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The Passing of Patrice Lumumba 
> 
>By John Henrik Clarke (1961) 
> 
>(John Henrik Clarke was United Nations Correspondent 
>on African Affairs, World Mutual Exchange, and 
>International News Features.) 
> 
>The life of Patrice Lumumba proved that he was a 
>product of the best and worst of Belgian colonial 
>rule. In more favorable circumstances, he might have 
>become one of the most astute national leaders of the 
>twentieth century. He was cut down long before he had 
>time to develop into the more stable leader that he 
>was obviously capable of being. When the Congo emerged 
>clearly in the light of modern history he was its 
>bright star. 
> 
>His hero was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and the model for his 
>state was Ghana. "In a young state," he had said, 
>paraphrasing a similar statement made by Dr. Nkrumah, 
>"you must have strong and visible powers." 
> 
> 
>At the beginning of his political career he was 
>pro-Western in his outlook. "Mistakes have been made 
>in Africa in the past, but we are ready to work with 
>the powers which have been in Africa to create a 
>powerful new bloc," he said at the beginning of 1960. 
>"If this effort fails, it will be through the fault of 
>the West." 
> 
>As a reformer he was somewhat of a republican in his 
>approach. "Our need is to democratize all our 
>institutions," he had said on another occasion. "We 
>must separate the Church from the State. We must take 
>away all power from the traditional chiefs and remove 
>all privileges. We must adapt socialism to African 
>realities. Amelioration of the conditions of life is 
>the only true meaning independence can have." 
> 
> His resentment of Belgian authority was unyielding in 
>most cases. Mostly because he believed that 
>paternalism was at the base of this authority. This 
>by-product of colonialism never failed to stir a rage 
>within him. On the other hand, his reaction to the 
>Belgian Missionary attempt to enforce Christianity on 
>the Congo was one of indifference. He had been 
>subjected to both Catholic and Protestant mission 
>influence, without showing any particular affection 
>for either. His parents were devout Catholics. Being 
>neither an atheist nor anti-Christian, he yet 
>considered submission to a religion to be a curb to 
>his ambitions. Rebellion was more rewarding and less 
>wounding to his pride. During his long and lonely rise 
>from obscurity to the Congo's first Prime Minister, he 
>taught himself never to completely trust power in the 
>hands of others. This attitude is reflected in the 
>suspicion that developed between him and the UN Forces 
>in the Congo. 
> 
>His conflicts with the other Congo politicians was due 
>mainly to his unyielding belief in the unitary state, 
>and partly to his lack of experience in explaining, 
>organizing and administering such a state. 
>Nevertheless, he was the only Congolese leader with 
>anything like a national following; a point too often 
>overlooked. His greatest achievement in the early 
>difficult months of Congo independence was in 
>maintaining, with only a few defections, the 
>solidarity of his widely disparate coalition 
>government. 
> 
>Lumumba belonged to the company of Kwame Nkruman, 
>Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, Tom Mboya in Kenya, and 
>Sékou Touré. These leaders believe that the only way 
>to build an effective modern state free from t he 
>shackles of narrow tribal loyalties is to create a 
>single, strong central government. This firm stand 
>joined the issues in the Congo and created both the 
>supporters and the opposition to Lumumba. 
> 
>He argued his case at the Round Table Conference that 
>gave the Congo its independence in 1960. He laid it 
>before the electorate in June 1960, and won an 
>indecisive victory. Finally he tried to force it on 
>his Federalist opponents when he took control of the 
>first independent government. Most of Lumumba's 
>critics considered this to be his greatest error. He 
>tried to cast the Congo into the tight mould of Ghana, 
>rather than into the larger, more accommodating mould 
>of Nigeria. The argument is interesting though useless 
>now. 
> 
>Patrice Lumumba's body now lies a-mouldering in some 
>unmarked and inglorious Congo grave.both his truth and 
>spirit go marching on, much to the discomfort of his 
>murderers. 
> 
>No other personality in African history has leaped so 
>suddenly from death to martyrdom. In death he might 
>have already made a greater contribution to the 
>liberation and understanding of Africa than he could 
>have make had he lived. In his short lifetime the 
>stamp of his personality was pressed firmly into the 
>African continent. He was purely an African of the 
>mid-twentieth century. No other place and no other set 
>of circumstances could have charged his life and 
>caused his death in the same unique and tragic way. In 
>death, he cast forth a spirit that will roam the 
>African land for many years to come. 
> 
>For a long time the Congo appeared to be a peaceful 
>island untouched by African anticolonialism. In the 
>twelve brief years between 1946 and 1958, the Belgians 
>began to lose what had appeared to be an impregnable 
>position. Some important events occurred in Africa and 
>the rest of the world, and broke up the trinity in 
>Belgium's alleged "perfect colony." A change of 
>political direction in Brussels and mounting 
>nationalist pressure coming from within Africa helped 
>to end the illusion that all was well and would stay 
>well in the Congo. At last the Belgians began to have 
>some second thoughts about their policy in the Congo. 
>The missionary-trained evolved, the supposedly 
>emancipated, Westernized middle class had found their 
>voices. 
> 
>Certain fundamental problems formed the core of the 
>colonial dilemma in Africa; although Belgian colonists 
>chose to ignore this fact. The same problems existed 
>in the Congo as elsewhere in Africa. Freedom, 
>self-determination, hatred of racial discrimination, 
>and white settlement without assimilation made the 
>Congo people feel unwanted in their own country, 
>except as servants for white people. 
> 
>It was within this order of ideas that the Belgian 
>Socialist Party attempted to change the trend of 
>Belgium's colonial policy and devise a more humane 
>approach to the problems of the Congo people. The 
>accelerated economic development in the Congo during 
>the war and after the war had changed the structure of 
>the Congolese community. The black population of 
>Leopoldville rose from 46,900 to 191,000 between 1940 
>and 1950. By 1955, the black population of 
>Leopoldville had reached some 300,000. The mass exodus 
>of Congolese from rural areas and their concentration 
>in urban centers created new problems. The 
>detribalized workers did not return to their 
>respective villages when the city no longer afforded 
>them employment. 
> 
>It was incumbent upon the Belgium Socialist Party to 
>define its position in relation to the Congo. As far 
>as basic premises were concerned, the party did 
>recognize "the primacy of native interests; and the 
>aim of its activity will be to prepare the indigenous 
>population gradually to take charge of its own 
>political, economic, and social affairs, within the 
>framework of a democratic society." Further, the Party 
>expressed its "uncompromising opposition to any kind 
>of racial discrimination" and advised a raise in the 
>standard of living of the people of the Congo. Only 
>those whites who are prepared to work for the 
>realization of these aims and who constitute the 
>administrative personnel of the indigenous population 
>are to enjoy the support of the government. This 
>preparation for self-government presupposes the 
>political organization of the Congo, i.e., the 
>initiation of the native into citizenship. With this 
>proposal the Belgian Socialist Party admitted that the 
>Congolese were not accepted as citizens in their own 
>country. This fact had been the cause of a broadening 
>dissatisfaction among the Congolese since the early 
>part of the twentieth century. With the relaxing of 
>political restrictions this dissatisfaction began to 
>manifest itself in a form of embryo nationalism. The 
>future Congolese leaders had already begun to gather 
>their first followers. All of the early political 
>parties in the Congo were the outgrowth of regional 
>and tribal associations. Patrice Lumumba was the only 
>Congolese leader who, from the very beginning of his 
>career, attempted to build a Congo-wide political 
>organization. 
> 
>During his short-lived career Patrice Lumumba was the 
>first popularly elected Congolese Government Prime 
>Minister. Like a few men before him, he became a 
>near-legend in his own lifetime. The influence of this 
>legend extended to the young militant nationalists far 
>beyond the borders of the Congo, and it is still 
>spreading. 
> 
>Of all the leaders who suffered imprisonment at the 
>hands of the Belgians before 1960, Lumumba had the 
>largest number of followers among the Congolese 
>masses, mainly because he had more of the qualities of 
>character with which they liked to identify. As a 
>speaker he was equally effective in French, Ki-Swahili 
>or Lingola. The devotion of the rank and file of his 
>party. Movement National Congolais (MNC) to Patrice 
>Lumumba was not a unique phenomenon. What is more 
>significant is the fact that he was able to attract 
>the strongly expressed loyalties of a 
>tribally-heterogeneous body of the Congolese. This 
>made him the only national political leader. While 
>other politicians tended to take advantage of their 
>respective associations as the path to power, Lumumba 
>took the broader and more nationalistic approach and 
>involved himself in other movements only indirectly 
>related to politics. 
> 
>In 1951, he joined the Association des Evolves de 
>Stanleyville, one of the most active and numerically 
>important of all the clubs in Orientale Province. He 
>was in the same year appointed Secretary-General of 
>the Association des Postiers de la Province 
>Orientale-a professional organization consisting 
>mostly of postal workers. Two years later he became 
>Vice-Chairman of an Alumni Association consisting of 
>former mission students. In 1956 he founded the Amicle 
>Liberale de Stanleyville. 
> 
>Patrice Lumumbe is a member of the Beteteta tribe, a 
>Mongo subgroup. He was born on July 2, 1925, in 
>Katako-Kombe in the Sunkuru district of the Kasai 
>Province. In growing up he only received a primary 
>education. Very early in life he learned to push 
>himself beyond the formal limits of his education. He 
>made frequent contributions to local newspapers such 
>as Stanleyvillois and the more widely read 
>publications, Vois du Conlais and Croix du Congo. 
>Unlike the vast majority of Congolese writers of the 
>period who placed major emphasis on the cultural 
>heritage of their own tribes, Lumumba's early writings 
>emphasized-within the limits of Belgian official 
>restrictions-problems of racial, social, and economic 
>discrimination. 
> 
>On July 1, 1956, the career of Patrice Lumumba was 
>temporarily interrupted when he was arrested on the 
>charge of embezzling 126,000 franc ($2,200) from the 
>post office funds. He was sentenced to serve a 
>two-year prison term. On June13, 1957, the sentence 
>was commuted on appeal to eighteen months, and finally 
>to 12 months after the Wolves of Stanleyville 
>reimbursed the sum in question. Subsequently, Lumumba 
>left Stanleyville and found employment in Leopoldville 
>as the sale director of the Bracongo (polar beer) 
>Brewery. 
> 
>Leopoldville became a good vantage point for Lumumba's 
>Congo-wide activities. He had now entered into the 
>crucial phase of his political career. In 1958, while 
>combining the functions of vice-chairman of a liberal 
>friendship society, the Circle Liberal d'Etudes et 
>d'Agreement, with those of the president of the 
>Association dis Batelela, of Leopoldville, he joined a 
>Christian Democratic Study Group, the Centre d'Etudes 
>et de Recherches Sociales, created in 1955 by the 
>Secretary General of the Jeunesses Ouvieres 
>Christiennes, Jacques Meert. Among the more prominent 
>members of this organization were Joseph Ileo (now 
>[early sixties] Prime Minister in the Kasavubu 
>government) and Joseph Ngalula. 
> 
>Joseph Ileo was editor-in-chief of the bi-monthly 
>Conscience Africaine. He had already acquired a wide 
>reputation among Congolese when he decided, in July of 
>1956, to publish a nationalist inspired manifesto 
>which contained a daring 30-year plan of emancipation 
>for the Congo. 
> 
>Both Ileo and Ngalyla were Anxious to broaden the 
>basis of the Movement National Congolais, a moderate 
>nationalist organization created in 1956. Patrice 
>Lumumba, then regarded as one of the eminent spokesmen 
>of liberal ideas, joined the MNC. 
> 
>Once affiliated with this and other groups, Lumumba 
>readily asserted himself and became the dominant 
>figure. Shortly after proclaiming himself chairman of 
>MNC's Central Committee, he formally announced on 
>October 10, 1058, the foundation of a "national 
>movement" dedicated to the goal of "national 
>liberation." His action at this moment was prompted by 
>two important developments affecting the Congo. One 
>was the forthcoming visit of a parliamentary committee 
>appointed by the former Minister of the Congo, Mr. 
>Patillon, for the purpose of "conducting an inquiry 
>concerning the administrative and political evolution 
>of the country." Another was the creation of a 
>Movement Pour le Progres National Congolais in late 
>November, 1958, by the Congolese delegates to the 
>Brussels Exposition. Lumumba moved in and around these 
>groups and quickly projected himself into the role of 
>a dynamic and radical nationalist leader. 
> 
>A high point in his political development came in 
>1958, when he was permitted to attend the Pan African 
>Conference in Accra, Ghana. Here he became a member of 
>the Permanent Directing Committee. Patrice Lumumba had 
>now projected himself upon a political stage of 
>international importance. In addition to whatever 
>personal counsel he might have received from Ghana's 
>Prime Minister, Nkrumah, there is little doubt that 
>the Accra Conference was an important factor in 
>shaping Lumumba's long-range objectives and further 
>sensitizing him to the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. 
> 
>When he returned home, the emancipation of the Congo 
>from Belgium's tutelage assumed first priority among 
>his activities. In March, 1959, when Belgium had 
>already announced its intention to lead the Congo 
>"without fatal procrastination and without undue 
>haste" toward self-government, Lumumba went to 
>Brussels where he delivered several lectures under the 
>auspices of Présence Congolese, a Belgian organization 
>dedicated to the promotion of African culture. On this 
>occasion, Lumumba indiscreetly turned on his host and 
>sponsors and deplored the "bastardization and 
>destruction of Negro-African art," and "the 
>depersonalization of Africa." He reaffirmed his 
>Party's determination to put an end to the 
>"camouflaged slavery of Belgian colonization" and 
>elect an independent government in 1961. With this act 
>of boldness, Patrice Lumumba had set the stage for 
>most of his future troubles and probably his future 
>death. 
> 
>After the target-date for independence had been 
>approved by the Movement National Congolais, new 
>troubles began for Lumumba and his supporters. Now 
>that the contestants for power were close to their 
>goal the competition between them became fiercer. 
>Delegates to the Luluabourg Congress, in April 1959, 
>ran against the demands of other nationalist groups 
>anxious to put themselves forward as the 
>standard-bearers of independence. Several of Lumumba's 
>earlier supporters withdrew from the MNC and formed 
>their own parties. With the date for Congo 
>independence practically rushing upon him, Lumumba set 
>out to rebuild the Movement National Congolais. He 
>involved himself in every phase of his party's 
>activists, organizing local sections of the MNC and 
>recruiting new supporters. 
> 
>On November 1, 1959, a few days after his wing of the 
>MNC held its congress in Stanleyville, Lumumba was 
>arrested for the second time and charged with having 
>made seditious statements. He was sentenced to six 
>months in jail. After serving nearly three months of 
>his sentence he was released when a delegation of 
>officials from the MNC notified the Belgian government 
>that they would not participate in the Brussels 
>Roundtable Conference unless Lumumba was set free. 
>Soon after his release, Lumumba's party was victorious 
>in the December elections. As expected, Stanleyville 
>proved to be the main Lumumba stronghold in the Congo. 
>In Stanleyville his party won ninety per cent of the 
>votes. 
> 
> 
> 
> Lumumba's status and influence continued to rise. As 
>a representative of Orientale Province, he was 
>appointed to the General Executive College, an interim 
>executive body established after the Brussels 
>Roundtable Conference. Trouble continued to brew 
>within the ranks of his party. Victor Nendaka, 
>vice-chairman of the MNC, broke with Lumumba for what 
>he termed the "extreme left wing tendencies" of the 
>party leader. In 1960, he organized his own party. 
>Once more Lumumba reshuffled the party personnel and 
>strengthened his position. The MNC emerged from the 
>next electoral struggle as the strongest in the House 
>of Representatives, with 34 out of 137 seats. In the 
>Provincial Assembly of Orientale, Lumumba's party held 
>58 out of 70 seats. In the assemblies of Kivu and 
>Kasai Provinces, 17 out of 25 seats were secured. 
> 
>Lumumba employed several techniques to mobilize his 
>support and activate the rural masses. First there was 
>the careful selection of party officials and 
>propagandists at the Lodja Congress, held March 9-12, 
>1960. These delegates of the Bakutshu and Batetela 
>tribes agreed that they would entrust the defense of 
>their interests to the political party which held a 
>dominant position in the region. Namely, that was 
>Lumumba's party, the MNC. The party's success among 
>the Bakutshu and Batetela tribal associations was 
>mainly due to Lumumba's tribal origin and the 
>anti-Belgian orientation acquired by these tribes in 
>resisting the penetration of Western rule. 
> 
>Lumumba and the MNC improved their techniques of 
>building up functional organizations, in order to 
>unify the political actions of the MNC. These 
>organizational networks embraced a variety of interest 
>groups and cut across tribal lines. Through a tactical 
>alliance with minor parties, Lumumba tried to 
>transform the MNC into an integrating structure where 
>both sectional and national interests would be 
>represented. This program received its formal sanction 
>at the extraordinary congress of the MNC, held in 
>Luluabourg, April 3-4, 1960. This was a major landmark 
>in the history of Lumumba's party. Once more he had 
>proven to be the most able of all Congolese leaders. 
> 
>As the Congo crossed the threshold of independence, 
>new troubles developed within the ranks of the MNC. 
>Communication between Lumumba and some of the leaders 
>of the party broke down. The Congo's most vital 
>instrument of stability, the Force Publique, 
>collapsed. The number and complexities of the issues 
>now confronting Lumumba absorbed most of the time he 
>formerly devoted to party activities. Now that the 
>pomp and ceremony of the Belgian's handing over power 
>to elected Congolese leaders was over, one struggle 
>for Lumumba was over, but a new and bitter one was 
>beginning. 
> 
>His devotion to the idea of a united Congo was now 
>more firm. He was one of the few Congolese politicians 
>who had any conception of the Congo as a strong 
>centralized state. Tshombe thought first of carving 
>himself out a state in Katanga where he could be the 
>boss, with Belgian help. Kasavubu cherished the dream 
>of restoring the ancient empire of Bakongo. Other 
>Congolese politicians were still involved in their 
>tribal ideals and hostilities. 
> 
>Lumumba was neither kind nor cautious toward the 
>Belgians during the independence ceremony. This might 
>have been one of his greatest mistakes. He announced 
>too many of his future plans; which included not only 
>the uniting of the Congo by giving assistance to the 
>nations around him (especially Angola) who were still 
>under European rule. Whoever made the decision to kill 
>Lumumba probably made it this very day. He had crossed 
>the path of the unseen power manipulators who wanted 
>to control the Congo economically even if they were 
>willing to let Lumumba control it politically. Instead 
>of saying, "Thanks very much for our independence. We 
>appreciate [what] all you Belgians have done for our 
>country," Lumumba said in effect, "It's about time, 
>too! And it's a pity that in a half-century you didn't 
>see fit to build more hospitals and schools. You could 
>have made much better use of your time." 
> 
>Lastly, when the Force Publique revolted in the first 
>days of July, Lumumba tried earnestly to be equal to 
>this and other emergencies exploding around him. He 
>faced the risks of his high position with real 
>courage. Frantically, he moved over his large country 
>trying to restore order. Several times he escaped 
>death by inches. Once he was saved by a Ghanaian 
>officer. Once his car was stoned by a mob. This did 
>not keep him from trying to restore order to his 
>troubled country. In the middle of July when the 
>structure of order in his country was deteriorating 
>into chaos, Lumumba flew off for a grandiose tour of 
>the United States, Canada, North, and West Africa. 
>This was another one of his unfortunate mistakes. In 
>his absence confusion became worse. 
> 
>In his dealings with the United Nations he never knew 
>exactly what he wanted; showing no steady policy 
>toward the UN, he confused both his friends and 
>enemies who grew impatient with his erratic behavior. 
>When the disintegration within his country reached 
>dangerous proportions he asked for military from the 
>United Nations. Within about three days the UN troops 
>were on the spot. When Lumumba found that the UN 
>troops could not be used as a private army to put down 
>his political opponents he became disenchanted with 
>their presence in his country. 
> 
>By now Lumumba had quarreled with nearly every leading 
>politician in the Congo. His continued erratic action 
>shook the confidence of the outside world and of many 
>of the African leaders who had wished him well and 
>hoped that he could restore order rapidly. A power 
>struggle had erupted in the Congo. Concurrent with 
>this struggle Belgians were working behind the scenes 
>to reconquer the Congo economically; their Congolese 
>puppets, bought and paid for in advance, were deeply 
>engrossed in their self-seeking venture. 
> 
>In the last weeks of his life, when he was being 
>dragged around with a rope around his neck, while his 
>captors yanked up his head for the benefit of newsreel 
>cameras, he still carried himself with great dignity 
>as well as courage. When he was beaten up on the plane 
>which carried him to be handed over to his arch enemy, 
>Tshombe, he did not cry out nor plead for mercy. When 
>Tshombe's troops beat him again, in the Elizabethville 
>airport, he asked no one for help or pity. He was 
>carried off by Tshombe's troops and their Belgian 
>officers on a journey from which he was certain never 
>to return alive. Lumumba's conduct in the midst of 
>these scenes will always stand to his credit in 
>history. These traits of independence and courage in 
>his personality went into the making of his 
>martyrdom-a strange and dangerous martyrdom that makes 
>Lumumba a more effective Africa nationalist in death 
>than he was in life. 
> 
>Some of the people who are now most vocal in their 
>praise of the dead Lumumba include many who in the 
>past criticized some of his actions and speeches most 
>savagely while he was still alive. Patrice Lumumba was 
>pulled from power mostly by his own people, who were 
>being manipulated by forces of change and power alien 
>to their understanding. 
> 
>In the killing of Lumumba, white neo-colonialists and 
>their black African puppets frustrated the southward 
>spread of independence movements. Lumumba had pledged 
>to give assistance to the African nations to the east 
>and the south of the Congo who are still struggling to 
>attain independence, particularly Angola. Lumumba was 
>a true son of Africa, and in his short unhappy 
>lifetime he was accepted as belonging to all of 
>Africa, not just the Congo. 
> 
>The important point in the Lumumba story, briefly 
>related, is this: He proved that legitimacy of a 
>postcolonial regime in Africa, relates mainly to its 
>legal mandate; but even more, legitimacy relates to 
>the regime's credentials as a representative of a 
>genuine nationalism fighting against the intrigues of 
>new-colonialism. This is why Lumumba was and is still 
>being extolled this "best son of Africa," this 
>"Lincoln of the Congo," this "Black Messiah," whose 
>struggle was made noble by his unswerving demand for 
>centralism against all forms of Balkanization and 
>rendered heroic by his unyielding resistance to the 
>forces of neo-colonialism which finally killed his 
>body, but not his spirit. This man who now emerges as 
>a strange combination of statesman, sage, and martyr, 
>wrote his name on the scroll of African history during 
>his short and unhappy lifetime. 
> 
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 


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