Nyang

Thx!

Not sure where you going with this but I like the start.

We ought to seriously reflect on ourselves more than our obsession with
Yahya must go. That's not to look at one as an individual person but what
our fight ought to be about vis-a-vis the roles and duties of citizens in a
republic.

However dire our situation I can't wrap my arms around an undemocratic
method as a way to earn us democracy. Isn't that what Yahya and his group
promised 29 years ago - today 180 degrees away from it. Like many I want
Yahya go even sooner - if for nothing it gives me opportunity to return to
enjoy home.

Social engineering takes time - I'm hopeful some day we will get to
discussing the critical issues with a view to assuming our
collective roles/duties as citizens of a republic as opposed to outsourcing
our role to some arms men/women. Dictatorship is the same for me whether is
perpetrated by Burama or Yahya or X or Y.

Until we make this fight reclaiming Gambia as a democratic republic - all
else will be hard to come by. Even if the do the likely outcome is the
decension of one dictator to ascension of another. The current approaches
reduces our causes to a contest between opposing political parties when
it should have been a fight to make Gambia what it it is supposed to
from founding. That debate makes Yahya and all his argument irrelevant and
him inconsequential.

God bless Gambia!

Burama

On Tuesday, January 13, 2015, Modou Nyang <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> When countries are faced with conditions of grave concerns eminent
> citizens are expected to rise to the challenge for diagnoses and a way
> forward. But in the Gambia, it is a different case. Only a few are ready to
> face the heat whether for good or worse. Where are our social scientists,
> men and women of letters? It was a similar situation when a particular
> Sidiya Bayo announced he was invading the Gambia. Only one or two voices
> were raised.
> Sometimes i think the reason behind this is the desperate desire to see
> the Jammeh government sent packing. But what kind of Gambia do we want post
> professor Jammeh should be a great concern to all of us. That is why any
> serous analysis of the December 31 incident must look deeper than just the
> inner feeling of wishing to see the demise of the Jammeh regime.
> That the perpetrators of the State House incident were lured into Banjul,
> isn't sufficiently supported by the evidence out in the open. I don't think
> there would have been a single escapee if the authorities in Banjul had
> laid waiting in ambush. They could have had prior knowledge of the plot,
> and its true that some people knew about it before hand, someone i also
> know knew about it, but still it is open to speculation that they were
> lured into Banjul.
> The loss of life makes it very sad, but a critical look at the whole
> incident will present very good lessons.
>
> Nyang
>
>
>
>   On Monday, January 12, 2015 10:18 PM, Musa Jeng <[log in to unmask]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml',[log in to unmask]);>> wrote:
>
>
>
> A hell of a reflection, job well done.
>
> Thanks
>
> ------------------------------
> *From: *"Ebrima Ceesay" <[log in to unmask]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml',[log in to unmask]);>>
> *To: *[log in to unmask]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml',[log in to unmask]);>
> *Sent: *Saturday, January 10, 2015 7:10:39 AM
> *Subject: *[G_L] Lessons of the 30th December failed ‘coup’ plot in the
> Gambia
>
>
>
> *Reflections on the events of 30th December 2014 in the Gambia*
>
> *By Ebrima Ceesay*
>
> Following the attempted coup of 30th December 2014 in The Gambia by
> Gambian dissidents based abroad, now that things have calmed down and a
> sense of normalcy has returned, it is important to take time for sober
> reflection and to learn some fundamental lessons. Over time, what actually
> took place has become more evident. As far as I am concerned, this was
> entrapment – a plot devised in the diaspora but manipulated by President
> Jammeh in The Gambia. It is as clear as noon day that any plot involving
> civilians or military personnel based in The Gambia would be bound to fail,
> since it would almost certainly have been leaked in advance to President
> Yahya Jammeh.
>
> *The Gambian Military*
>
> The Gambian military has the reputation, deservedly so, of being
> unreliable and indecisive. The Gambian President orchestrates his
> subordinates by betrayal, ensnarement, factionalism, implacability and by
> fostering jealousy and discord. Jammeh has created the climate that
> protects his interests and maintains him in power. Some members of the
> Gambian military have been giving verbal assistance to the dissidents who
> sought to overthrow President Jammeh by force on 30th December, while in
> reality remaining in Jammeh’s camp. It is highly unlikely that the Gambian
> military will ever be able successfully to overthrow the current President
> of the Gambia. An organized military coup, in the context of The Gambia, is
> highly unlikely. Perhaps a small group of renegade soldiers could achieve
> Jammeh’s downfall but the chances are that this will never happen in The
> Gambia. It is well known that Jammeh has, for many years, enlisted
> Casamance rebels into the Gambian army and now he has also arranged for
> Tuareg rebels/fighters to join the Presidential Guard, having recently
> negotiated this with President Idriss Deby of Chad. This is in fact one of
> his survival tactics – one of the reasons that can explain his prolong stay
> in power. In short, Jammeh has created a ring of steel around himself for
> protection and to ensure his prolonged stay in power.
>
> *Lessons for dissident Gambian groups abroad*
>
> The events of December 30th were not so much of an attempted military
> coup than a failed insurrection by dissident Gambians abroad who were
> infiltrated and outsmarted by Jammeh and his henchmen. It is clear to many
> Gambia watchers that the bulk of the army, especially the Presidential
> Guard, is loyal to President Jammeh. Those members of the military who are
> deemed to be disloyal are dismissed, arrested or moved to parts of the army
> where they pose no threat. The insurrectionists of December 30th made
> some serious mistakes: they believed that considerable numbers of the
> military would give them support and join them on the ground. Former
> Lieutenant Colonel Lamin Sanneh and his group involved Gambia National Army
> members in their schemes and it was this that contributed to their failure
> to overthrow the regime. Details of the plot were leaked in advance –
> indeed, a friend in London got to know of it - about a week in advance. The
> leak was due both to the unreliability of the Gambian military personnel
> involved and to the large numbers of civilians who had been involved in the
> planning.
>
> I am not a proponent of military intervention in politics, but let this be
> a warning for any future coup plotters or insurrectionists – keep it small,
> keep it tight, keep it quiet and trust as few people as possible.
>
> There is clear evidence that there was a trap to lure the dissidents into
> Banjul. State House had been fortified with many additional soldiers, and
> the first forays by the insurrectionists were met with heavy gunfire from
> the guard towers. It is as if the attack was expected. And sadly, Jammeh
> has now effectively used the events of 30th December to divert the
> attention of the Gambian population from the mounting economic pressures
> and challenges that his government is facing and to drum up support and
> sympathy for himself.
>
> As we mourn the loss of these gallant men, and honour the ultimate
> sacrifices they made for their beloved country, we must, at the same time,
> caution all Gambians, particularly former soldiers of both the Gambian and
> Western Armies to draw lessons from the unfortunate events of December 30th
> in the Gambia. Henceforth, be very careful of these so-called
> co-conspirators and collaborators based in the Gambia – be they military
> personnel or civilians. It would be foolhardy, reckless and thoughtless to
> go into any plot with Gambian soldiers in Banjul, who are known for their
> brutality, indecisiveness and unreliability.
>
> There is no doubt that those brave Gambians whose lives were cut short on
> the State House battlefields, were courageous and valiant men, and we pray
> for the souls of those who died and for their families, as well as for
> those who were injured in the attack. However, the planned takeover had
> something of the amateur about it and the plotters’ trust in apparently
> supportive members of the Gambia National Army and the Presidential Guard
> was misplaced to say the least. Let us be in no doubt that the Gambia Armed
> Forces, and especially the elite Presidential Guards, are not as
> disaffected or disunited as we may like them to be. Jammeh’s regime is
> strongly embedded and unlikely to be easily ousted by any perilously under
> armed and ill-prepared group of men. Those who are struggling to see a
> return to democracy in The Gambia would do well to remember this. In all
> fairness, I have to say here though that I am speaking with the benefit of
> hindsight.
>
>
> *Lessons for President Jammeh*
>
> For twenty years, President Jammeh has ruled as a despot, mindless of due
> legal process and against any notions of democracy. His regime is based on
> fear, threat, intimidation and ballot rigging and yet despite this, large
> segments of the Gambian population (especially women) and the armed forces
> appear to adulate him. To a large extent Jammeh has bought their support
> with blandishments and Dalasis. He has compounded this with vote buying,
> imprisonment and harassment of the opposition, manipulation of the
> electoral process and with murder. When news of the December 30th
> attempted coup started to emerge, many people in and out of the country
> were delighted that they would at last see an end to Jammeh’s regime. The
> euphoria was not to last long.
>
> However, the attempted overthrow of the regime by an external force has
> had a destabilizing effect on Jammeh’s regime and his power base no longer
> seems as stable and strong as it did prior to December 30th. The weakness
> of much of Jammeh’s security and military infrastructure has been exposed.
> There are still many groups of dissident Gambians across the world who are
> determined to topple the regime and who will have learned valuable lessons
> from the thwarted coup plotters. They will continue the struggle to
> overthrow Jammeh. Therefore, another external (or internal) attack on the
> regime will almost certainly result in unprecedented violence, bloodshed
> and mayhem throughout The Gambia with all the risks of ethnic overtones.
>
> We therefore, urge President Jammeh to resign; to open negotiations for
> his resignation with local and external opposition groups under the aegis
> of ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the UN, as first suggested by Sidi
> Sanneh in his blog. Reports of Jammeh’s ill-health abound and these give
> further impetus to demands that he quit his post.
>
> We know, through unimpeachable diplomatic sources in France and the UK,
> that President Jammeh has been very sick for some time now, but because of
> his contempt and hatred for the West, he is still refusing to take
> prescribed western medication against the wishes of his Egyptian doctors.
> The Egyptian doctors have repeatedly asked him to stop altogether or at
> least to reduce his intake of traditional herbal medicines. Years of
> untreated diabetes, high blood pressure and high levels of cholesterol have
> led to him developing a serious cardio-vascular disease. President Jammeh
> has had a health “scare” during a visit to New York a few years ago, when
> he suddenly collapsed (suffered a blackout). Luckily Pa Harry Jammeh,
> former Solicitor General, and others were with him at the time, and
> paramedics had to help load Jammeh onto an ambulance following his fainting
> episode. Subsequent MRI head scans, carried out in France and Morocco, have
> ruled out a brain tumour and blamed Jammeh’s prone to fainting on
> cardiovascular problems.
>
> There is little hope of regime change through the ballot box: Gambians
> have allowed Jammeh to hold onto power for twenty long years and they are
> suffering the effects of this. In many ways, the dire situation in the
> country right now can be laid at the feet of both Jammeh and the populace.
> Without the voluntary resignation of the President, it will be the Gambian
> people themselves who will have to end their predicament and bid farewell
> to Yahya Jammeh – and at what cost?  Jammeh’s resignation and a planned
> return to democratic rule would result in a peaceful, national change for
> the better and a more certain future for Gambians at home and in the
> diaspora.
>
> In conclusion, the gravest danger to President Jammeh will remain the
> threat of externally led or driven rebellion from dissident Gambian groups
> in the Diaspora. The events of 30th December 2014 have shown that Jammeh’s
> military and security establishments are not properly set up to deter,
> prevent and defeat any well planned external threat against the Gambia.
> Essentially, his Armed Forces are well organised to tackle conventional
> internal security threats, including civil unrest and military coups from
> within his Armed Forces, and this is why he has thus far been able to crush
> all attempts to remove him from power by force. His military has been
> strengthened significantly over the years to deal with internal or domestic
> security threats. But the events of 30th December have shown that his
> forces will not be able to deal easily with a very well-planned, properly
> coordinated and covert attack, carried out by seasoned, heavily armed and
> highly trained fighters from the diaspora. The threat he faces is an
> external one. In short, Jammeh’s grip on power may not be as strong as
> first thought.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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