Mr.Saine,
Your analysis is quite comprehensive. Thanks for sharing it
with us.
I just wanted to point out a couple tings.
First, you failed to elaborate on the governments' role in
brokering peace in Guinea Bissau as a major score in it's foreign relations
game.
Secondly, you are a bit lenient with regards to Jammeh's
relationship with defiant nations like Libya, Iran, Sudan, Iraq and Cuba.
Especially his numerous trips to Libya in defiance of UN
sanctions.
On another note, I believe Jammehs' new wife is Morrocan, not
Algerian as you mentioned. I may be wrong on this.
Thanks for sharing.
Abdoulie Jallow
To G-L Community:
For
those of you unable to open the earlier attachment that was sent, I
am
sending it via e-mail. Your comments and suggestions are
always
welcome.
Gambia's Foreign Policy Since the Coup:
1994-1999
Abdoulaye
Saine
Miami University
This paper analyzes Gambia's foreign
policy since the 1994 coup
d'etat1 that ousted Sir Dawda Jawara, Gambia's
first president
(1965-1994). The coup brought to power Lt. Yahya Jammeh
who headed the
Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), from July
1994 to
September 1996 when the AFPRC was dissolved. Jammeh, who
had earlier
resigned his commission, contested and won the presidential
election on
September 26, 1996. Thus, attention is also paid to the
policy
framework that continues to shape Gambia's foreign- policy
under
Jammeh.2 Three central questions underpin this study. First,
what
external policies did the AFPRC adopt to achieve its
objectives?
Second, What is the foreign-policy orientation of Gambia's
current
Alliance for Patriotic Reconciliation and Construction (APRC)
government
and third, what effect(s) did the foreign policies of the
AFPRC and the
ruling APRC government have on the national economy and
Gambians?
An appraisal of the content and conduct of
Gambia's foreign relations
since the coup of 1994, must of necessity, be
preceded by a quick recap
of what transpired during the Jawara years
(1965-1994). It is generally
agreed that the search for outside
resources to maintain domestic power
structures was central to the
foreign policies of the great majority of
African states.3 The way in
which this search was conducted, however,
varied appreciably according to
the nature of the governments concerned
and the domestic and external
threats they faced. At independence in
1965 and until the coup in
1994, Gambia's foreign policy was driven by
two overarching
objectives. First has been the desire to maintain
sovereign
statehood for the territory within the context of a perceived
potential
threat of assimilation by neighboring Senegal.4 The second had
to do with
attracting external economic resources to support the Peoples
Progressive
Party (PPP) government's development agenda as well as help
enrich
Gambia's political and bureaucratic class. In so doing, the
PPP
government under Jawara succeeded in attracting considerable
economic
and political support from the outside, principally because of
his
pro-Western, anti-Communist and strong human rights record.
Also,
Gambia's cordial relations with oil-rich Arab and Gulf states
proved
financially rewarding in Jawara's bid to diversify Gambia's
funding
sources in order to reduce the country's dependence on the
UK.
Gambia's relations with its all encompassing neighbor,
Senegal, have
occupied center stage since independence in 1965. It
is a relationship
often characterized by periods of relative calm and
turbulence,
cooperation as in the now defunct Senegambia Confederation
and border
closures to stem Gambia's re-export trade into Senegal and
neighboring
states. A UN report prior to independence suggested
several possible
strategies that ranged from total integration into
Senegal to proposals
for a monetary and customs union.5 In the
immediate aftermath of the
1981 aborted coup led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang,
Gambia agreed to join
Senegal in a loose confederation, which Senegal
hoped would lead
ultimately to full political union. The
confederation was however
marred from the outset by Gambian fears of
being disadvantaged and the
Confederation's "shot gun-wedding"
character.6 The Confederation ended
in 1989; in particular, over
the issue of a rotating presidency, which
Jawara would have liked, but
which Abdou Diouf of Senegal opposed.
Predictably, with the 1994 coup
against Jawara, Senegal refused to
intervene but offered the ex-president
and his entourage political
asylum immediately. In fact, poor
relations with Senegal after 1989 and
in particular, Senegal's border
closure contributed partly to both the
cause and success of the
coup. The immediate causes of the coup
however, lie more concretely
in the social, political, class and
generational problems that built up
in the long years of PPP rule and
within the army as
well.7
Reviewing Gambia's political history under
Jawara indeed resembles a
plateau occasionally marred by volcanic
eruptions. The general image,
as projected perhaps too often to the
world outside, was of a mini-state
adept at survival, able in spite of
underdevelopment to run an open
society with a multiparty democracy and
encapsulating both the problems
and opportunities of small states.8
In this picture the putsch in 1981
and for that matter, the coup of 1994
were potrayed as aberrations. On
the economic front, despite years of
claimed economic success, Gambia
under Jawara continued to have one of
the lowest living standards in the
continent and ranked 166th in the
world out of 173 countries according
to the UNDP Human Development
Index.9 In spite of very generous
financial assistance after the
1981 attempted coup, approximately 60 per
cent of Gambia's population
still live under the poverty line. Thus,
Gambia's paradox under Jawara
lay in the fact that here was a mini-state
whose viability at
independence was in question and in spite of the odds
managed to build a
relatively open economy and a functioning democracy,
but with a very low
level of development.10 Clearly, while part of the
problem lay in
elite corruption and enrichment, the overriding cause
more generally, was
the poor performance of public institutions.
Regionally,
Jawara maintained good relations with neighboring states
and as an elder
statesman, sought to resolve the Liberia conflict. At
the
continental level Gambia under Jawara supported the OAU and its
efforts
to end racism and apartheid in South Africa. What at first
started
out as good relations with Libya quickly deteriorated in the
early 1980's
because of Gadaffi's support of Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who
led the
unsuccessful coup attempt against Jawara in 1981. By the time
he
was overthrown, Jawara was acclaimed internationally for his
commitment
to human rights, democracy and the rule of law especially
within the
Commonwealth. Consequently, the condemnation and the
subsequent
sanctions imposed by the West and Western institutions on the
AFPRC
following his ouster, was to have a chilling effect on the coup
and
Gambia's
economy.
The AFPRC's External Policy Pronouncements: 1994-1996
The central preoccupation of the AFPRC following the coup was the
need to
ensure Gambia's economic survival in the face of mounting
Western
displeasure and threats of economic sanctions. These threats
were
not taken lightly by the AFPRC, understandably. The fact that
80
per cent of Gambia's national development budget was at the time
funded
by the EU, Japan, the UK and international financial institutions
meant
that the severing of aid would have disastrous economic and
social
consequences. Until 1972, Britain provided the bulk of
foreign
financial assistance to Gambia and by 1981, EU aid to Gambia rose
from
$0.5m in 1976 to $13m, making it the largest multilateral donor in
that
period. Although the volume of aid declined in subsequent
years, the EU
maintained its lead as Gambia's principal multilateral
donor until
1986.11 In that year, the International Development
Agency, a World
Bank affiliate took the leading position. Between
1987-1990 EU's
assistance to Gambia amounted to some $30m. A large
part of this came
in the form of balance of payments
assistance.
Furthermore, US withdrawal of $10m in aid
coupled with Japan's and
the UNDP's freezing of all development aid,
meant that Gambia's external
reserves, scant as they were, would become a
major source for financing
the balance of payments deficit. A
British Foreign Office "travel
advice" on November 23,1994,
four months after the coup, that "Banjul is
calm but the political
situation in The Gambia remains uncertain and
could deteriorate
quickly" literally gutted the tourist industry.12
This travel advice
was quickly followed by similar Swedish and Danish
announcements
cautioning potential tourists not to visit Gambia, because
of political
instability. Since the mid-1970's, tourism had become
Gambia's main
source of foreign exchange and constituted 12 percent of
GDP. It
employed approximately 10,000 workers many of whom were heads
of
households supporting on average ten individuals.
Combined Western sanctions came into effect in November, following
the
failed coup attempt on November 11,1994 in which as many as 30
soldiers
were said to have been summarily executed. Also, the dismissal
of
Bakary Dabo, allegedly for his involvement in the foiled coup,
triggered
a swift and severe Western reaction.13 Dabo, who was at one
time Jawara's
minister of finance, also held the same portfolio in the
new
regime. He subsequently fled the country out of fear for his
life.
The EU froze all balance of payments support, followed by the
suspension
of all but humanitarian aid by the US and Japan, pending
the
announcement of a program to return the country to democratic
rule.
With sanctions in place, government coffers were quickly being
depleted
with reverberating effects on the average Gambian's standard of
living.
The failed coup attempt combined with Western sanctions to create
an
atmosphere of growing AFPRC insecurity domestically.
Consequently, the first reaction to suspend bilateral aid and balance
of
payments assistance provoked two main reactions. The first was
a
defensive reaction from the AFPRC itself that "with or without
aid, The
Gambia would maintain an independent state, run by Gambians in
the
interest of Gambians." 14 The second came generally from
government
officials and the public at large, who felt that the sanctions
were
unjustifiable. All however, were concerned with Gambia's
economic
future in the face of these sanctions. The sanctions also
had the
immediate effect of potentially affecting the projects outlined
in the
development programs of the transition period. Indirectly,
they led to
lower tax revenue for the AFPRC, due in part to dislocation
of trade
caused by foreign currency shortage. Jammeh criticized the
IMF and
World Bank for the negative effects structural adjustment had
on
Gambia's poor and vowed that the burden of such policies would no
longer
be borne by the poor alone, but by the rich as well. He also
rejected
forthwith the linkage between Western aid resumption to Jawara's
return
to Gambia. He castigated Jawara for presiding over a
democracy defined
by corruption and promised to recover money embezzled
by officials of
the previous regime.
Perhaps the earliest
and most significant demonstration of goodwill
toward the AFPRC came from
Libya. Following the withdrawal of Western
bilateral aid in
November 1994, Libya stepped into the void with a $15m
grant.15 In
November 1994 full diplomatic relations with Libya were
restored after 15
years of hostile relations between Jawara and
Gadaffi. Chinese
support and goodwill in the form of a $23m grant for
agriculture
followed. Chinese assistance was to cease immediately,
however,
following the AFPRC's resumption of diplomatic relations with
Taiwan on
July 13, 1995, after a 21year break.16 The Jawara government
had
earlier in 1968 established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but
broke
them off in 1974 in favor of China. Outraged by the APRC
policy
change, China severed relations with Gambia on July 25,
1995. Since
then, Taiwan has been a staunch supporter of the AFPRC
and the
subsequent APRC government with an initial loan of $35m.17
Today,
Taiwanese aid has totaled about $80m. Clearly, because of
ongoing
difficulties with the mainland, Taiwan has tried to make friends
and win
support for its position internationally. The AFPRC's
efforts to make
friends and hence, end growing international isolation
also led to the
dispatching of several government delegations to Nigeria,
Sierra Leone
with Jammeh making his first trip to Senegal on September
22, 1994 to
meet with President Diouf.18 Diouf promised
support for the new regime
aware of Jammeh's potential role and future
involvement in the civil war
in Senegal's northern province of
Cassamance. Senegal's border closure
before the coup,
together with the impact of Western sanctions was
already putting a
suffocating squeeze on Gambia's economy.19
At this
point Nigeria became Gambia's benefactor and proved critical
to the
survival of Gambia's economy. Surrounded by Senegal and
other
French-speaking countries, Gambia has maintained warm and
cordial
relations with its larger and more populous protector. With
the demise
of the Senegambian Confederation in 1989, president Jawara
sought and
received protection from the military president of Nigeria,
General
Ibrahim Babangida. Subsequent to the coup in 1994, Jammeh
inherited and
strengthened relations with Nigeria and became the
protégé and ally of
the late Nigerian president, General
Sani Abacha. In fact, Jammeh cut
short a regional tour to
Mauritania, Cape Verde and Guinea on learning
of Abacha's death in June
1998. Jammeh maintained good relations with
Nigeria's military
president and successor to the late Abacha, General
Abdusalam Abubakar,
who visited Gambia in early 1999. With Nigeria's
new civilian
government now in power, it is doubtful if such relations
with president
Obasanjo will continue. Since coming to power in early
June,
Obasanjo has begun a purge of many senior military officers in
Nigeria's
army.
The severe reduction and in some cases the freezing of
aid compelled
the Jammeh regime to seek alternative sources of
development funding and
keep the economy afloat. In January 1995,
Jammeh held talks with
President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau
and held similar
meetings with Strasser of Sierra Leone and Rawlings of
Ghana. A visit
to Mauritania in the summer of 1995 and various
delegations to Egypt and
Nigeria and promises of financial support and
cooperation eased at least
temporarily AFPRC isolation. At the same
time however, Western pressure
to hand power over to a civilian
government was mounting and the
sanctions were by now having a
detrimental effect by way of sluggish
business activity.
By the end of November 1994, four months after the coup, Jammeh
announced
at a rally in Banjul, the capital, that the AFPRC would return
the
country to civilian rule in December 1998 after free
presidential
elections. This meant the AFPRC would be in office for
a little over
four years and five months. The length of the
transition was condemned
both nationally and internationally. Chief
Emeka Anyaoku, the
Commonwealth Secretary-General, issued a statement in
London rejecting
the four-year delay as "unacceptable" and
called for elections within
three to six months. Aware of mounting
domestic and international
pressure against the four-year timetable and
upon the recommendation of
the National Consultative Commission (NCC),
the AFPRC agreed to a
two-year timetable to culminate in presidential
elections in June 1996.
The AFPRC however, rejected the NCC's proposal
for an interim civilian
government to be headed by Dr. Wally Ndow, a UN
official or Dr. Lamin
Sanneh, a Yale University professor of
religion.
Following the two-year term limit
announcement, AFPRC foreign
relations assumed a more aggressive stance
with Jammeh visiting Egypt on
June 11-12, 1995 where he met President
Mubarak and PLO leader Yasser
Arafat. At the 31st Summit of the OAU
heads of state meeting in Addis
Ababa, Jammeh pledged to pay in full,
Gambia's overdue contributions to
the organization. This earned him
needed recognition. But perhaps the
regime scored its greatest
success in its foreign relations, when it
succeeded in July of 1995, in
hosting President Rawlings of Ghana as the
guest of honor during the
first anniversary of the coup. Also, the
official opening of the
mosque at the State House, later that summer by
the Imam of Mecca, had an
important symbolic effect on a predominantly
Muslim country, in addition
to cultivating support and goodwill with the
oil-rich Arab and Gulf
States. In time, the AFPRC cultivated and
maintained cordial
relations with these states and in August 1996, Iran
pledged to improve
relations with Gambia and to cooperate in agriculture
and fishing
sectors. It appears that by the time the AFPRC celebrated
its
second year in office in July 1996, it had succeeded in spite of
the
sanctions, to make friends and earn the financial support it needed
to
undertake its development projects. A $20m loan from the
Africa
Development Bank to refurbish Banjul's international airport is a
case
in point. This was indicative of the slow but growing
acceptance of the
regime in some circles, in part because of its putative
objective to
improving living conditions for the average Gambian. A
visit by
President Abdou Diouf of Senegal earlier in January, was also a
sign of
Senegal's approval, perhaps apprehensiveness of the AFPRC.
The
resumption of some financial aid from the West, in preparation for
the
impending presidential elections now slated for September
1996,
suggested some shelter from the storm. In fact, during his
address at
the second July 22 celebration of the coup and two months
before the
elections, Jammeh singled out Taiwan, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria,
Sierra
Leone, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia as "true
friends." He also
spoke warmly of the improved relations with
Senegal.20
In retrospect, it seems that the AFPRC succeeded
in maintaining the
economy, albeit marginally with funds made available
by friends. In
fact, by March 1996, Gambia's external reserves
stood at $112m compared
with $90m at the end of June 1995. The
generally held belief that the
economy would ultimately collapse in the
face of reduced development
aid, balance of payments support and reduced
revenue because of the
British travel advice, was in reality, not
realized.21 While all these
were inevitably affected, Gambia's
macro-economic framework under the
supervision of Central Bank and the
Ministry of Finance averted major
economic dislocation. That the
AFPRC initiated several development
projects including two high schools,
a hospital in Farafenni etc. and
raised salaries was indeed remarkable
given the adverse international
environment.
The
consequences of donor sanctions were far-reaching, nonetheless.
They
undermined business confidence and activity, created mass
unemployment in
tourism and raised the price of essential commodities.
Personal income,
not even to speak of government and corporate revenue
plummeted. It
is estimated that the sanctions resulted in a $100m loss
in aid and
approximately $10m in direct foreign investment by the end of
1995.
While the sanctions targeted the AFPRC, in hindsight it hurt the
average
Gambian economically. Economic sanctions, as other countries
like
Iraq and Libya suggest do not bring about the intended political
changes
in leadership. If anything, they tend to worsen the hardship
among
the poor and vulnerable in the
population.
The APRC and Gambia's Foreign Policy: 1996-
1999
Gambia's
transition to "civilian" rule culminated in the election
of
retired Captain Yahya Jammeh as president of the Second Republic
on
September 26, 1996 and the holding of National Assembly elections
on
January 2, 1997.22 Jammeh resigned his commission shortly
before the
presidential election, formed the APRC party and tilted the
rules to
favor him after having banned his major political
opponents.
Predictably, the Commonwealth condemned both the results and
the process
in which all the major contestants were excluded from
participation.
Jammeh responded "that the West wanted democracy to
be restored in
Gambia. Now they have it and as an added bonus an
olive branch to
march." He further argued that there was no
reason to ostracize the
regime and no justification for maintaining the
economic sanctions on
the country. In early November 1996, Libya
expressed strong support for
the new government and urged Gambians to
"live in dignity and freedom
under its youthful
revolution." Thereafter, Jammeh paid a four-day
visit to Libya
and in a communiqué called on OAU member states to work
together
and called for the end "to unjust sanctions imposed on the
Libyan
people." In January 22, 1997, Taiwan announced a $411,500
grant
to enable the Jammeh government pay the salaries of Cuban, Nigerian
and
Egyptian doctors and healthcare workers. Aware of the fact that
his
regime was not looked upon favorably by its main aid donors, Jammeh
was
bent on cultivating productive alliances and support elsewhere.
He made
several trips to the Middleast and performed the pilgrimage to
Mecca in
1997. Thus, with Jammeh in power and control over the
National
Assembly, the APRC's diplomatic flurry sought to
consolidate
pre-election friendships and the creation of new ones.
In fact,
Jammeh's wedding to an Algerian national in early 1999
strengthened
further Gambia's relations with Algeria.
The
meeting in Gambia on September 11, 1997 of the nine member
countries of
the Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in
the Sahel
(CILSS), accorded the new regime much needed recognition and
prestige
regionally. Serving as the CILSS current Chairman gave Jammeh
a
forum to showcase his development programs, especially the
newly
refurbished airport and new television station. The APRC
gained more
international recognition when Gambia became a non-permanent
member of
the UN Security Council on January 2, 1998 for a two-year
term. Jammeh
has used his newly found status to support friends
like Taiwan, Libya
and Iraq. On May 14, 1998, Iraq's foreign
minister visited Gambia to
seek help in fighting UN imposed
sanctions. Similarly, Jammeh has
called for the end of UN imposed
sanctions against Libya at the OAU and
the UN respectively. It
appears that Jammeh's international image is
improving with Gambia's
presence in the Security Council. In February,
1998 Jammeh paid
visits to France and Italy, chaired the UN Security
Council in March and
held talks with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Nigeria in April and
May. Regionally, Jammeh's government successfully
mediated the
conflict in Guinea- Bissau. This was a major
accomplishment.
The APRC has also offered its good offices in the civil
war between
Senegal's government and the rebels of the Movement for a
Democratic
Casamance (MFDC). Clearly, this has enhanced Jammeh's sense
of
confidence. Thus, Jammeh like Jawara before him has emerged as
a
peace broker in part to ward off these conflicts from destabilizing
his
regime. Already, Gambia is home to over 10,000 refugees from
Senegal's
neighboring province of Casamance, Guinea- Bissau and
Sierra-Leone. The
need to attract foreign resources to support his
development agenda at
home and maintain Gambia's territorial integrity
are the driving forces
for Jammeh's numerous missions abroad. This
is a paradox however,
because this is an issue that he consistently
criticized ex-president
Jawara for, after the coup.
Gambia's foreign policy successes are also attributable to a cadre
of
seasoned career diplomats, notwithstanding the frequent changes at
the
foreign minister level. Since the coup, Bolong Sonko,
Baboucarr
Blaise Jagne, Omar Njie and its current holder, Lamin Sedat
Jobe, an
official at UNESCO, have held this position. Together,
they have given
leadership, coherence and direction to Gambia's foreign
relations. The
appointment of seasoned diplomats like Njogu Bah,
who serves as
Ambassador to France is indicative of France's growing
importance and
source of support for Gambia. Bah, who studied in
Dakar and France,
respectively, first served as Ambassador to Senegal and
is also
accredited to several European countries. Ex-minister Sonko
has since
joined the major opposition party, the United Democratic Party
(UDP) and
Jagne now serves as Gambia's representative to the
UN. As in most
countries, Ambassadorial appointments under
Jammeh have often been
political. The accreditation of Crispin
Grey-Johnson as Ambassador to
Washington was greeted with
enthusiasm. Though not a career diplomat,
Johnson, by most accounts
performed well as Ambassador. As of this
writing, he has been
recalled to Gambia with the official reason that
his two-year term was up
and was needed elsewhere.
Yet, it seems likely that
Gambia's increasingly activist foreign
policy may begin to restore the
goodwill of its main donors and reverse
what once was an antagonistic
relationship. This is precisely what
appears to be happening.
After almost a four- year absence, the World
Bank has resumed lending to
Gambia with an initial loan of $18m in April
1998. The IMF at the
end of June 1998 also approved a three-year loan
to the regime under an
enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) of
$27m. The
UNDP and the US have resumed some aid. The EU has also
promised aid
to the tune of $100m over a three-year period. The
African
Development Bank also made an additional $13m loan in 1998 to
compliment
the $14m in aid given in 1997. The money would be used to
improve
health services, population and poverty reduction measures.
While some
major Western donors have resumed aid it is yet to reach
pre-coup
levels. Jammeh's commitment to democracy and human rights will
be
the basis upon which Western aid and support will be continued.
Yet,
with tourist bookings approximating pre-coup levels, the economy
could
get a shot in the arm. These loans and added revenue could
give the
regime the needed stamp of approval to attract more loans and
support.
Also, the resumption of aid to almost pre-coup levels and
relations with
Senegal improving, Gambia's re-export trade could get a
new leash on
life. Jammeh's conciliatory gesture to the diplomatic
Community in
Gambia in January 1998 seeks to forge a "new era of
partnership and
cooperation." In spite of the resumption of some aid
and returning
tourists however, the economy remains vulnerable to
external shocks. The
APRC's growing repression of opposition leaders,
parties and the press
could deteriorate into instability with potential
spillover into the
army and civil society. It seems the donor
community will keep a
watchful eye over Jammeh's commitment to principles
of good governance
and human
rights.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Gambia' s foreign policy since the coup
d'etat of 1994
has been remarkably innovative and effective in attracting
needed funds
from alternative sources abroad to support domestic
programs. Jammeh
and his ministers wasted little time in
cultivating new friendships and
consolidating old alliances outside the
Western sphere of influence.
Thus, following the coup AFPRC policy had
the dual objective of making
friends and securing alternative sources of
financial assistance. In so
doing, AFPRC policy succeeded partly in
circumventing growing
international isolation and the negative impact of
Western imposed
economic sanctions. Under the APRC, Gambia's
foreign policy also has a
dual strategy of appeasing the West and lending
institutions in order to
attract needed funds, and support for so-called
"rouge" states like
Libya and Iraq. Gambia's
non-permanent membership of the UN Security
Council however, broadened
the scope and conduct of its increasingly
activist foreign policy.
This engendered a growing sense of confidence
for the president, leading
him to play an important role in conflict
mediation and resolution,
regionally and internationally. Gambia's
growing activist foreign
policy has also begun a gradual reversal of
Western imposed economic
sanctions and Gambia's international
isolation. The combined roles
of the President as peace broker and
fundraiser underscore the two
central objectives that have driven
Gambia's foreign policy historically,
i.e., territorial independence and
procurement of external financial
resources for internal development and
regime legitimization
purposes. In this regard, Gambia's foreign
relations have remained
remarkably consistent since independence. This
is what links Jammeh
to Jawara and explains to some extent why both men
use(ed) foreign travel
in part, to fulfill these dual national
objectives. The fates of
geopolitics and limited resource endowments
have conspired to keep it
this way. Future presidents are not likely to
deviate significantly
from this trodden path.
Perhaps this realization
coupled with Jammeh's slow, albeit,
growing acceptance in the
international community has led him to temper
his once defiant and
defensive posture toward the West. He has as a
result become more
concilliatory like Jawara before him in order to gain
Western support and
financial assistance with occasional criticism of
the West.
However, this changed behavior or strategy has not
necessarily led to
full resumption of aid. Jammeh therefore, finds
himself in a
difficult mediator role as he seeks to balance Western
capitalist
interests, adverse effects of structural adjustment, on one
hand and the
welfare of a poor and growing population, on the other.
This systemic
tension, perhaps conflict, is likely to sow the seeds of
discontent and
instability in the army and civil society. Coups and
counter coups
in Africa and in Ghana for example, have in part, been the
consequence of
regime inability to mediate this conflict. While
Gambia's foreign
policy under the AFPRC and APRC succeeded in attracting
external
financial assistance, the question remains if this would
translate into
tangible welfare improvements and benefits for Gambians.
Foreign policy
under Jawara successful as it was, marginally improved
the lives of
Gambia's poor. And notwithstanding APRC projects and the
good
intentions of the donor and lending community, the logic of IMF and
World
Bank structural adjustment policies and lending, in general, tend
to put
in place a good macro-economic framework but often fail to
ameliorate or
reduce poverty levels.
Jammeh's role(s) and skills as
a regional conflict mediator and
between Western capital and domestic
welfare needs, must be extended to
negotiate the crisis in the domestic
political domain. The current rift
between the regime and
opposition political parties and leaders must be
resolved to pre-empt a
quickly deteriorating political atmosphere.
Political space must be
provided these leaders and parties to enable
them to engage effectively
in the political process. Political
repression and human rights
abuses only delay temporarily the quest for
freedom, participation and
accountability. A threshold is finally
reached when repression may
not necessarily engender compliance. What
is needed is political
"Vision 20/20" to complement its predecessor
(economic)
"Vision 20/20." Jammeh's commitment to human rights
and
democratic principles will be the basis upon which Western aid
and
support will be continued. The appeal by Jammeh to traditional
African
principles and practices of democracy as possible alternatives to
a more
inclusive and participatory type democracy, are not likely to
bring aid
to pre-coup levels. Insistence by Jammeh on maintaining
the status quo
may not in the end elicit desirable outcomes.
Consequently, an enabling
political and economic environment that has at
its root individual
freedoms and opportunity for self- improvement,
especially for women and
the rural poor must accompany this.
Despite some obvious flaws, Vision
20/20 is a good start in this
direction.23 These strategies combined
could go a long way in
releasing and further developing both the
creative and entrepreneurial
qualities of Gambians. However, when
stifled they deepen
underdevelopment and mediocrity and no amount of
external funding or
successful foreign policy per se, can begin to
reverse this
process.
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