TANZAPHILIA
In January 1964, a little known Ugandan immigrant named John Okello, led a
group of Africans dissatisfied with the domination of economic and political
life in Zanzibar by an Arab minority to seize a police station. They overpowered
the police, succeeded in arming themselves with guns and went on a violent
rampage in which more than 5000 Arabs lost their lives. This revolution brougt
to an end the brutal rule by Arabs over the African majority; a rule that was
supported by the British who continued to treat Zanzibar as an Arab colony. The
Revolutionary Council that was set up was led by Karume and included the
legendary Abdulrahman Muhammed Babu.
The Zanzibari Revolution was swiftly followed by a chain reaction in
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda. Officers from both the army and the police
mutinied for general resentment against the continuing presence of British army
officers and for better pay. The governments were alarmed and Nyerere himself
went into hiding for a couple of days as the mutineers had seized State House
and the airport at Dar es Salaam. The situation was only brought under control
after he appealed for assistance from the British.
Meanwhile, Marxists were effectively in power in Zanzibar. Western
countries witheld recognition of the new state but China, East Germany and
the Soviet Union were swift in their offer of aid and support, and without delay
commuinist technicians arrived in Zanzibar.
Nyerere became alarmed and feared for Zanzibar being drawn into the Cold
War, while loosing any possibility of influencing the course of events there. So
he proposed a union with Zanzibar. Together with the island of Pemba, the
result of that union became known as Tanzania. Briefly, this is the historical
setting that defined the ideolgical process laying the foundation of what
became known as Ujaama.
In Europe, like many other African leaders, Nyerere experienced the horrors
of capitalism at first hand. The gross exploitation of the workers and peasants
by an elite ruling class, racism, and the humiliation of having to see
fellow Africans being brutally exploited by colonial governments even as many of
these lost their lives in fighting to liberate Europeans from the horrors of
German fascism, were for many of them, as powerful an indictment of capitalism
as was imaginable.
So African leaders like Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Amilcar Cabral,
Agostino Neto, Sekou Toure and others, (many of them trained in the West) became
ardent Socialists. Added to this is the fact that capitalism produced nothing
attractive to Black Africans.
Colonial governments were dictatorial, autocratic and brutal. Not only were
the educational systems they designed geared towards serving their own
interests, but the economic infrastructure was destructive of African indegenous
industries, and discouraged competition with their metropolitan counterparts,
this to the extent that African states were reduced to producing nothing but
primary products. Also, colonial policy did not create ethnicity in Africa but
it promoted ethnic consciousness and helped stratify society on those
lines.
Eventually, while African colonies were waging bitter and bloody
struggles to liberate themselves from colonial domination (the Portuguese
colonies in particular) many Western Governments were helping these colonialists
to remain in power as a pretext to ward off Soviet interests in the continent.
Their policies sharply contrasted with the solidarity and material support
offered by socialist/communists states to people struggling and yearning for
freedom.
So clearly, the ideological lines were visibly drawn and it appears to me
as a matter of common sense as to what choice many of the leaders made. The
choice for socialism was not so much of a case of pitting Marxist economic
organisation of society against the free market system. It was more of an
instance of putting up cultural resistance against and constructing a
psychological distance from a system which first enslaved Africans for centuries
before subjecting them to the horrors of imperial colonial rule. Besides,
socialist theory with its emphasis on an egalitarian ethic fitted very well with
the urgent question of addressing the social and economic injustices apparent
everywhere in the newly independent countries.
Nvertheless, Nyerere's case was a rare instance of uncommon wisdom. The
union with Zanzibar brought under his control a tiny island that the West feared
was becoming an African Cuba. He brought Abdulrahman Babu and Kassim Hanga into
his government and thereby retained the support of their international friends,
China and the Soviet Union. (Babu earlier worked for the New China News agency
and Hanga who studied in Moscow had married a Russian woman). Yet he exercised
moderacy in his committment to socialism by refusing to link up his ideological
persuasion as a version either that of Marx and Lenin or that of Mao-Tse Tung.
Instead, he polished
his socialist ideals and cloaked them with a primitive African communalist
reality, all of it laundered and ironed into an originality he called Ujaama. He
loosely translated this to mean "familyhood" in English; and everybody got
happy. Mwalimu the theoretician, was born and in his vision was an African
country where colonial neglect of the rural areas, especially, came to an abrupt
end. This way Julius Nyerere became the darling of both East and West and firmly
placed his country outside the cold-war theatre, getting massive aid from
everyone and everywhere, and the CIA had therefore, no cause to plot his
overthrow - a fate met by many African radical leaders who sat squarely in
the Soviet camp. Consequently, Tanzania enjoyed a long period of political
stability.
Ujaama was officially launched in 1967 and that was a particularly euphoric
year in modern Tanzanian history. Nyerere did not just get massive international
backing and support. The majority of Tanzanians were firmly behind him and there
were genuine hopes that Nyerere's African socialism would serve as a ready model
for developing otherwise undeveloped African countries. None other than Ali
Mazrui labelled the contagious euphoria as "Tanzaphilia"!
True, Nyerere threw away and gave up the ideals of a democratic society as
stipulated in the Tanzanian constitution. But so did almost everyone else.
The reasons for this development seems to me quite simple:
The Westminster model of constitutions that independent African states
authored for themselves had no basis in African political traditions. That
colonial governments that helped shape them were themselves insiduously
autocratic, meant these constitutions were literally alien.
Secondly, democracy as a system of rule emerged through a process of
long continuous struggle everywhere. The concept of Western democracy has
meaning only in the presence of a loyal opposition. i.e a necessary
condition for a democratic state is the presence of a dialectically opposite
counterpart that lays claim to improve conditions by criticising the party
in power. This, I would dare stick out my neck, is also alien to Africa. It is
true as Nyerere himself would later say, that "the men would sit under a tree
and argue until a consensus is reached". But as soon as agreement is made,
dissent becomes taboo. Our own historian, Patience Godwin-Sonko has written
about this. But this formula fits more with the modern understanding of a
one-party state rather than the constitutionally sanctioned presence of a loyal
opposition, which by fiat, need not keep silent only because a consensus had
already been reached on a particular issue. I think
investigating our concept of a loyal opposition is of particular importance.
What indeed are the Mandinka, or for that matter Wollof or Fula words for a
political opposition?
Infact, Joseph Diescho writes "....Africans experimenting with
democracy...have no experience with the kind of opposition necessary to
strengthen a republic" and the "whole practice of opposition is alien to
the universe of thought in African societies". He goes so far as to say that
there is no neutral word for opposition in existing African languages; that in
Southern African languages the words that approximate to the Western notion of
an opposition do not contain the element of loyalty; that its meaning borders on
destroying and eliminating the one being opposed.
Is it too surprising then that we see all the leaders readily silencing
opponents and throwing journalists into jail? Have they not been champions
at eliminating opponents, feeding some to crocodiles?
[ To this day, the educated elite is subscribing to
this confusion of cultural political alienation by naming political
parties for PPP, NCP APRC, PDOIS, UDP, etc. All these names together with their
"magic" acronyms are not only unpronounceable by the great majority of Gambians,
it is only with great difficulty that common illiterates can remember
whatever notions of idealist visions lie behind them. Instead of worrying about
these meanings they simply replace the messenger for the message. This way the
politicians themselves aid in introducing a politics of personalities instead of
issues. The acronyms are duely appropriated as symbols for the party].
Thirdly, that proponent of liberal democray, the bourgeiosie was absent in
many countries; and where it existed it was weak, embryonic and tiny, and not
infact truely bourgeois. Where it evinced a courageous political and economic
alternative, it ran the risk of passing as an antiliberationist force especially
in countries where memories of the liberation struggle and institutionalised
racism were so deep.
For these and other reasons it is understandable that Nyerere and other
leaders threw away the democratic ideals which they swore to defend and
uphold immediately after assuming power. Most of Africa, with its internal
schisms and searing poverty and chaos, was simply waiting to be controlled by a
strong man at the helm - either through the military apparatus or by controlling
the system of distribution - preying upon a very weak state structure. Of
course, many of the leaders were just callous idiots!
Yes, Ujaama failed, and Ayitteh and Shirima told us the reasons why. But
they neither told us all the reasons of failure nor the little successes! In
1973, signs of failure were clearly visible in the villagisation scheme. Up to
that time the relocation of peasants was virtually voluntary and only 2 percent
of the population had been moved. Nyerere became impatient and changed policy
towards enforced villagisation. But by this time world-wide recession as a
result of the first oil shock was already underway. The price of Tanzanian
exports such as tea and sisal fell like meteors. The ulready unfair terms of
trade became even worse for all African economies. In 1970 one ton of exported
tea could fetch for Tanzania 60 barrels of oil. By 1980 the same quantity
of tea earned them less than 5 barrels! The country was by now running a deficit
economy and its debt kept soaring, making it impossible to import spare parts.
Drought also took its toll on agricultural production. Tanzania also incurred
severe costs - estimated at US$500 million - in liberating Uganda from Idi
Amin's terror.
A few bright sides are that 40% of villages were provided with running
water while three out of ten had clinics. Adult literacy grew from ten to
ninety-five percent while average life expectancy rose from 41 to 51 years.
School attendance soared from 25% of the children to 95% while infant mortality
felt to half of what it was in 1960.
These were by all means modest achievements by a country that was the
most helped. Ujaama failed terribly, without question. But in contrast to what
Ayyiteh and Sharima wrote, Nyerere was very honest in admitting failure even
before he resigned as President in 1984. He did not seek to lay the blame on
Mwinyi, his succcessor.
Given that other leaders who chose the capitalist path towards economic
organisation of their countries failed almost equally miserably, but
perhaps less dramatically, it was incredible that the authors chose to argue
against Nyerere being a saint without telling us the concrete historical
circumstances that presented him with an alternative course of action which
could have prevented him from becoming a knave.
Did he have a more reasonable choice, say, other than in 1973 when he could
have changed course, instead of stubbornly declaring ".....we shall never
change"? Was there anyone, anywhere, who advised or opposed "Ujaama" from
the beginning?
My belief is that in spite of similarities of experience with other
colonised and oppressed peoples, there were no blueprints anywhere in the world,
at the dawn of independence, that correctly could tell Africans what road to
take towards social progress.
Sorry, It became just too long, but well that's it!
Momodou S. Sidibeh,
Stockholm/Kartong