I would like to briefly intervene in the debate raised by Eric Gillet and
others about "reality", "transference", "self-analysis" etc. I would like
to quote some passages from a chapter I was asked to contribute for a book
in memory of Merton Gill, edited by Doris K. Silverman & David L. Wolitzky
(Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1998, in press):
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In Gill's (1982, 1984, 1991, 1994 Ch. 5) view, psychoanalysis
is simply a continuous attempt on the part of the therapist (and hopefully
also of the patient unless he is temporarily incapacitated by his defenses)
at exploring and analyzing the various meanings of the relationship. I say
"analysis of the relationship" and not "analysis of transference" (even if
this latter term is used interchangeably) because Gill gave a different
meaning to the traditional concept of transference. Due to his adoption of
a "relativistic", "perspectivistic" or "socio-constructivistic" paradigm
(Hoffman, 1991) for the analytic situation, the analyst has no right to
define what is transference (what is distorted from a supposedly
non-distorted or realistic relationship), since "distortions" are part and
parcel of any ways of perceiving reality. Actually, we should not use such
terms as distortions or manipulations in the first place (that's way I used
the quotation marks), since it might imply that we believe in the opposite,
i.e., that it is possible to eliminate distortions and perceive an
uncontaminated or "true" reality. In analysis there are only various types
of "realities", i.e., various ways of perceiving and feeling, and these can
be discussed freely until a consensus can be reached on a shared reality
that seems to us more "realistic". Although our perception is subject to
the constraints of reality, "we cannot say what the reality really is"
(Gill, 1994, p. 2; see also Freud, 1940, p. 196). There is no single
definitive or ultimate way of understanding reality, since analysis is an
endless process (in this sense Gill is close to the hermeneutic positions,
but only in this sense, because he disagreed in other respects -- I will
not discuss
here Gill's views on hermeneutics). The perception that the analyst (or,
for that matter, the patient) has at any one time, T1, is conceived as the
reality, and if for some reason later, at time T2, the perspective
changes, he may label as transference the perception he had at T1, while
in turn also the perception at T2 could eventually be seen as transference
once later interpreted; and so on. In this Socratic, hermeneutic dialogue,
the therapist has no right to think he is more knowledgeable than the
patient: he is simply trying to do his job, and the patient hopefully
profits from the therapist's help. However, if the patient believes that
the therapist, simply because of his role as therapist, must necessarily
know the
"truth" better than himself, this could be immediately a matter for
analysis and might possibly be seen as a transferential reaction
(similarly, the analyst's belief that he knew more than the patient could
imply a countertransferential reaction). The fact that one of the two asks
for the other's help and pays him a fee (we should not forget, however,
that also some therapists "need" their patients and depend on them) is an
asymmetry that marks the entire meaning of the interaction, with obvious
suggestive
implications. This asymmetry can be discussed by both partners, and in
theory, when it is sufficiently analysed and resolved, the therapy may end.
Indeed, the patient's request for treatment itself, when appropriately
analyzed, could be seen as his "symptom," and in such a case this should
be interpreted and worked through.
Etc.
  ___________________________________
  -----------------------------------
  Paolo Migone, M.D.
  Via Palestro, 14
  43100 Parma
  Italy
  Tel./Fax:  + (39) [0]521-960595
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