G-L Community:
I am pleased to share with you an abridged version of a 34 page-long
paper on "The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia." I
thank you all for the lively debates and the numerous newspaper
clippings from all the relevant newswires posted on G-L. I have in
some instances used quotes from postings by some individuals, but did
not refer to them in name in order to protect their anonimity. All the
views, errors and coclusions in the paper, I take full reponsibility.
As usual, your comments, criticisms and suggestions are welcome.
Abdoulaye
THE OCTOBER 2001
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE GAMBIA
On October 18, 2001, The Gambia held a second presidential election
following the 1994 coup d’etat. The first, in 1996, was declared not
“free and fair” by the international community. Since then, a
soldier-turned-president has ruled the country.
BACKGROUND
The Gambia, a former British colony, is a tiny West African country of
1.2 million people almost surrounded by Senegal. Since gaining
independence in February 1965, it remained one of four democracies in
Africa, until the coup d’etat of July 22, 1994. The coup, therefore,
effectively ended the longest continuously surviving multiparty
“democracy” in Africa and the reign of Sir Dawda Jawara, who at the time
was the longest serving head of state in Africa. With the Armed Forces
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) in place, the constitution was
suspended, politicians and political parties were banned and all
semblance of the rule of law ended. Rule by decree became the mode of
governance with predictable arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture,
disappearances, killings and other flagrant abuse of fundamental human
rights.
Combined international economic sanctions and domestic protests,
however, led to a two-year timetable back to “civilian rule.” This
culminated in presidential and national assembly elections in 1996 and
1997, respectively. The presidential election was, however, neither
free nor fair because the electoral process was engineered from the very
beginning to enable the incumbent military-turned-civilian leader to
win. Consequently, the results were widely disputed and condemned by
the Commonwealth. In fact, the results continue to be contested to this
day by the leaders of the United Democratic Party (UDP).
Despite The Gambia’s return to “civilian” rule under the
Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) party in
1996, the country continues to be headed by a “civilianized” military
government. In fact, human rights deteriorated further leading to the
deaths of many citizens, including the tragic deaths of 14 students who
were killed while peacefully protesting government policy in April
2000. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the official repressive
arm of the regime engages in torture of dissidents and those perceived
as threats to the regime. Predictably, the justice system and the
courts are not generally regarded as independent and serve the primary
purpose of enforcing draconian laws and decrees. Accordingly, the press
remains severely constrained by military decrees and journalists are
sometimes subjected to severe beatings and torture.
The regime prides itself, however, with the numerous schools,
hospitals, clinics and roads it constructed since coming to power in
1994. It is true that the regime also refurbished the national airport
and government owned radio station, in addition to building the
country’s first university and only television station. This is a
remarkable achievement for which many Gambians take pride. On this
score, the regime’s performance is relatively better than that of the
civilian regime it replaced. Not withstanding these improvements,
however, the economy remains sluggish, in part, because of a cessation
of aid from the country’s major European donors. The primary consequence
has been deepening poverty for the bulk of The Gambia’s 1.2 million
people. At a United Nations sponsored conference held in The Gambia on
November 28, Gambia’s vice-president, Isatou Njie-Saidy admitted to the
country’s worsening poverty (allAfrica.com, November 29, 2001). It is
against this backdrop of state sponsored repression, violence,
intimidation of political opponents and increasing poverty that the
October 2001 presidential election must be situated and analyzed.
On July 22, 2001president Jammeh was forced to lift the ban on
the major pre-coup political parties and politicians imposed shortly
before the 1996 presidential election (Reuters, July 22, 2001). Again,
it took the combined efforts of domestic and international pressures to
force Jammeh to partially open the political process. Widely condemned
by the Commonwealth, Decree 89 was imposed on August 12, shortly before
the September 1996 presidential election to strengthen an earlier ban
following the 1994 coup d’etat. Under the provision, the three major
political parties: the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), The National
Convention Party (NCP) and the Gambia Peoples Party (GPP) led by
self-exiled ex-president Jawara, Sheriff Mustapha Dibba and Assan Musa
Cammara, respectively, were banned together with most ex-ministers of
the previous government from all political activity. The ban was
imposed for periods ranging from five to twenty years (The Point, 12
August 1996). While the lifting of Decree 89 elicited mixed reactions,
from one of jubilation and condemnation, it nonetheless, set high public
expectations for a total coalition of all the opposition parties in a
bid to defeat Jammeh. Yet, a rift among political leaders was rumored.
The rumor of a rift in the proposed coalition was confirmed when
Dibba of the NCP refused to endorse Darboe’s presidential candidacy
under a limited coalition between the UDP/PPP/GPP. Ultimately, for a
combination of reasons, personal ambition, irreconcilable ideological
and personality differences or otherwise, the opposition leaders could
not overlook these differences and rally around the overarching
principle of defeating Jammeh. Meanwhile, Jammeh had all the advantages
of a sitting president, abundant personal finances, state resources and
monopoly over state owned media. In the end, there were five
presidential candidates: incumbent president, Yaha Jammeh (APRC),
Ousainou Darboe (UDP/PPP/GPP coalition), Hamat Bah (NRP), Sheriff
Mustapha Dibba (NCP) and Sidia Jatta (PDOIS). For Bah, Dibba and Jatta,
however, the UDP/PPP/GPP limited coalition appeared to be controlled by
the PPP, thus their reluctance to joining it.
CAMPAIGN and ISSUES
Jammeh, the incumbent president, ran a vigorous campaign that was hinged
concretely on his seven-year development record in The Gambia. He
dismissed the limited UDP/PPP/GPP coalition leadership as a sinister
front for the deposed PPP government bent on returning ex-president
Jawara to power. Jawara’s leadership of thirty-two years, he charged,
brought nothing to the Gambian people but poverty. This he contrasted
with his development of roads, hospitals, better access to education and
medical care, especially for the disadvantaged and rural poor. Jammeh
vowed that his reelection would usher in more development and
prosperity. Like the 1996 presidential campaign, Jammeh again accused
Darboe of seeking to restore years of institutional corruption and poor
performance. While Darboe countered with charges of more corruption,
murder and lack of transparency and accountability under Jammeh’s
tenure, he could not successfully break out of the definition or box
into which he was trapped. The appearance of a sweetheart deal between
the UDP and the PPP in Darboe’s election as the limited coalition’s
presidential candidate was not lost to Jammeh and the electorate.
The limited coalition under Darboe ran a relatively strong campaign but
not strong enough to overcome these negative public perceptions. Darboe
focused on the April 10 and 11 slaughter of peacefully demonstrating
students, a sagging economy characterized by growing misery and a
plummeting currency, human rights abuses and a bleak future under an
APRC led government. Darboe promised that under his leadership farmers
would be paid a fair price for their groundnuts, unlike the useless
promissory notes Jammeh gave to them as payment. But more important,
Darboe promised that his tenure would be one based on the rule of law,
unlike Jammeh’s. Yet, in spite of “these philosophical pronouncements
and overview of their intentions, the coalition fell short in coming up
with specific solutions where the APRC government was found wanting (The
Point, October 9, 2001).
A major development leading to the election was Gabriel Roberts’
reappointment to the Chairmanship of the Electoral Commission (EC).
Jammeh dismissed Roberts for reasons of alleged incompetence after the
1996 elections. Many, however, reasoned that Roberts was in large
measure instrumental in Jammeh’s tainted victory in 1996. It was widely
felt, therefore, that his reappointment as EC Chairman could make it
possible for Roberts and Jammeh to reengineer the 2001 presidential
election.
A more nettlesome issue leading to the polls had to do with
those entitled to vote on election day. On the eve of polling, the
opposition scored a victory when the EC Chairman accepted a demand that
only people whose names appeared on the main voter registers would
vote. The previous regulation allowed voters to only show their
identity cards (BBC World Service Africa/news/, October 18, 2001). The
decision by Roberts to rescind this decision on election day, allowing
voters to show only an identification card to vote, confirmed to many
Roberts’ resolve to see Jammeh reelected. The concern over the issue of
who should vote in the election is important. This is because there
were allegations of “extra-registration and voting on election day of
some thirty to forty thousand Senegalese from the neighboring Casamance
region of Senegal. To this number was added thousands of refugees and
other foreigners from the sub-region. It was alleged that the campus of
Gambia College harbored some thirty to forty thousand of Jammeh’s Jola
kin from Casamance.
Also troubling during the campaign leading to the presidential
election were the rising political tensions that resulted in two deaths
and the arson attack by UDP supporters on the house of an APRC member of
the national assembly (BBC World Service News, October 16, 2001).
Earlier arson attacks believed to be carried out by APRC militants on
houses of UDP supporters and a pro-democracy private radio station added
to on going tensions.
Gambians abroad played a more active role in the 2001 presidential
election compared to 1996.
Several conferences were held in London, Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta and Raleigh, North Carolina and other parts of Europe to which
party leaders or their representatives were invited. At these meetings,
political parties presented their platforms and solicited funds. These
meetings were indeed historic and important campaign venues for various
political parties. But not only did political campaigning transcend the
spatial confines of The Gambia into North America and Europe, it was
also extended into cyberspace. The UDP, PDOIS and APRC leaders or their
representatives were able to reach and discuss their party platforms
with Gambians on-line and through party and other web sites on the
Internet. Gambia-L, (G-L) a cyberspace mailing list based in the U.S.
but with members throughout the world and devoted to the discussion and
debate of issues relevant to The Gambia, was also a forum used by all
the political parties and their representatives to reach Gambians in the
Diaspora.
THE RESULTS
Contrary to public fears in The Gambia and abroad, the presidential
election was peaceful. With a voter turnout of approximately 80%,
Gambians lined up under a scorching sun to vote for their next
president. Jammeh’s APRC won 52.96 percent of the vote, (55.76 percent
in 1996) as opposed to the coalition’s 33.67 percent in 2001, and (the
United Democratic Party’s 35.84 percent) in 1996. Hamat Bah (NRP)
polled 8%, Sheriff Dibba (NCP) 4%, and Sidia Jatta (PDOIS) polled 3% of
the total vote (The Point, October 20, 2001)
Table 1. Voting results 2001 presidential election
Candidate(s) Party
Votes %
Yahya Jammeh (APRC) 242,302 (52.96
%)
Ousainou Darboe (UDP/PPP/GPP) 149,448 (33.67 %)
Hamat Bah (NRP) 35,678 (
7.80 %)
Sheriff Dibba (NCP) 17,271
( 3.78 %)
Sidia Jatta (PDOIS) 13,841
( 2. 86 %)
_____________________________________________________
Total
458,540 (80%)
________________________________________________________
Source: national press
International observers declared the elections “free and fair” and
Darboe later conceded defeat to president-elect, Jammeh.
The voting pattern indicated that Jammeh won forty-one of the
forty-eight constituencies nationwide, including former opposition
strongholds of Jarra East, West and Central, Kiang East and Kiang
Central and Darboe’s home constituency of Upper Fulladu West. Of the
seven remaining constituencies, Darboe won six and Bah (NRP) won one,
his home constituency of Upper Saloum, the only presidential candidate
to do so. Jammeh also defeated Dibba (NCP) and Jatta (PDOIS) in their
home constituencies.
Equally significant, is that Jammeh also swept the
constituencies of Banjul South, North and Central, once opposition
strongholds. Many expected that the vote against Jammeh would be
overwhelming in these constituencies, in part, because of increased
urban hardships and high youth unemployment. The voting pattern also
suggests that Jammeh’s support was broad based, especially in the rural
areas. Here, it was expected that Jammeh would not do well because of
dissatisfaction over the government’s poor handling of a bumper
groundnut harvest and rocketing food prices. While Darboe won Bakau and
Basse, two major towns, Jammeh won the more densely populated urban
centers of Serrekunda and Brikama.
Jammeh’s victory would, however, be tainted by accusations of
cross-border voting and allegations of inflated voter registers, despite
commendations from the Commonwealth Observer Group. Less than a week
after conceding defeat, Darboe strongly attacked the EC and its Chairman
for what he called “inept and corrupt” handling of voter registration in
which non-Gambians were issued voter cards (The Observer, October 25,
2001). As proof, Darboe presented a Senegalese national to the press
who possessed both a Senegalese ID card and a Gambian voter’s card.
The data also indicate a discrepancy in the number of
registered voters and votes cast in Niani Constituency on election day.
The EC published results show a total of 7877 votes cast against a total
number 7464 registered votes. This, Darboe contends, is proof that the
EC actually carried out “extra registration of non-Gambian voters who
were then sent to various constituencies throughout the country to
vote. This gave the APRC an unfair advantage over the opposition
parties” (The Observer, October 25, 2001).
Kemeseng Jammeh, (no relation to president) the national
assembly’s minority leader, similarly accused EC Chairman Roberts of
issuing voter cards to non-Gambians. Jammeh cited the dramatic change
in the total number of votes cast in Karantaba and Soma. In Karantaba,
specifically, 459 people cast votes in 1996 compared to 1331 in 2001.
In Soma, a growing urban center and residence to many citizens of
Senegal, Guinea, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, according to Jammeh, was also a
site for “extra-registration.” Here, Jammeh contends that there were
only two polling stations in 1996 with a total vote of 1408. In 2001,
by contrast, Soma had four polling stations with a total of 3,254
votes. Jammeh also alleged similar electoral irregularities in Jenoi,
Pakalinding and Toniataba (The Independent, November 12, 2001).
While the limited proof shown by Darboe and allegations by
Jammeh, the minority leader, of “extra-registration” and non-Gambian
participation in the 2001 presidential elections raise serious doubts
about the “free and fair” conclusion of international observers, the
accuracy of the 40,000 alleged voters is difficult to substantiate,
empirically. It is true, that returning Senegalese from The Gambia,
following the elections were arrested and their Gambian voter cards
confiscated. But the numbers of reported cases appear negligible, as of
now.
Post-Election Violence, Intimidation and Job Dismissal
Jammeh’s victory celebrations were suddenly dampened by arrests,
beating of opposition members and dismissal of civil servants perceived
to be opposed to his rule. There appeared to be an organized attack on
the opposition and the NIA arrested, detained and tortured dissidents
and some members of the opposition. (The Observer, October 25, 2001; BBC
World Service/Africa/news, October 29, 2001; The Independent, December
3, 2001). The violence visited on the opposition by the regime or its
militants was also accompanied by dismissals and retirements of senior
and junior civil servants thought to be disloyal or unsympathetic to
Jammeh’s government or bid for reelection. His attempt to purge the
civil service of his opponents, however, is rationalized along lines of
“professionalism.” If one is deemed “unprofessional,” often analogous
to being a non-supporter, it could mean being dismissed.
Jammeh’s frequent “hire and fire policy” is nothing new but represents a
pillar in his repertoire to keep himself in power. In this regard, an
average of one secretary of state is dismissed every six months. He has
since coming to power in 1994, fired, changed, or redeployed fifty-nine
secretaries of state to other ministries (The Independent, July 24,
2001). One died under mysterious circumstances and another while in
prison for alleged complications arising from hypertension. The
latter’s widow denied that her husband had hypertension. Foday Makalo,
an opposition politician, disappeared more than three years ago and is
presumed dead by his family. All dismissals, however, have not been
over political disloyalty and some that were dismissed earlier have
since been reemployed (The Point, November 30, 2001).
ANALYSIS
It appears that the limited coalition under Darboe and the other
political parties were doomed from the very start in their bid to defeat
Jammeh. In fact, it seems, even if the opposition parties managed to
form a single opposition party they would have still lost to Jammeh.
Yet, the fact that EC Chairman changed the rules of the game in
mid-stream, in effect, undermined the legitimacy and ultimately called
into question the “fairness” of the presidential election. But even if
the vote itself was properly conducted, some domestic observers contend,
“The election could not be described as free and fair. Apart from the
fact that Jammeh does have some support, his victory is largely a result
of his carrots and stick policy. The widespread dishing out of money to
voters throughout the country, combined with his threats of exclusion
from development programs for those opposed to his presidency must have
given him the vote” (allAfrica.com, October 19, 2001). Jammeh is
reported to have spent over two million Dalasis ($122,000) on his
campaign (allAfrica.com, October 19, 2001).
Predictably, a level playing field did not exist as the rules of
the game and a political atmosphere and campaign marred by violence and
intimidation worked in tandem to favor Jammeh and oddly against the
opposition parties. A political observer noted, the “political
atmosphere is threatening the peace, stability and even the foundations
of our nation. Our society is becoming dangerously over-polarized” (The
Independent, August 6, 2001). The deployment of heavy anti-craft
weaponry, visible police support and presence at APRC rallies, in
addition to the brandishing of machetes by Darboe supporters added to an
already charged pre-election political atmosphere (BBC World Service
News, October 17, 2001). Therefore, even under the best circumstances of
a total coalition of opposition parties, the battle for the presidency
would be uphill and especially daunting for a splintered opposition. The
concern over “extra-registration and cross-border voting also severely
tainted the “fairness” of the election. The confiscation of voter cards
and arrest by Senegal’s border police of returning Senegalese two days
after the Gambian presidential polls raised serious problems about the
election itself. It made “Jammeh the first truly elected president of
Senegambia,” noted an observer.
Many Gambians reasoned in 1996 and perhaps in 2001 that Jammeh would not
step down and concede defeat peacefully were he to loose to Darboe.
Fear of escalating violence and instability forced many to vote for
Jammeh. An astute political observer noted, “ indeed in a political
culture such as The Gambia’s, where politicians with power like Jammeh
can use the resources at their disposal-both coercive and persuasive
with reckless abandon, it is not a great feat to win elections.”
Dibba, NCP’s presidential candidate, by contrast, saw the
elections as the “freest and fairest since independence” and observed
that it had contributed to the “strengthening of the democratic process
in The Gambia” (Gambia Radio & TV News, November 25, 2001). These
comments were made in the aftermath of a meeting with Jammeh at the
State House in which Dibba left open the prospect of allying with Jammeh
or other political parties in the forthcoming national assembly
elections in February 2002 (The Daily Observer, November 26, 2001). To
his detractors, Dibba’s comments are self-serving. But some of his
supporters contend that it reflects his pragmatic approach to politics
and desire to serve the nation.
But more fatal to Darboe’s bid for the presidency was not
Dibba’s refusal to join the coalition but his failure to focus
concretely on the issues and/or respond pointedly to Jammeh’s charges.
More importantly, Darboe failed to disassociate himself with the
perception in the public mind of being a front for the PPP. It is this
lingering public perception dating back to the 1996 presidential
election that primarily doomed Darboe’s race for the State House. Also,
the fact that the issues in the campaign generally focused on Jawara and
defense of his thirty-two year record by ex-PPP ministers in the
coalition did not win him much public confidence. It appeared, in fact,
that Darboe’s campaign was unwittingly eclipsed, perhaps dominated, by
PPP elements in the coalition who used it as a platform to vindicate
themselves and their party. This did not help Darboe, as it appeared to
confirm public perceptions of him.
But perhaps the most daunting challenge that dogged the limited
coalition from the very start was its limited financial resources.
While Darboe and other party leaders, except Jammeh and Dibba made
several overseas campaign trip to Europe and North America and raise
funds for their candidacy, the funds were not enough to make any lasting
effect. The fact that the coalition did not include all the opposition
parties coupled with the perception by many in the Diaspora that
Darboe’s presidency could be a comeback for the PPP and ex-president
Jawara, led many to withhold financial support. Furthermore, Sheriff
Dibba’s presidential candidature split what little money that was raised
in the US into several donations, the largest share going to Darboe.
Yet, Dibba’s candidature appeared doomed from the start by his
seven-year absence from the political scene, public perceptions of him
as being power hungry and allegations of being financially sponsored by
Jammeh. PDOIS’ Sidia Jatta, a dedicated and principled politician,
failed to engage in usual campaign techniques. This limited his appeal,
considerably. Of all the opposition candidates, however, it seems that
Hamat Bah of the NRP emerged as the clear winner, even if trailing
Darboe. He retained his constituency unlike Darboe and Jatta.
Why then did Darboe acknowledge defeat? Perhaps the single most
important reason for Darboe’s acknowledgement of defeat has to do with
concerns over his own security, his supporters and The Gambia’s. It is
also conceivable that upon a few days of reflection on the process and
outcome of the elections that Darboe saw the bigger picture and then
decided to contest the legitimacy of the outcome. It seems, however,
that even in the face of electoral malpractices, it is not clear whether
electoral discrepancies were as widespread as alleged. This is because
Jammeh’s support appeared broad based, defeating all but one
presidential candidate in their home constituencies. Of these, there
were few reports of inflated voter rolls or participation of
non-Gambians.
Could Jammeh have won without all these advantages? This is the
fundamental question. It is likely that Jammeh would have won the
elections all things being equal. But all things are seldom equal in
elections. Incumbents the world over have added advantages and
resources at their disposal. In addition, he launched an effective
campaign centered on Jawara, development successes under his rule and
promises of a better future, even when Gambians were poorer under his
rule, paradoxically.
Yet, if the allegations and Darboe’s evidence are accepted as
proof of non-Gambian participation and “extra-registration” a
conservative reduction of approximately 30, 000 votes from Jammeh’s 242,
302 total would not have earned him the required 50 % of the electoral
vote. Thus, assuming that Jammeh received a total of 2012, 302 (minus
30,000) votes against the combined total of 216, 231 for the opposition,
there would have been a run-off between Jammeh and Darboe. If this were
to obtain, Darboe would have most likely defeated Jammeh.
CONCLUSION
The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia was riddled with
several irregularities and problems, ranging from a short campaign
period, which favored the incumbent, to instances of intimidation and
violence against the political opposition. In addition, a hand picked
EC Chairman, not only appeared to collude with the ruling president but
also reversed an important ruling made earlier. The ruling favored
Jammeh and contributed significant to the incumbent’s victory.
Instances of “extra-registration,” a 105% voter turnout in Niani and
instances of cross-border voting undermined the very essence of the
presidential election and raised serious doubts about its “fairness.”
REFERENCES
A. Saine, (1996) “The Coup d’etat in The Gambia, 1994: The End of The
First
Republic,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23
A. Saine, (December, 1997) “The 1996/1997 Presidential and National
Assembly
Elections in The Gambia,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 16,
No. 4,
A. Saine, (Winter 1998) “The Military’s Managed Transition to “Civilian
Rule” in
The Gambia,” Journal of Political and Military
Sociology, Vol. 26, No.2
A. Saine, (2000) “ The Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate,” Journal
of Political
and Military Sociology, Vol. 28
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