Indeed Yero, leadership is definitely not about beautiful feathers. Thank you. Baba On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 1:10 PM, Y Jallow <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Mawdo Baba, nice read and great substance. I like the conclusion. I read > few books on leadership and the subject matter of its theory is far from > what we see daily. Leadership is for those to be served. It shouldn't be > about more colorful feathers, etc..warm regards, Yero > > ------------------------------ > Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 09:46:41 -0600 > From: [log in to unmask] > Subject: Re: African Leadership Studies: Beyond Theoretical Exceptionalism > To: [log in to unmask] > > Thank you Boss Karim. I continue to salute my boss! > > Baba > > On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 2:40 AM, abdoukarim sanneh < > [log in to unmask]> wrote: > > My Boss > Thanks for sharing this body of knowledge. I continue to salute you amd > regards to the family > > ------------------------------ > Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 18:00:05 -0800 > From: [log in to unmask] > Subject: African Leadership Studies: Beyond Theoretical Exceptionalism > To: [log in to unmask] > > > > *African Leadership Studies: Beyond Theoretical Exceptionalism* > > Paper presented at the 16th Annual International Leadership Association > Conference > > October 30 – November 2, 2014 / San Diego California[1] > > > > *Baba G. Jallow, Creighton University, [log in to unmask] > <[log in to unmask]>* > > > > Some scholars de-contextualize Africa’s leadership and developmental > crises by attributing them to the mistaken and untested assumption that > Western theories and styles of leadership are not appropriate for African > and other non-Western cultures. Geert Hofstede (1993) has argued that > Western theories and styles of leadership are not appropriate for > non-Western cultures. Hofstede claims that this is so because leadership > studies theorists grew up in particular environments that inevitably limit > the applicability and utility of their concepts of leadership to other > environments. This proposition represents a form of theoretical > exceptionalism and diminishes the globalizing potential of leadership > studies scholarship. In this paper, I propose to demonstrate that > situational, transformational, transactional, servant and other theories of > leadership may usefully be applied to the study of African leaders. Using > Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, the former Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko and South > Africa’s Nelson Mandela as case studies, I argue that leadership studies > theory is applicable to the study of leadership regardless of cultural > idiosyncrasies. It is my contention that the problem lies not with the > Western theories or styles of leadership per se, but with the nature of > African leadership and the cultural context from which it emerges, within > which it is embedded and within which it is exercised. Africa’s > developmental failures reflect first and foremost a failure of leadership. > And the theoretical exceptionalism that theories of leadership studies are > not suitable tools of analysis for African leadership should be rejected in > favor of experimentation. > > One may be forgiven for observing that the vast amount of leadership > studies literature reads as if leadership exists only in the west. > Leadership studies scholars’ preoccupation with their immediate > environments and audiences obscures the presence of other environments and > audiences equally invested in solving leadership problems in their > communities. Organizations and managers are studied as if they only exist > in western societies and remedies are suggested that are specifically > designed to solve problems in western leadership and organizational > cultures. The “we” we encounter in so many works on leadership studies > often refers to “we” westerners, not we human beings. The University of San > Diego’s Professor Bob Donmoyer speaks of a certain culture of “regionalism” > in leadership studies that urgently needs to be addressed.[2] Not only is > there a need for African leadership studies, Asian leadership studies, > Latin American leadership studies and Middle Eastern leadership studies; > western leadership studies scholars may find much that is useful in looking > at other leadership and organizational cultures beyond their immediate > spatial and academic environments. > > Leadership is a universal human process. It is found in all human > societies. Since human beings are essentially similar in all the ways that > really matter, it follows that theories used to understand and explain > human motivation and behavior in one part of the world may be used to > explain human motivation and behavior in other parts of the world. Of > course, no theory of leadership may be applied wholesale in any part of the > world without taking into due account human differences and cultural > idiosyncrasies. But overall, we can safely argue that as valid > generalizations on human nature, theories of leadership apply to their > subjects regardless of spatial or temporal differences. Once created, > knowledge becomes a universal artifact that recognizes no boundaries. > > Organizational culture and leadership theory lends itself particularly > well to the study of leadership in Africa. Edgar Schein’s (2010) insights > help us visualize the African nation-state as an organizational “macro > culture” within which exist levels of organizational “micro cultures”. > Schein suggests that understanding the “shared assumptions” of group > members is key to resolving intra-organizational conflict and maintains > that “leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (2010: 3). > Both insights are useful to an understanding of African leadership > cultures. Culture, Schein writes, “is ultimately created . . . by leaders” > (2010: 3). The cultures of material poverty and political intolerance in > contemporary Africa are no mere accidents of history; neither are they > manifestations of inherent African backwardness; or lasting immutable > effects of the colonial encounter. They are in fact created and nurtured by > African leaders. The saying that a people gets the leadership it deserves > may perhaps more usefully be rendered a people’s leadership determines the > nature of the culture they get. Leadership cannot be divorced from its > cultural context, just as culture cannot help but be shaped by leadership. > > Bolman and Deal speak of leaders as often incarcerated in a “psychic > prison” that prevents them “from seeing old problems in a new light or > finding more promising ways to work on perennial challenges” (2003: 7). > This is a particularly useful insight into understanding the seemingly > inscrutable antics of many post-colonial African leaders. Determined to > hang on to power at all cost, many independent African leaders are > perpetually in a state of denial; they claim progress and prosperity when > their nations and people lack the barest necessities of life; they commit > unspeakable crimes against their fellow citizens in the name of a national > security that never was; they muzzle dissent and kill their opponents even > while proclaiming their impeccable record of human rights and the rule of > law. Bolman and Deal’s concept of the psychic prison might help us > understand just why African leaders commit these crimes and break all rules > of ethical behavior, often in broad daylight, before everyone’s eyes, and > with a nonchalant attitude. African leaders of the post-colonial era often > wield a “vision” in one hand and a club in the other. You either support > them or shut up. > > Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first prime minister and president was, on the one > hand, a successful nationalist and pan-African leader who led his country > to independence, initiated a number of important development projects, and > contributed to the process of decolonization across Africa. He did a lot to > propagate the idea of a united Africa and was instrumental in the formation > of the Organization of African Unity, now African Union in 1963. He > initiated a lot of important domestic development projects that continue to > benefit the people of Ghana to this day. On the other hand, however, he was > a power wielder who systematically monopolized the Ghanaian political > space, criminalized his political opponents, muzzled freedoms of > expression, association and of the press, had himself declared president > for life, and turned his newly independent country into a single-party > dictatorship, thus stifling his people’s creative and developmental > potentials. His immediate political legacy was a quarter century of > political turmoil that saw a series of failed experiments in civilian and > military leadership in Ghana. > > Nkrumah’s domestic policy actions suggest that Machiavellian leadership > theory is a useful lens through which to understand his transition from a > freedom-loving nationalist leader to the dictator of a single party state. > Between 1947 when he returned to Ghana (then called the Gold Coast) and > 1966 when he was overthrown in a police-military coup, Nkrumah initiated a > series of policy-action transformations that suggest the adoption of the > twin Machiavellian personas of the lion and the fox. Let us illustrate: > > In 1947, Nkrumah accepted an invitation from the United Gold Coast > Convention to return to Ghana knowing, as he admits in his autobiography, > that he could not possibly work with what he called the convention’s > “reactionary leadership.” He admits that he knew “it was quite useless to > associate myself with a movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, > middle class lawyers, and merchants, for my revolutionary background and > ideas would make it impossible for me to work with them” (Nkrumah 1957: > 62). It could therefore be argued that he accepted the U.G.C.C’s invitation > for Machiavellian reasons: to use the U.G.C.C. as a means of furthering his > own political ambitions. He admits that he had his own plans and would not > hesitate to pursue them whether the U.G.C.C. leadership liked it or not > (Nkrumah 1957; Nugent 2009 - 2010). And that is exactly what he did. > > Europe’s subjugation of African territories during the periods of the > scramble and pacification was often effected by a combination of force and > cunning, of military might and fraudulent treaties of friendship and > protection, of Machiavellian lion and fox tactics. African states that > resisted colonial encroachment were forcefully subjugated and pacified, > while occasionally, African leaders unwittingly signed away their > sovereignty to European powers. In order to satisfy the requirements of the > Berlin Act that came out of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, European > powers had to demonstrate effective claim to and occupation of African > territories. This they did either by force or by producing written evidence > of African sovereigns’ consent to submit to their protection or rule. > Nkrumah translated these imperial strategies of force and fraud into his > policies of Positive Action and Tactical Action, the former a show of > nationalist muscle modeled on the Quit India campaign (Nugent 2009-2010), > the latter a show of nationalist cunning to effect the final push against > colonial domination. In deploying these two approaches, Nkrumah used the > same Machiavellian Lion-Fox strategies to fight British imperialism that > Britain used to subjugate Africans. > > Nkrumah’s twin policies of Positive Action and Tactical Action were in > line with Machiavelli’s exhortation that the prince must be able to be both > a lion and a fox. The prince, Machiavelli teaches, “must know that there > are two kinds of combat; one with laws, the other with force. The first is > proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is not often > enough, one must have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for > a prince to know well how to use the beast and the man” (Prince Ch. 18). > And “since a prince is compelled by necessity to know well how to use the > beast, he should pick the fox and the lion . . . one needs to be a fox to > recognize snares and a lion to frighten the wolves” (Prince Ch. 18). > > From 1947 to 1949, Nkrumah played the fox to outsmart the U.G.C.C. > leadership. From 1949 when he founded the C.P.P. to 1951 when he became > Leader of Government Business, he played the lion through Positive Action. > From 1951 to independence in 1957 he reverted to playing the fox through > Tactical Action. Positive Action required him to seem tough and fearless as > a lion in order to force the British government to grant internal > self-government to the Gold Coast. Once internal self-government was > achieved, he turned to Tactical Action, which he described as “a contest of > wits” (Nkrumah 1957) in order to convince the British government that his > party was capable of ruling the country. In typical Machiavellian fashion, > Nkrumah tricked London into believing that he had abandoned his hostility > toward imperialism, even though that was furthest from his mind. After > independence in 1957, Nkrumah eased back into the lion persona and renewed > his relentless onslaught against imperialism, neocolonialism, and those he > considered their local agents and stooges in Ghana. His hostile > anti-capitalist rhetoric did not deter Nkrumah from seeking financial > assistance from the capitalist West in order to implement his most > important development projects. Nkrumah was, in effect, a consummate > Machiavellian. > > The Congolese scholar Jean-Claude Willame (1998) has identified > Machiavellian tendencies in the politics of former Zaire (DRC) dictator > Mobutu Sese Seko. Willame argues that Mobutu managed to remain in power for > so long because he deployed the Machiavellian strategies of “ruling men” > and “how to keep power” (1998: 38). Mobutu saw the chance to grab power in > 1965 when the newly independent Belgian Congo was bedeviled by internal > political factionalism and mired in cold war intrigues. Having captured > power, Mobutu kept it by deploying a pattern of Machiavellian politics: “a > sometimes unpredictable mix of threats . . . magnanimity, seduction, > cunning, ‘make believe’, ‘double talk’ and ‘the frequent rotation and > removal of bureaucrats, army officers, and ministers’” which created much > uncertainty and insecurity in Zairian society and effectively precluded any > organized threat to Mobutu’s power (Willame 1998: 39-40). > > But if Mobutu was a Machiavellian leader, he was also a transactional > leader. As a way of maintaining his grip on power, Mobutu rewarded his > supporters with financial and other incentives that eventually bankrupted > his country. Unlike Nkrumah however, Mobutu had no vision for his country > or for Africa. His primary concern was amassing wealth and keeping power. > Those who supported him were amply rewarded; those who opposed him were > effectively neutralized either through force or lucrative persuasion. > > Of our three case studies, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela lends himself > more readily to contemporary leadership studies theory. As demonstrated by > Robert Rotberg (1991), Chis Saunders (2014) and Daniel Lieberfeld (2014) > Mandela was clearly a transformational leader, or perhaps more accurately, > a transformational servant leader. Rotberg and Saunders have used > transformational leadership theory to show how Mandela was able to > transform his country from a violently divided society into a rainbow > nation between 1990 when he was released from prison to 1999 when he > stepped down as South Africa’s first Black president. Lieberfeld uses trait > theory to highlight Mandela’s success as a transformational leader. > According to Lieberfeld, Mandela possessed emotional self-control, empathy, > a sense of self-efficacy, conceptual complexity and pragmatism that enabled > him to perform the reconciliation-oriented leadership that transformed > enemies into friends and made South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to > democratic majority rule possible. > > Ironically, Mandela has also been characterized as a Machiavellian leader. > In a newspaper review of British journalist Anthony Sampson’s biography of > Nelson Mandela, James Gump (1999) writes that the Mandela that emerges from > Sampson’s book “is part Gandhi and part Machiavelli, moral statesman and > consummate politician.” In response to an email request from me to > elaborate, Gump wrote that his reference to Mandela’s Machiavellianism > derived from Mandela’s pragmatism: While “Mandela turned to violence in the > early 1960s as a tactical position . . . he was also prepared to negotiate > with his enemies at any time” (Gump February 6, 2013). Gump also cites > Mandela’s “posturing with guards” on Robben Island “to gain prisoner > rights” and “to make the best of a bad situation” as a Machiavellian > survival strategy (2013). But if Mandela was a Machiavellian leader, he put > his Machiavellian skills to good use, to beat the Apartheid system at its > own game. > > In short, Hofstede’s claim that leadership studies theory is not > applicable to studies of non-western leadership is flawed. As demonstrated > in this paper and more comprehensively elsewhere (Jallow 2014a; Jallow > 2014b), leadership studies theory may usefully be deployed in the study of > African leadership. Organizational leadership theory as proposed by Edgar > Schein, Bolman and Deal and many other scholars is a useful tool for the > study of dysfunctional organizations in Africa. Information processing > theory helps us understand the mentality of African leaders. Theories of > transformational, transactional, servant leadership, among others are as > suitable for the study of African leadership as they are for the study of > Chinese, Japanese or American leadership. Machiavelli’s Lion and the Fox is > a useful framework for the analysis of the leadership style of Ghana’s > Kwame Nkrumah and other African leaders. Situational and contingency > theories are applicable to the study of any leadership context. It is high > time that leadership studies scholarship moves beyond theoretical > exceptionalism and academic regionalism to embrace the wealth of leadership > potential around the world. > > ------------------------------ > [1] Due to the limited time available for presentations at the ILA > Conference, this paper is an abridged version of a longer study. > [2] Personal communication. > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To > unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web > interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search > in the Gambia-L archives, go to: > http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the > List Management, please send an e-mail to: > [log in to unmask] > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To > unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web > interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search > in the Gambia-L archives, go to: > http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the > List Management, please send an e-mail to: > [log in to unmask] > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > > > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To > unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web > interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search > in the Gambia-L archives, go to: > http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the > List Management, please send an e-mail to: > [log in to unmask] > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To > unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web > interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html > > To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: > http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the > List Management, please send an e-mail to: > [log in to unmask] > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤