Jim Time to get more serious... Realism and anti-realism: At it's core science wants to be a realism - Scientific Realism is the position that scientific theory construction aims to supply us with a literally true story of what the world is like and that acceptance of a scientific theory involves a belief that it is true. This fits the crisis theory of science that Kuhn (and Lyotard as an ex-marxist realist) desire to be true. Anti-realism (conventionalism) is the alternative position that the aim of science can well be served without giving such a literally true story and the acceptance of a theory may propoerly involve something less (or other) than the belief it is true. Theories about the structure of the human genetic code are either true or false and a correct theory will be a true one. However since science cannot be said to get things "right" the best that a Scientific Realist can say is that we often get close to the truth. The intention is that we are aiming to discover the costruction of things and knowing what makes up the universe. (Science in these terms has no need to be modest it has been quite extraordinally successful). What does a scientist do under these different perspectives? A realist argues that when someone proposes a theory he is asserting it to be true. But the anti-realist the theorist is not asserting it is true ; he proposes a theory and then claims it has this or that virtue. These virtues may simply be empirical adequacy, comprehensivness, acceptability, productiveness and so on. An anti-realist position is a conventionalist one, it does not necessarily deny that a 'real world' exists. Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequately and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that which is empiricially adequate. In this framework it is possible to engage in a discourse even when you do not accept that a theory is correct. To clarify - all language is infected by theories. If we could remove from our languages theory laden terms such as 'digital computer', 'video recorder', 'picasso', 'god' and continuing with 'mass', 'elements' etc and so on back into the pre-history of the indo-european languages we would end up with nothing usefule to say at all. The way we talk (scientists included) and exist is guided by previously accepted theories. This is true of scientific experimental reports. The reconstruction of language as positivists envisiged (and Deleuze and Guattari implied) is simply not on. But we must not then become scientific realists, ambiguity and adequacy require more of us than that. I define science in terms of the aims of sciences and epistemological attitudes. The issue is what aim the activity has, what should we believe when we accept a theory. What is proper is it: belief that a theory is true? or something else? I believe that it is crucial to accept what is observable as relevant (hence empirical adequacy). It can be said that for an anti-realist what it decides to believe about the world will depend on the epistomological communities range of evidence. At present most people consider the community as being the human race - but this may mutate by adding other animals through ideological and ethical changes which will add the animals to the communitiy. science in society: (Latour) Science and technologists working can be studied as a social activity - my personal favorite amoungst this growing field is Bruno Latour - he occupies a relativist and critical approach which is not to be understood as imposed by Latour on the scientists being studied; rather he proposes that it is what the scientists do. This is of course unproven. In his text 'Science in Action' he discusses at great length how social context and technical content are essential to scientific understanding and in doing so effectivly places science within the context of a wholely human activity. What he fails to do is to adequately deal with relativism and its relationship to reality, this may be unimportant to Latour since he is dealing with essentially narrative knowledge - from which perspective the truth and accuracy of the scientific theory is unimportant. Science studies is explicity historical and as interested in failed theories as succesful ones. Latour is very much a non-post-modernist. He argues somewhere or other that both mdernists and post-modernists have effectivley left 'belief' untouched. He suggest that both M and PM naively believe in belief. Varieties of belief beckon for M and PM - a selective refusal to believe in the content of belief from fetishisms and God to science. Here the thing to avoided at all costs is being naivly taken in. Salvation comes from revealing the labour hidden behind the illusion of autonomy and independence... To do away with belief is of course to adopt to an anti-realist position and look for other methods of action and mastery. Alternatively you can end up with the belief-as-shared-community-of-knowledge which is equally horrendus... enough for now regards SDV jim clark wrote: > What sdv's reply demonstrates to me is the kind of unreflective > commentary that characterizes so much of the criticism of > science. The underlying assumptions of the "devastating" reply > were: (1) I don't know Kuhn, (2) Kuhn actually said (or meant) > what many have attributed to him, (3) Kuhn is the be-all and the > end-all of philosophical/historical positions on science, (4) > Kuhn's analysis of historical events was in fact an accurate > characterization of science, (5) philosophy and history are the > proper disciplines to resolve these difficult questions, > (6) one can develop accurate models of science without > rigorous application of scientific methods to the problems, and > so on. > > Scientists interested in these issues should not assume that they > have been well-addressed to date, at least not if one adheres to > the rational and empirical criteria emphasized in scientific > modes of thought. Of course, if one is willing to ignore reason > and evidence, then my criticisms are probably irrelevant. > > Best wishes > Jim > > ============================================================================ > James M. Clark (204) 786-9757 > Department of Psychology (204) 774-4134 Fax > University of Winnipeg 4L05D > Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9 [log in to unmask] > CANADA http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark > ============================================================================