our system of government and many other aspects of our daily > lives are founded on British principle and Justice.(Martin,2005). > Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the first leader of Mauritius, operated under > the same internalized leadership codes as Sir Seretse. Ramgoolam was more > explicit in charting his vision, however—much in the manner of Lee Kuan Yew > of Singapore. Ramgoolam was able to give Mauritius a robust democratic > beginning that has been sustained by a series of wise successors from > different backgrounds and parties (Rotberg ,2007). Both Khama and Ramgoolam > could have emulated many of their contemporaries in establishing strong, > single-man, kleptocratic regimes. They refused to do so, in the process > demonstrating that positive leadership does make a difference. > Likewise, without Nelson Mandela’s capable leadership, South Africa after > 1994 would have emerged from the cauldron of apartheid more fractured and > autocratic. Mandela’s vision dictated vigorous adherence to a comprehensive > rule of law, a broadening of the essential services and a slow shift away > from the existing command economy toward one that was market driven > (Rothberg, 2007). Nelson Mandela’s era of presidency was a moment of > liberation that was felt around the world. Mandela was once asked how > different was the man who emerged from prison after twenty-seven years. He > replied, with characteristic brevity, “I came out mature” (Martin,2005). > Mandela disliked talking about himself and allowed few glimpses into his > personal thoughts or emotions. The years of imprisonment had turned him > into an intensely private person. > Mandela was determined never to lose sight of the goal of nonracial > democracy, believing that whites’ fear of Blacks in government positions > could eventually be overcome. The example he set was of profound > importance. He emerged from prison and insisted on reconciliation, which > undermined the demands of those seeking revenge and retribution. His > generosity of spirit also had a profound impact on his white adversaries, > earning him measures of trust and confidence that laid the foundations for > political stability. His inspired leadership proved critical both in > launching a new society atop the ashes of the old and in implanting a > culture of good governance and democracy (Rothberg, 2007). It was Mandela’s > leadership that many attributed to achieving liberation. The transfer of > power was accomplished in an atmosphere of much goodwill and brought with > it the closing of an era of three centuries of white rule. > South Africa could not have moved so rapidly to a democracy without > Mandela’s instinctive, open gift for harmony over disorder and democracy > over authoritarianism (Rothberg 2007). If Mandela had not set South Africa > firmly on a path toward good governance, it is possible that Mbeki’s > centralizing tendencies would have unraveled the concord between classes > and colors that Mandela had forged during his presidency. > Though their styles of leadership were vastly different, these African > leaders, riding the crest of popularity, all stepped forward with energy > and enthusiasm to tackle the task of development and nation-building. > Ambitious plans were launched, and expectations were high. The march of > African nationalism seemed invincible. Leadership that emerged after > independence was characterized by pretentious, megalomaniacal venality. In > other places the leadership dogmatically embraced alien revolutionary > ideals, assumed the trappings of foreign cultures, and misperceived the > process of development. The irony was that many African leaders came to > assume some of the very same characteristics they so loudly denounced in > the colonialists, imperialists, and those who were racist. There were only > a few men—namely Mandela, Khama and Ramgoolam—who became servants of their > people by addressing the needs and aspirations of their people without > contempt and putting the needs and wishes of their people above their own > desire for power. > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To > unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web > interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html > > To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: > http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the > List Management, please send an e-mail to: > [log in to unmask]¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤