This is an attempt at ridding the text of those awful code-blemishes... Sorry for presenting such an unreadable mess... LEOK.



Essay on THE GREAT DEBATE: Physical Realists and Social Constructionists

-Setting the context-

Being competitive, I cannot refrain from entering - considering myself an evolutionary psychologist, I am biased - and being European, I do not exactly understand what the question "what should an undergraduate be taught" could possibly mean, so I do not know what I am talking about. I am not going to be comprehensive, I will not explain all concepts - I believe my audience knows more than I do. I will respond to any comments and questions.

- And now for something entirely different...-

The great debate is an epic battle - the heroes are more legion than Homer et al. might have imagined, the plethora of villains occupy the popular science bookshelves, the arsenal of arguments are so flashy they make Industrial Light and Magic's illusions pale, and the tricks dirtier than would ever be admitted. Often it seems just a wee bit too fantastic, locked in Cartesian and other detrimental, outdated philosophies. Natural science is pitted against research into specific cases - hermeneutic interpretations opposed to nomothetic data. The greed for status is persistent and obvious, and an either-or thinking so popular the world of academia seems "borderline". 

The choices "both sides are correct", "one side is correct", "no sides are correct", etc. soon become meaningless. The problem is that loosing one's paranoid wartime mentality is not easy, and academic PTSD is rife. I am probably a casualty myself, and do not know it... I am sure my diagnosis will be set, even by those who abhor on ideological and intellectual grounds such labelling. But I will in an exhibitionist manner set forth some comments that I find obvious, and if this is shared by all I will seem simpleminded, but maybe also be able to end some skirmishes (I then might receive the Nobel peace prize if not the bottle). I take solace in that was a simple young lad that noticed the emperor was naked... 

I suggest: We know enough on both sides to conclude that we are all right about some things, not totally right about much that matters, able to discern patterns clear enough to be statistically correct at group levels, and fond of many of the opposing camp's major achievements... 

-Sciences and areas of research-

I do not know if I have my history in perfect order here, and am sure I will be corrected, but... I think it would be in order to consider the culture of a country, say the UK, and the history of knowledge and status within the system of education. Certain universities (redbrick) were constructed to teach sciences, while the grand old status-rich institutions ("oxbridge") considered the classical education of any worth for a gentleman to exclude science, it was something to do in one's spare time, like gardening - the closest one got was mathematics as a logical (philological?) exercise. In that cultural setting Science was not what everyone wanted to do and Science was not the only label one's research could be gratified by. It is therefore a relatively new idea that only Science is worthwhile and important. (Dare I say a Modern idea?) Elitist thinkers and romantic thinkers yearn for those classical days. Humanists and social studies want to share the status of Science - instead of constructing their own status. There is research - different kinds, all of which is of possible great worth to many. Some research is by method (and method alone, not Status or Truth) identifiable as Science. With the limitations that this offers, and the levels of generality that this offers etc. Some research, of no lesser status and worth, is still not science. 

In psychology one needs to be able to integrate natural science, social studies and humanities. One cannot get away from this position. Sometimes people try - and they fail. Not because "reduction" to the analysis levels of biology, mind or social are illegal moves in all instances (indeed it is necessary in many instances), but because when attempting to understand a complex situation one must be able to process simultaneously bottom-up (from the jig-saw pieces to the whole picture) and top-down (from the Gestalt, the whole, to the atoms, the pieces). Within psychology the biopsychosocial perspective has been a long-standing alibi for paying lip service to "holism" while actually considering merely one level. A commitment to biopsychosocial models, which consider interactions between levels as main focus, will lend one a tool for combining "holism" and "reductionism". An example: The patient showing severe depressive symptoms may benefit from a range of interventions: a) Biochemistry (SSRI, ECT), b) Psychotherapy (Cognitive therapy, Interpersonal therapy), c) Social interventions aimed at social relations at work, in the family, etc. All of these interventions are likely to help on their own. A consideration of interactions between them will improve the likelihood of succeeding to help the patient. If there are marital problems or so low levels of activation that one cannot access the mental mechanisms verbally then cognitive therapy, which is a well-documented psychotherapy of choice for many depressed patients, is probably not a viable intervention or as good a treatment as could be offered. Only by considering interactions between levels may one perceive the complex situation, just as only by reducing it may one intervene.

The craft (forget science and art in this case, these are words of status only, for materialistic and humanistic elitists) of psychotherapy provides yet another interesting look into the differences of epistemological methods. Hermeneutic knowledge and analysis, which seeks to gather an interpretation of the specific "text" or "individual", is by most philosophers of science, and almost all researchers that use this approach, considered to not be compatible with natural science. Natural science generally seeks general or universal regularities, thus the two will, it is claimed, never meet. Obviously if one's research is meant to say something special about Ibsen's "Peer Gynt" and not all plays, or even all plays by existentially oriented Scandinavian authors around the turn of the century, and one limits ones interest to "Peer Gynt", then it is only "Peer Gynt" one needs to research and only "Peer Gynt" one acquires knowledge about. Just as obvious - one is not doing this in a vacuum, so one is generalising during one's work, and one is more than prone to do so after one has finished. If one does empirical, replicable and falsifiable research one wants to find an answer that does not necessarily fit any one of one's objects of study perfectly, but one that statistically will suit the population of objects with a greater likelihood than not. Different methods of research provide different answers, with different qualities. 

Therapy is not a science, as I mentioned - it might to a certain degree be a form of research. One needs to know quite a lot about the specific qualities of the patient. This is true of all forms of treatment, even medical treatment - patients react differently to medicine. A behaviour therapist needs to know about the individual's history of learning and what idiosyncratic reinforcers that work best for the patient. A cognitive therapist needs to research the patient's idiosyncratic automatic thoughts and beliefs. A psycho-analytic/ psychodynamic therapist gathers the biography of the patient. At the same time nomothetic knowledge, knowledge that is either provided by natural science methods or otherwise thought to be general for all patients or all people or at least all people with the specific diagnosis, must be available. The learning laws, the model of cognitive processing that causes emotional states, theories by Freud or even Klein etc. The social constructionist, narrative, postmodern psychotherapists also make general, human nature statements - they write books on how people in general create meaning, share stories, etc. and instrumentally (and surely surprisingly, too) they claim theirs is better than other modes of practice - so it constitutes technology (Sic! Postmodern social constructionist technology, can it be true?). 

In practice one usually combines knowledge that is general with knowledge that is specific. When generating such knowledge one needs to decide what one wants to know. The two kinds of knowledge meet all the time outside of research.

-The death of "objective versus subjective"-

How does one perceive the world? We cannot believe in Tabula Rasa models - evidence for the opposite is too compelling. We have a set of predispositions and rules that tell us what is what - some of these mature through adequate experience, others have to be pretty much in place without experience in order to sift order out of sensational chaos. We do not see the world as it really is, we cannot measure it as it really is. It just cannot be done. We choose certain aspects of what "really is". A flower may look blue to us, we know that is due to what frequencies of light our visual sensory organs are set to scan. It is not blue. The fact that we are interested in it's colour at all is due to that we are able to perceive colour, not due to any objective part of the flower. Of course the flower may have evolved to be blue of a special reason, or maybe it has not. Maybe it was genetic drift, or a spandrel (I refuse to call it an exaptation - that is just a neologism, so far, it has not, as far as I have seen, gathered any weight as a concept), that made the flower blue. But there is something about the matter of the petals that reflect light of a certain frequency. This is true, or we would not see blue. But other organisms see other frequencies (insects?), other qualities of the same frequencies (dogs?), or are less taken with visuals and go for smells and other chemical auras etc. The sets of instruments we are provided with provide us with a certain spectrum of data. This data then is processed by the mental mechanisms (schemata or Darwinian algorithms or even cognitive spandrels, lets be inclusive) our mind consists of. Thus the cognitive constructivist, would be right: we do not see the world as it is, we construct it. Neisser, the cognitive psychologist, is right in claiming we cannot see what we have no schemata for seeing. This also holds for social data and social phenomenon. Schrödinger himself would point out - the real cat is either dead or alive. There are limits to what may be constructed, some phenomena are not quantum and some phenomena are not social - and thus the rules change. 

One also learns. Learning is also a biological, psychological and social process. From Eric Kandel to Lev Vygotsky. 

So equipped with this perspective we know that our human universals make intersubjective much that has been claimed to be subjective. Objectivism is dead - we cannot do it, even our machines are limited by what we design them to measure and how they measure the object. All that is communicable between human beings is intersubjective. That which may not be communicated, which makes up the intrasubjective domain, is our personal experiences. No research may enter the objective, this is the asymptote of the communicable, the intersubjective. No research may publish the intrasubjective, though this may be a major part of the researcher's experience.

To communicate, to research, to seek and to construct meaning - this is to be human, at least within academia. This is what the undergraduate ought to be taught. Then methods for such practice ought to be taught - both logic, critical thought, basic science, as well as insights into major issues within humanities, social studies and arts. The broader the scope the better - thus the student may be able to make informed choices.

-An end to this discussion and long life to the great debate-

The Vienna circle's members are no longer the authorities on philosophy of science, and the belief in objectivism is a cul-de-sac, or a dead end. Long discussions about how everything is relative and nothing can really be known are second rate wordgames, philosophy for peacocks. Richard Dawkins narrates in one of his books how someone once told an author of a postmodern book that she did not understand it at all, and the author took that as a compliment (sic!). Dawkins goes on (if my memory does not fail me) to point out that any postmodernist that is told that his wife is cheating on him would like to know if this was true or not. Any scientist who considers him- or herself free of prejudice and bias, has not read his research manual (or has bought a sloppy manual) and is (this goes without saying, but I take no chances) therefore biased about his own lack of bias. 

A lack of focus on social factors and consciousness has been a problem for science. I would blame Descartes. Modern functional cognitive neuroscience (an other way to say evolutionary psychology?) is one correction, as are all related fields of study. How words and labels influence us, how culture forms us, how social factors are as important now as during the Pleistocene etc. are important issues to research. Models and metaphors that make us aware of these agents are necessary or else we will be blind to many important levels of analysis. This paragraph attempts to show how "modern" ideas of "reality" combines necessarily with "social influence".

I am biased. I am prejudiced. I cannot help being so. I try not to be, but that is all. Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. But I think there is reason to start with the basic theorems of this text when teaching anyone anything about science, research, ourselves, our world and any possible interactions. An alternative summary: The world exists, we exist. We do not exist to create the world; we do not create the world. We do not perceive the world as it is, but we get it right enough much of the time. Blindspots are signs of evolutionary design. We are social animals and we are conscious of many but not all things that affect us. As animals, we are biological, and chemical beings. As social, we are relational beings. And our mind sorts this data to provide us with what we are. We can gather some information about what is general, and some information about what is specific. In both cases we will get a slice of reality (as Asimov writes in one book - it takes a large universe in which one may build a model of that universe. I believe Borges has said something similar). If we neglect either side we do so with a loss of information about the world - readily available information. If nothing else we loose knowledge of what humans have thought about and considered important. 

Physical realists must accept that they are social cognitive constructivistic creatures, unable to be objective. Social constructionists cannot deconstruct that which is not a result of social cognition and social structures. Limits and possibilities abound. 

The great debate will not end. It can not. This discussion will end, it must. The great debate is a place where perspectives and points of view communicate. Most often they communicate in a less than constructive way - food fights and back stabbing being games that are part of too many academic institutions' extracurricular and intracurricular activities. Sometimes the communication causes us to see a broader scope, and better understand our world and ourselves.

Cheers,

Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair