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The Cuban Revolution
A Critical Perspective
by Sam Dolgoff
The Character of the Cuban Revolution

A Non-Social Revolution

The myth, induced by the revolutionary euphoria of the pro-Castro left,
that a genuine social-revolution took place in Cuba, is based on a number
of major fallacies. Among them is the idea that a social revolution can
take place in a small semi-developed island, a country with a population of
about eight million, totally dependent for the uninterrupted flow of vital
supplies upon either of the great super-powers, Russia or the U.S. They
assume falsely that these voracious powers will not take advantage of
Cuba's situation to promote their own selfish interests. There can be no
more convincing evidence of this tragic impossibility than Castro's
sycophantic attitude toward his benefactor, the Soviet Union, going so far
as to applaud Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a crime
certainly on a par with the military coup in Chile, which Castro rightfully
condemned. To assume, furthermore, that the Cuban social revolution can be
miraculously achieved without simultaneous uprisings in Latin America and
elsewhere, is both naive and irresponsible.

Nationalization Versus Socialism

To equate nationalization of the economy and social services instituted
from above by the decree "revolutionary government" or a caudillo, with
true socialism is a dangerous illusion. Nationalization and similar
measures, under the name of "welfareism," are common. They are widespread,
and in many cases deep-going programs, instituted by democratic "welfare"
states or "benevolent" dictators as an antidote to revolution, and are by
no means equtvalent to socialism.

Russia and Cuba: Two Revolutions Compared

Another fallacy about the nature of the Cuban Revolution can perhaps be
best illustrated by contrasting the early stages of the Russian Revolution
of 1917 with the Cuban events. Analogies between the Russian and Cuban
Revolutions--like analogies in general--fail to take into account certain
important differences:

Czarism was OVERTHROWN by the spontaneous revolts of the peasant and
proletarian masses only after a prolonged and bloody civil war.

In Cuba, the Batista regime COLLAPSED WITHOUT A STRUGGLE for lack of
popular support. There were no peasant revolts. No general strikes. Theodor
Draper (and many other observers) argues persuasively that since there were
at least "500,000 agricultural workers in Cuba" there could not have been
many peasants in a . . . guerrilla force that never amounted to more than a
thousand. . . there was nothing comparable in Cuba to the classic peasant
revolution led by Zapata in Mexico in 1910. . . there was no national
peasant uprising. Outside the immediate vicinity of the guerrilla forces,
revolutionary activity, in the country as a whole, was largely a middle
class phenomenon, with some working class support, but without working
class organizations...(Castroism: Theory and Practice; New York, 1965, p.
74-75) [This takes on added significance when we consider that the unions
comprised ONE MILLION out of a total population of about six million when
the Revolution began, Jan. 1, 1959.] In Russia, the masses made the social
revolution BEFORE the establishment of the Bolshevik government. Lenin
climbed to power by voicing the demands of, and legalizing the social
revolutionary DEEDS of the workers and peasants: "All Power to the
Soviets," "The Land to the Peasants," "The Factories to the Workers," etc.
In Cuba, Castro, for fear of losing popular support, carefully avoided a
social-revolutionary platform--assuming that he had one. Unlike Lenin, he
came to power because he promised to put into effect the bourgeois-
democratic program.

History is full of unexpected twists and turns. Ironically enough, these
two different revolutions had similar results: Both Lenin and Castro
betrayed their respective revolutions, instituted totalitarian regimes and
ruled by decree from above.

The well-known anarcho-syndicalist writer and activist, Augustin Souchy,
makes a cogent comparison between the Spanish Revolution (1936-1939) and
the Cuban Revolution (both of which he personally witnessed): . . . while
in Spain, the confiscation of the land and the organization of thc
collectives was initiated and carried through, by the peasants themselves;
in Cuba, social-economic transformation was initiated, not by the people,
but by Castro and his comrades-in-arms. It is this distinction that
accounts for the different development of the two revolutions; Spain, mass
revolution from the bottom up; Cuba, revolution from the top down by decree
. . . (see Cuba. An Eyewitness Report, below) Which brings to mind the
celebrated phrase of the "Apostle" of Cuban independence Jose Marti: "To
Change the Master Is Not To Be Free."

Revolution the Latin American Way

The Cuban Revolution draws its specific character from a variety of
sources. While not a Latin American "palace revolution" which produced no
deep seated social changes, it nevertheless relates to the tradition of
miltarism and bogus paternalism of Latin American "Caudillismo," the "Man
on Horseback." "Caudillismo"--"right" or "left," "revolutionary" or
"reactionary"--is a chronic affliction in Latin America since the wars for
independence initiated by Simon Bolivar in 1810. The "revolutionary
caudillo" Juan Peron of Argentina, catapulted to power by "leftist" army
officers, was deposed by "rightist" military officers. Maurice Halperin
calls attention to the ". . . expropriation of vast properties in Peru in
1968 and in Bolivia in 1969 by the very generals who had destroyed Cuban
supported guerrilla uprisings in their respective countries. . . " (The
Rise and Fall of Fidel Castro; University of California, 1972, p. 118)

The militarization of Cuban society by a revolutionary dictatorship headed
by the "Caudillo" of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro follows, in
general, the Latin American pattern. Like other revolutionary Latin
American "Caudillos, " Castro would come to power only on the basis of
programs designed to win the indispensable support of the masses. Edwin
Lieuwen marshalls impressive evidence: . . . In Chile in 1924, Major Carlos
Ibanez established a military dictatorship [that] was notably successful in
combining authoritarian rule with policies aimed at meeting popular demands
for greater social justice. Successful but short lived revolutions took
place during 1936 under the leadership of radical young officers inspired
by ideas of social reform and authoritarian nationalism. . In Bolivia a
clique of radical young officers came to power. Major David Toro and
Colonel German Busch successfully headed regimes that had social revolution
as their goals. . . they catered to the downtrodden and pledged to build a
new nation. Toro and Busch based their dictatorial regimes on attempts to
win mass support ... (Arms and Politics in Latin America; New York, 1961,
pgs. 60, 62, 78, 79)

When in 1968, a "revolutionary" military Junta seized power in Peru, the
new military government proclaimed the fundamental principle underlying all
"radical" military regimes": . . . the final aim of the State, being the
welfare of the nation; and the armed forces being the instrument which the
State uses to impose its policies, therefore, . . . in order to arrive at
collective prosperity, the armed forces have the mission to watch over the
social welfare, the final aim of the State... (quoted, Modes of Political
Change in Latin America, ed. Paul Sigmund, New York, 1970, p. 201) Dr.
Carlos Delgado, Director of the Information Bureau of the Revolutionary
Government of Peru, after stressing that the revolution was " . . .
initiated from above" by decree, boasted that the dictatorship in "...the
last four and a half years" accomplished more for the betterment of the
people than in the "whole epoch of Republican rule." The revolution was
hailed, boasted Delgado, even by the French Marxist thinker, Henri
Lefebvre, as one of the most important historical events of the
contemporary world..." (see Reconstruir, anarchist bi-monthly, Buenos
Aires, Nov.-Dec. 1974)

There is an umbilical connection between militarism and the State, fully
compatible with, and indispensable to, all varieties of State "socialism"--
or more accurately State Capitalism. George Pendle (and other observers)
with respect to Peron's social and welfare programs initiated to woo mass
support concludes that: ...Peron's National Institute of Social
Security...converted Argentina to one of the most advanced countries in
South America. . . it was not surprising that the majority of workers
preferred Peron to their traditional leaders...they felt that Peron
accomplished more for them in a few years than the Socialist Party achieved
in decades...(Argentina; Oxford University Press, London, 1965, pas. 97,
99) . . . In Havana Premier Fidel Castro proclaimed three days of mourning
and Cuban officials termed Peron's death a blow to all Latin America. .
.(New York Times, July 2, 1974) This cynical proclamation was not made
solely for tactical reasons, but in recognition of the affinity between the
Casro and Peron regimes. As early as 1961, there were already informal
contacts between Che Guevara and Angel Borlenghi "... a number two man in
Peron's government and his Minister of the Interior for eight years ... Che
told Borlenghi that there's no question about it that Peron was the most
advanced embodiment of political and economic reform in Argentina ... and
under Che's guidance a rapport was established between the Cuban Revolution
and the Peronist movement ... Che has in his possession a letter from Peron
expressing admiration for Castro and the Cuban Revolution and Che had
raised the question of inviting Peron to settle in Havana . . . " (quoted
by Halperin, from Ricardo Rojo's work, My Friend Che; ibid. p. 329-330)
Herbert Matthews supplements Rojo's revelations:...the Argentine journalist
Jorge Massetti who went into the Sierra Maestra in 1958, became friends
with Guevara. He was trained for guerrilla warfare in the Sierra Maestra
and in 1964 was killed in a guerrilla raid in Argentina . . . Massetti was
credited with convincing Guevara that Peronism approximated his own ideas.
Hilda Gadea--Guevara's first wife--wrote that for Ernesto Guevara, the fall
of Peron Sept. 1955 was a heavy blow. Che and Massetti blamed it,...'on
North American Imperialists'...(ibid. p. 258) [Carmelo Mesa-Lago notes the
connection between State Socialism and militarism. Castro enthusiastically
hailed] " . . . the Peruvian Social Revolution as a progressive military
group playing a revolutionary role. . ." (Cuba in the 1970s: University of
New Mexico Press, 1975, p. 11]) In an interview, Castro emphatically
maintained that social revolution is compatible with military dictatorship,
not only in Peru, but also in Portugal and Panama. [When the military junta
in Peru] took power...the first thing they did was to implement agrarian
reform which was MUCH MORE RADICAL than the agrarian reform we initiated in
Cuba. It put a much lower limit on the size of properties; organized
cooperatives, agricultural communities; . . . they also pushed in other
fields--in the field of education, social development, industrialization. .
. We must also see the example of Portugal where the military played a
decisive role in political change. . .and are on their way to finding
solutions. . . we have Peru and Panama--where the military are acting as
catalysts in favor of the revolution. . . (Castro quoted by Frank and Kirby
Jones, With Fidel; New York, 1975, p. 195-196) [The evidence sustains
Donald Druze's conclusion that] . . . the programs of modern 'caudillos'
embodies so many features of centralism and National Socialism, that it
almost inevitably blends into communism...(Latin America: An interpretive
History; New York, 1972, p. 570)

Militarism flourishes in Cuba as in latin America. Castro projected
militarism to a degree unequalled by his predecessor, Batista: total
domination of social, econonmic and political life. In the Spring of 1959,
a few months after the Revolution of January 1st, Castro, who appointed
himself the "Lider Maximo" ("Caudillo") of the Revolution and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, promised to cut the size of the army in half and
ultimately to disband and replace it by civilian militias and police. "The
last thing I am," said Castro, "is a military man . . . ours is a country
without generals and colonels. . . "

Within a year after the disintegration of the Batista Army, Castro turned
Cuba into a thoroughly militarized state, with the most formidable armed
force of any in Latin America. For the first time in Cuban history,
compulsory military service was instituted. Now, Cuba has adopted the
traditional hierarchical ranking system of conventional armies. The Cuban
army differs in no essential respect from the armies of both "capitalist"
and "socialist" imperialist powers.

"Communism" a la Castro

Insofar as relations with the communists are concerned, Theodore Draper
notes the striking resemblance between the policies of Batista and Castro:
. . . Batista paid off the communists for their support, by among other
things, permitting them to set up an official trade union federation, the
Confederacidn de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) with Lazaro Pena as its
Secretary-General. In 1961, Castro paid off the communists for their
support, by, among other things, permitting Lazaro Pena to come back
officially as Secretary General of the CTC...(ibid. p. 204) If we accept at
face value Castro's conversion to "communism," his "communism" embodies the
Latin American version of Stalinism, absolute personal dictatorship. But
"Caudillos" are not primarily ideologues. They are, above all, political
adventurers. In their lust for power, they are not guided by ethical
considerations, as they claim. In this respect, there is no essential
difference between capitalist states and "revolutionary socialist states."
All dictators conceal their true visage behind the facade of a political
party, paying lip service to goals supposedly popular with the masses.
Castro became a "communist" because he considered that his survival in
power depended on cementing cordial relations with his saviors, the
"socialist" countries (former enemies) and by extension with Batista's
former allies, the domestic "communists." To promote his ends, Castro
established relations with Franco Spain and the Vatican. Nor did he
hesitate to side with the Arab oil magnates--lords over their impoverished
subjects--in the mid-east disputes, or to endorse the Russian invasion of
Czecho-Slovakia.

The Real Revolution Is Yet To Come

Albert Camus observed: . . . the major event of the twentieth century has
been the abandonment of the values of liberty on the part of the
revolutionary movement, the weakening of Libertarian Socialism, vis-a-vis
Caesarist and militaristic socialism. Since then, a great hope has
disappeared from the world, to be replaced by a deep sense of emptiness in
the hearts of all who yearn for freedom... (Neither victims Nor
Executioners) Whether Castro is working out his own unique brand of "Cuban
Socialism" is a relatively minor question. Even if Castro had no connection
with the communist movement, his mania for personal power would lead
inevitably to the establishment of an "independent" totalitarian regime.
What is decisive is that the Cuban Revolution follows the pattern
established in this century by the aborted Russian Revolution of 1917. This
pattern is the counter-revolution of the State.

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