Mr. Darbo That was a hard look. Asking hard questions is always good for any cause. I do recognize some frown on questioning but that's needed especially after 20 years of failed approaches and strategies. Glad we're all not 'DEAD FISH' - carried by tides/flow. Keep it up. Burama On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Lamin Darbo <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > CORDEG's Utterly Blurred Vision > > Its leadership is almost entirely Diaspora-based, with some absent from > The Gambia for two, maybe three decades. Under Professor Jammeh's > Constitution, none of those leaders are qualified to contest any public > elections slated for 2016/17. Outside the cyber political world, the > organisation and its leadership are unknown, and crucially, to all but > probably a negligible fraction of the home-based electorate. With no money > on the table, it nevertheless pretends to the title of "... home to Gambian > opposition political parties and Civil Society organisations at home and in > Gambia's various Diasporas". Without so much as a passing justification, it > seeks to wholly diminish the established and singularly significant > home-based political opposition by proposing to commingle its influence in > an egalitarian commune populated by purported civil society entities > peopled, in the overwhelming number of cases, by a handful of individuals. > Even more egregiously, what should have been a national project was > hijacked and placed in the exclusive control of three very close social and > cultural friends. > > Welcome to the make-believe world of The Committee for the Restoration of > Democracy in The Gambia (CORDEG). As if to compound the illogical and > unsupportable claim it is "... home to Gambian opposition political parties > and Civil Society organisations at home and in Gambia's various Diasporas" > it asserts that "CORDEG recognises the autonomy of its *constituent > members as equal partners* in the struggle to democratise The Gambia". > Whoever its "constituent members" maybe as of March 2014, it is > unreasonableness personified to contend that CORDEG itself has the clout to > demand "equal partner" status with political parties whose followership > number in the hundreds of thousands! > > As the latest organisational progeny of the Gambian Conference on > Democracy and Good Governance, Raleigh, North Carolina, 17-19 May 2013, > CORDEG was originally projected as a facilitating mechanism for party-based > opposition unity in Gambia's fight for national democratisation. At least > that was a plausible understanding of its primary objective based on the > marketing literature put out by conference organisers. In the subsequent > Raleigh Accord, some reference to the G6 was maintained but the role of > home-based political parties was progressively diluted to a point all > specific reference to their very central significance to a project that > must be fought and won inside Gambia's geographic contours was dropped from > the just-published CORDEG "vision" statement. > > Without question, there is a yawning gap in CORDEG's incomprehensible > reasoning. As an "independent, non-profit transnational democratic umbrella > organisation that is committed to peaceful, non-violent democratic change > in The Gambia", it stands to reason that CORDEG can effect change in The > Gambia only through the electoral process. With no political base where it > matters - in The Gambia - and deficient in critical aspects of the > political process such as funding, it is hard to appreciate the locus of > the leverage CORDEG assigns itself as the "... home to Gambian opposition > political parties and Civil Society organisations at home and in Gambia's > various Diasporas". The established political parties have no reason to > subsume themselves in an unknown entity that purports to control them and > their clear influence. Herein CORDEG's disconnect with reality as far as > Gambia's political terrain. > > Or maybe there is no disconnect, but what calculations are driving > CORDEG's so far opaque strategy are too opportunistic to openly communicate > without triggering great public disquiet. It is an open secret that Gambian > public life under the Professor is unsettled enough to collapse either of > its overwhelming weight *vis-a-vis* its utterly weak foundation, or with > a little push from some hostile quarter. Should that happened in a chaotic > manner on the stretch to 2016, it would completely alter the dynamics of > play in the country's political topography. Like any of the endless array > of Diaspora-based organisations, CORDEG would likely want a seat at the > table of inevitable reconciliation around a transitional national unity > government. There are various other scenarios present in a seismic national > event that ruptures the current status quo and elements within CORDEG may > want to hedge bets just in case. On the formation of the National > Resistance of The Gambia, Yero Jallow of *Gainako Online Newspaper*profoundly reflects: "Isit by coincidence all these groups are emerging or do the fortune tellers > of the land revealed a secret that some of us are not aware yet? I just > find things very interesting nowadays. It is as if people are clearly > seeing Jammeh's demise". > > If CORDEG's focus is sincerely on a peaceful change of government, the key > question is why it treats the established political parties as though they > are in the same league as some of the Diaspora's less than ten-people > organisations. Can it be that CORDEG harbours the ambition of morphing into > a political party and under that calculus may consider it unwise to get too > cosy with any of the current crop of home-based political parties. If that > is the case, CORDEG ought to dispense with all pretense and consolidate on > that independent and legally permissible basis. Or is it intending to > travel the fictional route of sponsoring an independent presidential > candidate outside the explicit blessing of the established parties, or some > of them at least. Whatever its real intentions, CORDEG can achieve nothing > meaningful without expressly recognising the stranglehold of the > established home-based political parties on the electorate that must decide > the outcome of any election. Even more crucially, it must embrace Gambia's > true diversity in its critical decision-making organ. > > We can all admire the personal achievements of some CORDEG members but > that unquestioned reverence must never extend to matters touching on > critical issues of Gambian public life. By all means celebrate the > friendships and other relationships but do not require us to endorse > pronouncements grounded in mere assertions, and visions that fell far short > of what it takes to bring personal and national political salvation to The > Gambia. What CORDEG placed on the table is not a national vision. It is a > vision for personalities and a quite marginal group when what is needed is > a selfless commitment to the creation of a national tent large enough to > accommodate all colours of opinion but realistic enough to cede leadership > to the more compelling players inhabiting the storm centre of Gambian > public life. > > In light of its comparative strength and appeal, CORDEG is best advised to > pitch its tent in the domain most suited to its objective character, > advocacy that has as its central element the facilitation of opposition > party consolidation where it matters, inside Gambia. If, like others, > CORDEG projects itself as an entity committed to forceful change in Gambian > public life, this rejoinder would not be necessary as it would then be > operating under different justifications and rules, and more crucially, on > its exclusive resources to realise its objective. In the political world, > it denotes unreasonableness of the highest order to seek to either > proactively control or diminish the significance of entities without whose > willing cooperation and resources there is absolutely no chance of > achieving ones desired objective. As CORDEG advanced no reasonable > explanation to its boldest assertion of not conceding any supremacy to > political parties with supporters in the hundreds of thousands, its true > intentions may at best be regarded as mired in opaqueness. To recognise no > distinction between established political parties on the ground, and > few-person entities like the myriad of so-called civil society > organisations in the distant Diaspora, is the very epitomisation of > fantasy. > > This apparently characteristic opaqueness on critical questions is > threatening to be the albatross around CORDEG's neck. In the run-up to > Raleigh, the conveners of the conference were marketed as STGDP, based in > Atlanta, and GDAG, based in the host city. After Raleigh, DUGA-DC was > retrospectively included among the conveners. No explanation was ever > advanced. Even more crucially, when CORDEG's leadership team was unveiled, > GDAG, the other principal to Raleigh, came out utterly empty handed in the > executive and sub-executive line up. Again, no explanation whatsoever even > though this turn of events is potentially the most fatal development going > to CORDEG's very questionable credibility. In case any is tempted to > advance the democratic process as having spoken on the leadership issue, I > strongly suggest that a fair and visionary group would exercise heightened > and appropriate sensitivity in the overall circumstances it was confronted > with as far selecting its top echelon team. To its regrettable peril, > CORDEG blatantly ignored common sense! > > For example, CORDEG purportedly 'elected' three socially and culturally > connected individuals in the persons of Dr Abdoulaye Saine (Chair), Ms > Sigga M Jagne (Vice-chair), and Abdulai Jobe (Secretary General), and *probably > *imposed them on the group as the untouchable Executive Committee (EC). > Were the participants in its so-called executive elections on prior notice > that "the EC is CORDEG's top-tier administrative group, responsible for > overall policy, strategy and implementation of CORDEG's programs and > projects, with the Secretary General (SG) serving as the hub for CORDEG's > specialiased Committees/Directorates". These three very close friends are > "also responsible for Foreign Affairs/International Diplomacy, strategic > partnerships and overall management of CORDEG". Or were the > responsibilities attached to the positions after the elections? If the > latter, the overall process does not pass the smell test! > > Stated unequivocally, Dr Abdoulaye Saine, Ms Sigga M Jagne, and Abdulai > Jobe comprise CORDEG's equivalent of the UN Security Council with power to > veto anything they don't like. The public deserves clarification on whether > the so-called "vision" statement predates the elections, or whether the > "vision" statement was crafted after the elections. I cannot accept that > some of the independently minded individuals I encountered in this > struggle, and who participated in CORDEG's so-called elections, would have > voted for such a perverse arrangement had they known they were endorsing a > dictatorship of three social and cultural chums in the sense that the > "Steering Committee", and the "Specialised Committees/Directorates" are > utterly redundant in the area of crucial management decision making. In > light of the above, I emphatically reject the claim in the so-called > "vision" statement that CORDEG "enjoys wide mandate and legitimacy, as the > recognised representative and voice of the Gambian opposition the > world-over". > > Notwithstanding the claim of "home to Gambian opposition political > parties and Civil Society organisations at home and in Gambia's various > Diasporas", we know there are other Diaspora groups with competing > priorities and some are calling for even CORDEG to join them. The claim and > the reality therefore diverged. Indeed CORDEG continues to ignore the fact > that not all political parties were present in Raleigh, and some prominent > participants are now leading groups with quite a militant approach to > ending public lawlessness in The Gambia. CORDEG's very deficient "vision" > statement can only make it impossible for those outside this > architecturally flawed "umbrella" to want to peep in, much less join its > cover. Although there appears to be many unanswered questions around > CORDEG's intentions, or at least the intentions of those steering the > entity in the unlit pathways of potential deception, what is explicit in > its own "vision" statement is alarming enough to scare me away. > > Those who contend for the proposition that unity is the highest value we > should aspire to in our fight against atrocious public lawlessness in > Gambian public life are counselled to embrace the more admirable philosophy > of objective reason and fairness as the highest foundational values of any > viable national space. As currently constituted, CORDEG's "vision", and top > leadership team, lacks both reason and fairness! CORDEG will therefore > struggle for traction. Don't take my word for it. I am more than content to > leave the verdict in the hands of that great arbiter of human affairs - > time. > > And in case any is tempted to brand legitimate queries on seminal national > issues as a distraction, I suggest some inner self-conversation around the > fundamental question of what you have done/are doing for the vital struggle > for a democratic Gambia that the person supposedly causing a distraction > has no done. In the event of a struggle for an affirmative answer, that > inner conversation should constitute co > いいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいい To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] いいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいいい