By H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Ph.D.

Posted July 26 2008



The history of African nationalism--in all its variants--has been the
history of the struggle for the conquest of state power. The various
approaches and methods used in the pursuit of this objective have determined
the forms and content of the emerging social formations.

An analysis of nationalism in Africa and its impact on the evolution of
institutions and the nature of social transformation must as a necessity
inquire into the pitfalls of tactics and strategy and how the failure to
resolve these led to national stultification and the attendant problems of
marginalization and the aridity of ideological orientation.

These problems have bedeviled the states of Africa since independence and
the apparent difficulties in forging viable nation-states out of the
multiplicity of nationalities and creating a culture of collective
participation--which would be both democratic and popular--have more to do
with orientation than with any socio-cultural impediment. In short, African
problems of nation-building have to do with the predisposition of a social
sector and the chronic limitation of its political horizon which are both
the residual of its compromise not with the builders of the nation-states
but with those who stand to gain from the debilitating diversity of the
various narrow interests of the nationalities.

The paper will be divided into three parts. The first part will look at some
issues within the general framework of Africa and deal specifically with the
pitfalls of nation-building after independence and how these have impacted
on the attempts at creating a democratic culture within multi-ethnic
societies. The second part of the paper will address the problematic of
transformation and the building of a democratic culture. Here, we will
consider the nature of the democratic implantation in Africa. One must
always address the issue of democracy in a specific context. Is our
conception of democracy defined simply by political pluralism? Is it only
synonymous with western liberalism--with its adjuncts of universal adult
suffrage, free press, political competition and the freedom of choice? Of
what relevance are concepts and methods which do not take into consideration
the interests of the vast majority of the people? Can there be a democracy
over and above the western variant? The third part of the paper will
consider two case studies--Liberia and Sierra Leone in contemporary
times--and try to show how the inability to grapple effectively with the
issue of multi-ethnicity and democratic participation hamstrung the process
of nation-building and led to decay and collapse.

PART 1

Africa and the forms of independence

The struggle for power and its underlying rationale in Africa took various
forms. There were three variants: the "negotiated" variety which left intact
the structures of pre-colonial Africa which were used effectively by
colonialism and then handed over to that social sector which had been the
most vocal in the assertion of African nationalism--that is to say in the
demand for political power. The second variety was the "compromised" brand
which entailed the granting of political power to that social sector which
had been separated from the more militant nationalists. This variety from
the outset was consciously divisive and thus repressive as it had to contend
with a segment which also had legitimate claims to political power. The
final variety was the Jacobin" brand. This variety was revolutionary and
populist and invariably ended in the violent destruction of colonialism and
the uprooting of those negative tendencies associated with the pre-history
of African civilization.

In the first dispensation, what obtained was a truce, not only between the
nationalists and the colonialists, but also between the various social
sectors which emerged as representatives of the respective nationalities in
the country. The defining parameter was the absolute protection of the
interests of the various nationalities as opposed to the collective and
inseparable interests of the state. As if to underline the tendency toward
separatism, it was argued in certain quarters that the emerging states could
not be considered nations, but "mere geographical expressions." (1) Thus
what emerged in most instances were contending parochial nationalisms within
the ambit of a specific state. The independence thus bequeathed took place
against the background of desperate centrifugal forces, with negotiations
centered on the type of modus vivendi which allowed for the growth and
crystallization of regional or ethnic chauvinism.

A few generalizations will suffice to show some identifiable trends in the
various social formations in this category. There is invariably a very weak
attachment to the nation-state by the various nationalities, thus leading to
instability and very often national sclerosis. Against this background,
civil wars have resulted as the logical culmination of ethnic irredentism.
Secondly, there is always a pattern of ideological obfuscation giving rise
to the tendency to develop by improvisation--most often borrowed from
cultures which are dissimilar. Thirdly, there is the marginalization of the
people who are then forced into conformity either through mystification or
chronic dejection. Finally, one can point to the fetishism of pomp and
pageantry which caricatured the symbolism of grandeur in the Roman Empire.
Within this matrix, the attempt at nation-building always seem Herculean. As
regards this category, it has been argued that "the present-day rulers have
inherited only unconsolidated nations; as in early America, so in Africa
there remain fissiparous social, economic and psychological forces that must
be overcome before we can say that the colonial nations have survived the
shocks of independence." (2) The reference to surviving "the shocks of
independence" has to do with overcoming the forces of disunity which are
both traditional and modern. In the context of the nationalism which was
germane to this category, the builders of the nation-state were left
immobilised in their cocoons of traditional loyalties and regional
prejudices. The state was handed to those who were proponents, not of social
transformation which would have addressed the cardinal issue of
nation-building within the framework of collective advancement, but to those
who only wanted power no matter how truncated and vacuous.

The second variety, that of the "compromised" brand had it most portent
aspect in countries where the militant struggle was cut short by duplicity
and leaders emerged who were acceptable to the colonialists. The acceptable
leaders were those who moderated their demands by prolonging the dialogue
for the transfer of power. Those who sought to mobilize the majority of the
people for a decisive struggle which would destroy colonial structures and
address the issue of popular participation in the process of nation-building
were annihilated because the people did not have the time to develop
effective organs for popular struggle. Unfortunately, the failure of the
militant leaders stymied the progress of the national struggle; for these
were the leaders who had gone over and beyond the particularism of the
region or the tribe and had embraced the collective movement of the people.
Their nationalism was both constructive and destructive. It was constructive
in so far as it sought to mobilize the majority of the people and thus break
down the inhibitions toward collective transformation. It was destructive of
the traditional order as it sought to undermine the old value system of
obedience and conformity. In this context, James Coleman has argued
persuasively that:

In general, it would seem that where nationalism manifests itself in
considerable strength it is evidence that disintegration of the old and
social mobilization around the symbols of the new order have occurred on a
scale sufficient to weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the
nationalists to pre-colonial socio-political units, either because they have
been crushed and are beyond memory or because they are unattractive or
manifestly unsuitable as ‘nations’ in  a modern world of nation-states. (3)

In the case of those who wanted to prolong the dialogue and thus delay the
transfer of power, history was generous at that point in time as the
colonialists settled for an artificial transfer of power and deposited it in
the laps of those who were less inclined to use it for the collective good.
It was Frantz Fanon who understood better this phenomenon and saw its tragic
consequences at the dawn of African independence. He argued that those who
inherited power with the consent of the colonialists "came to power in the
name of a narrow nationalism and representing a race; they will prove
themselves incapable of triumphantly putting into practice a programme with
even a minimum humanist content, in spite of fine-sounding declaration which
are devoid of meaning since the speakers bandy about in irresponsible
fashion phrases that come straight out of European treatises on morals and
political philosophy." (4)

The emergence of this form of nationalism led immediately to
authoritarianism which was the defense mechanism used to contain those who
had better credentials because of their broad social base. Thus what
obtained in those countries where the compromisers were successful was a
form of garrison nationalism which barricaded itself from any form of
popular participation.

The final variety was the ‘Jacobin’ brand which as we have argued was
militant and revolutionary. Here the confrontation was most often violent
primarily because the arrogance of the colonialists came up against the
total mobilization of a determined people. Those who led the revolt were
uncompromising as their objective was the social transformation of the
society. In this regard, they went over and above the mere taking of power
and addressed the social question which had to do with the collective
participation of the people in the building of new social, economic and
political relations. In this variety, there was the marginalization not of
the people but of that social sector which demonstrated diametrically
opposed interests to that of the majority. In this variety, new theories of
advancement and development had to be conceived. These revolved around the
fundamental issue of collective nation-building. The basic argument here was
that:

No real nation can emerged from the amalgamation of disparate or conflicting
nationality interests, but only by organizing all elements...on the basis of
their specific social interests: by building the nation, that is, upwards
from the bottom and not downwards from the top. Once this was undertaken,
all elements...could be harmonised within the same overall system because
their specific social interests were identical in kind or closely similar.
That being so, the social question had to have primacy over the national
question. You had to start from the real and immediate needs of the people
‘at the base’: their need for control over their own communities, their need
for understanding how to use this control  so as to improve life, their need
for means to make this improvement possible. (5)

The attempts at creating new structures which would accelerate the process
of social transformation elicited hostile responses both internally and
externally. Internally, those social sectors, both traditional and modern,
which wanted to safeguard certain privileges and create rigid social
divisions used all methods of sabotage to hinder the process of mobilization
and social transformation. Externally, plots and conspiracies were hatched
in conjunction with certain circles in Africa to destroy the emergence of
new and dynamic social formations. For example, in Southern Africa, it was
the apartheid state machine which served as a conduit for aggression and
destabilization. It was in this context that UNITA and RENAMO, in Angola and
Mozambique respectively, were nurtured and maintained. In Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese employed mercenaries to assist their troops in
the process of repression and destabilization. Tanzania had to contend with
the remnants of Arabised feudalism and later with that grotesque militarist
called Idi Amin. Thus, the states in this category went straggling into the
modern world with all the hindrances put in their way by those who fear a
genuine alternative for Africa’s growth and development.

Independence and Nation-building

The states which emerged into independence reflected to a great extent the
nature of the nationalist struggle and the method of the acquisition of
political power. The first two varieties mentioned are the norms in modern
Africa and we must therefore deal with the inadequacies of nation-building
in these social formations. As to the last variant, whatever abortion of the
process of social transformation that subsequently occurred had more to do
with exogenous forces. The argument here is that the third variant had the
necessary ingredients for constructive nation-building and would have
evolved into dynamic social formations with popular participation and
democratic transformation if external forces had not intervene to abort the
process. The form of external intervention had nothing to do with economic
or political manipulation. This form was naked aggression and its objective
was to subvert and destroy all forms of transformation that were not modeled
on western institutions and Anglo-Saxon values.

The "negotiated" and "compromised" variants on the other hand had major
pitfalls at the inception of independence. These were endogenous and derived
from the orientation of the social sector which was in a dominant position
to direct the process of the transfer of power. In the first place,
nationalism was built on regional and/or sectional interests. It was based
on a vertical hierarchy with rigid structures of division defining the
various compartments and the level of participation. It involved the people
only at the level of "shock troops" in the process of negotiation. Without
the consciousness of a nation imbued in them, they followed those from the
regions who were their tribesmen and thus stopped at the level of regional
irredentism. The social sector which led only wanted power as an instrument
of control and personal gratification. In this regard, the regional base was
sufficient and whatever negotiations took place for the acquisition of power
were done against the background of a truce worked out between the various
regional denizens.

Basil Davidson has argued convincingly that with this method of negotiation
for independence, "nationhood won the day. But it had come as a bastard
birth, or rather, out of parents so ill-matched as to make the raising of
the infant worse than chancy. Married to colonial attitudes, structures and
values, the cultures of Africa brought forth a creature of
self-contradiction that mocked the vision of the past. The few were set
against the many. Nationalities were counter-posed to nations. Old
inequalities from the pre-colonial heritage, whether between man and man or
more painfully between man and woman, were enlarged by new inequalities from
the colonial heritage; and the outcome was frustration and defeat." (7)

The attempt at building viable nation-states must tackle first and foremost
the mobilization of the people. No form of marginalization can address the
issue of that necessary consensus which is indispensable for the negation of
those tendencies that lead to regional irredentism. The national consensus
must invariably address the social issue of political and economic
participation. Politically, the issue can never be what form of government
is adopted but to what degree the people are involved in the process of
decision-making. The fallacy that voting once in every four or five years is
sufficient for the involvement of the people has been the bane of
independent Africa. Economically, "the marginalization of the masses is the
very condition for the integration of the minority into the world system,
the guarantee of a growing income for this minority, which encourages it to
adopt Europe-type models of consumption." (8)

The grand illusion of nation-building has to do with the inability of the
leading social sectors to take stock of the travesty of that nation-building
process which is prone to instability and paralysis. The model they have
adopted is rigid and exclusivist. Many of the institutions are not relevant
for national integration. The concept of surplus generation is barren and
thus the dependence on those foreign institutions which see development as
the incremental hoarding of wealth by selective social sectors and not the
all round diversification of productive activities which takes as its point
of departure the peasantry as the foundation of growth and development.
Samir Amin, in his analysis of class and nation has pointed out the
barrenness of the model adopted by the two variants we mentioned and has
argued that in order to move the nation forward, "industrialization must
first be used to increase rural productivity. In the same way, those wishing
to serve the urban popular masses must stop luxury production for the local
market and exportation, both of which are based on the reproduction of a
cheap labour force." (9)

A cheap labour force is the sine qua non for an unconscious and immobilized
populace. Existence here is harsh and brutish. Torn from the rural
communities and deposited in urban centres, the masses of the people exist
on the peripheral of the nation. The social divisions which ensue undermine
the ethos of national unity. Those in the rural areas suffer neglect and
abandonment. Here, what exists is not an all embracing entity but a
multi-faceted structure of gradations, regional loyalties and tribal
sentiments. The failure to involve the people in a collective effort forces
them to fall back on the narrowness of regional loyalties. The state which
emerges in this context stands as a behemoth for the protection of certain
parochial interests and thus has no relation to the Hegelian state which is
seen "as the embodiment and the protector of the whole of society, of its
higher reason, and of its permanent interests." (10)

The fragmentation which emerges in the structure of the African state can be
resolved not by the policy of appeasement of regional and sectional
interests but by negating those interests and identifying the issues which
can motivate the vast majority of the people. Against this background, new
arrangements are made to involve the people at all levels of discussions.
From village committees to urban neighbourhood councils, the issues of
political and economic participation are discussed within the context of the
development of new structures. Economic and political ideas are debated, not
in jargons which make them esoteric, but in simplified language which is
comprehensible to the people. The dynamism of popular participation breaks
down barriers and focuses attention on the issues which can lead to all
round growth and development. But most often it happens that this road is
not taken and in the absence of a coherent strategy for development,
improvisations are made. One of such improvisations is the one-party state.

The one-party state is an admission that new social relations have not
developed after independence and that the numerous centrifugal forces must
be contained by censure and intimidation. In the final analysis, this state
is kept afloat by the threat of the use of force to elicit compliance. Here,
the army is seen not as an extension of a conscious and armed people who
together are seen as builders of the new society but as the protector of a
fragile polity kept intact by fear. From this point to the coup d’ etat is a
very short distance.

It is obvious that the forces of disunity in these one-party states are
numerous. However, the political sterility that pervades these states stems
from the absence of an ideology and thus there is hardly any framework in
which the disunity can be mitigated. No nation in history has developed
without an ideology. Suffice it to say that African nationalism is not an
ideology. The ahistorical posture in Africa of trying to create
nation-states without an ideology is one of those aberrations that must be
given serious attention by scholars of the African experience.

In the absence of an ideology for social transformation and popular
mobilization, Africa has co-opted both the western capitalist model and the
socialist arrangements with dastardly consequences. Both these arrangements
emerged against the background of developments which were unique to Europe.
They are outgrowth of social relations in Europe that cannot be duplicated
in Africa. The fallacy that an ideology can be borrowed and applied to a
different cultural milieu has plagued most of the new nations of Africa
since independence.

PART 2

The problematic

Nearly forty years after the independence of most of the states in Africa,
the search goes on for formulae that would underpin the building of stable
nation-states. In a world of vigorous competition between states and
economic entities, internal structures and institutions must provide the
necessary ingredients for the stability that would allow the state to
interact effectively within the world system.

Undoubtedly, there have been some successes in certain cases where national
mobilisation has led to social transformation with the attendant
consequences of popular participation and national integration. In this
context, it can be argued that the process of nation-building has involved
the dynamic development of structures and institutions which has positive
implications for unity and stability. In other cases, there has been rapid
disintegration due to the absence of any constructive framework for
amalgamating the various nationalities. Here, in some instances, we have
witnessed the total collapse of states as the result of national atrophy
leading to civil wars. In recent times, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia
were designated as "failed states." The failure was both structural and
institutional and was a consequence of the inability of the dominant social
sectors to identify and address the social question. In most of Africa, the
fragility of national structures and institutions is the result of the
postponement of the resolution of that fundamental issue which revolves
around the welfare of the vast majority. The question that was posed at the
dawn of independence about the involvement of the people in the economic and
political transformation of the state still stands.

What in essence was the debate about nation-building and democratisation in
the context of Africa’s advancement? What were the issues about social
transformation and the democratic participation of the people in the new
nations? Few of the nationalist leaders grappled with these questions. They
emphasized the central role of the "common man" in the new political and
economic dispensation in Africa. For them, the success of any nationalist
movement in its nation-building efforts must take as its point of departure
the awareness that "a nation is the transformation of people, or of several
ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilisation."14

The fallacy with regard to the form of nationalism that was pervasive in the
variants of "negotiation" and "compromise" was that it was possible to build
viable new nation-states with rigid stratification which marginalised the
people. In this context, the concept of democracy that emerged was the one
which took its point of departure from the interest of that social sector
whose definition of the nation and of democracy was limited to its narrow
interests. Integrated into the world system with its model of development
patterned after Europe, it sought to create a society of rigid social
barriers. It concentrated on the over-development of the cities to the
neglect of the rural areas. It abandoned the peasantry to the constraints
and taboos of the countryside. Those who managed to escape to the cities
found themselves in dysfunctional urban settings with mass poverty, crime
and misery. In the absence of all egalitarian tendencies, the state became a
foreign imposition with its menacing presence suffocating the people.

For the privileged social sectors, agreement is reached between various
tendencies as to the kind of political framework that should evolve. They
most often settle for pluralism within the context of liberalism. There is a
fixation on "freedom of the press," when the major news organs are owned by
millionaires and about ninety percent of the people cannot read or write.
There is the intoxication with "freedom of movement" when the vast majority
of the people are consigned to the rural wasteland and the urban slums.
There is the fetishism of "freedom of expression" when the masses of the
people cannot even understand the jargons with which economic and political
issues are debated. In the case of "freedom of choice," the chosen ones are
already designated by the position they occupy on the apex of the social
ladder. Against this background, politics becomes a game of deciding which
faction among the privileged social sector should be allowed to preside over
the interests of the entire sector. Thus, we have a fantasy of democratic
participation. Like all fantasies, this one is kept going because it
assuages various political hangovers. Is there an alternative?

The search for an alternative to the political and social dislocation must
begin with the definition of new forms of democratic participation which
allows for the germination of positive social relations as the basis for
collective advancement. Ahmed Sekou Toure, like Nyerere, realised the
absolute necessity for this. He starts off by defining the form of
nationalism which was necessary and sufficient for nation-building and
democratic participation after independence. He averred that:

To us, the departure of the colonialists corresponded to the conquest of
political power, but this conquest was not sufficient...the existing state
had to be annihilated, because of its colonial structures and methods. Even
in its notion...there was only a minority which understood the contours and
bases of the nation; all the others had no notion of the nation, than that
of micro-nations represented by the regionalist groups, the tribes and
diverse retrogressive formations, to which they belonged, and they often
determined their attitude on the basis of biological and tribal
affinities.15

What was interesting about the Guinean experience was that these ideas were
not only expressed as a declaration of intent, but were operationalised in a
society which involved the people in the building of new structures and
institutions. Popular participation became the basis of a political system
that placed the social issue at the top of the national agenda. The diverse
regional and sectional tendencies were neutralised because the development
of the nation was undertaken together with the social and political struggle
for economic emancipation and democratic participation. Politics thus became
a pastime for all and not a form of cultism in which the rituals are
understood by only a few. Development--what little existed--was spread
evenly throughout the country. A cultural revolution took place which
transformed the various languages into national languages. Every local
culture was elevated to the position of a national culture and presented to
all the people with its rich symbolism. A national ideology emerged which
had its basis in the egalitarianism of traditional African society.

The Fulah, Sousou, Mandingo and the other nationalities embarked on the
building of the Guinean nation because only within this nation could they
defined and identify their interests. And then there were the armed people,
auxiliaries to the men in arms who had dedicated themselves to the defence
of the nation. There was no instance when arms were used in the furtherance
of regional or sectional interests. These tendencies had been eliminated in
a frontal assault that wiped out anti-national sentiments.

The liberation of man and his transformation into a new social species with
a high level of political consciousness became the raison d’ etat of the
various political organs of the party-state. The emancipation of women was
placed on the same level as the abolition of exploitation. A party emerged
drawing cadres from the most conscious elements in the society. Many critics
have argued that this was a dictatorship because certain rights and
privileges were denied to selective social sectors. But no dictatorship in
an underdeveloped country--lacking the sophistication and refinement of
terror as witnessed in Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia, Franco’s Spain or
Mussolini’s Italy--can survive when guns are given to the people.

The regime in Guinea was stern because the process of nation-building had at
first to contend with obnoxious particularisms magnified by colonialism. The
regime was uncompromising because the process of social transformation must
first and foremost abolish all forms of obscurantism which retard the
people’s vision. But there was democratic participation as the people
negated all tendencies towards irredentism and with arms in hand debated in
the national languages the issues of justice, equality and national unity.
The only mishap in this experiment was that the Guinean people believed so
implicitly in Ahmed Sekou Toure--in his courage, his vision and his
indispensability--that his departure sapped them of all energy and left them
forlorn.

Democracy, to be germane to the African condition, must extricate itself
from the political shibboleths expatiated by certain social sectors for whom
democracy is another label for political chicanery and national
manipulation. The priority in the implantation of democracy in a
multi-ethnic society is the resolution of the nationality question. This is
resolved not by the political appeasement of certain social sectors and
perfunctory voting once every four or five years but by addressing the
primary issues of the economic and political empowerment of the broad masses
of the people. The question of empowerment has to be tackled not at the
regional but at the national level. First and foremost, the peasants,
irrespective of ethnic origins are confronted by the same phenomena of low
productivity, high cost of fertilizers and relegation to the rural wasteland
without a modicum of modern conveniences. Thus, a priority ought to be the
bridging of the communication gap between different sectors of the peasantry
through an organization which addresses the problems confronting the
peasantry at the national level.

What was done in Guinea under Ahmed Sekou Toure with the transformation of
major indigenous languages into national languages and then their
utilization in all official and non-official undertakings, followed by the
carrying out of a cultural revolution which put emphasis on the relevance of
indigenous languages to the modernisation and development of Guinea are
pertinent examples. In most countries in Africa, the peasants are affected
the most by the process of modernisation. They suffer from serious complexes
which undermine their sense of dignity. However, they are the custodians of
indigenous cultures in an age of westernisation through unfettered
consumerism. By elevating indigenous cultures to national prominence, the
peasants are made aware of their importance in the development of the
nation. Here, we are not referring to the sporadic display of culture for
the entertainment of visiting tourists but to its dynamic presentation on a
regular basis to the people and its integration within the framework of
historical interpretation.

With the cultural revolution, the process of social mobilisation becomes a
dynamic facet of development. The bringing of the great majority of the
people into the mainstream of development portends rapid transformation in
social and political awareness. From this stage to that of democratic
participation is a short leap. Participation in this context does not limit
itself to voting. The ahistorical proposition that because a people can vote
for leaders therefore they are involved in democratic pursuits is one of
those fallacies that is a by-product of cable TV and western talk-shows.
Former President Kaunda of Zambia alluded to the deficiency of this kind of
democracy recently in an address to the Oxford Union. He averred that "a
deficient conception of democracy is dangerous for democracy. The mere
existence of political parties, or the right to form them, or periodically
holding free and fair elections, is not enough. Democracy can only survive
by means of increasing the efforts to protect its values against the
ever-present dangers of tokenism."16 We must assume that the democratic
values President Kaunda is referring to are people’s participation in
decision-making at all levels and the positing of their economic interests
as the fundamental basis of development and growth.

The focus on the peasantry in the building of democratic culture is not the
result of any romantic fascination with rural simplicity, but a realistic
conclusion that emanates from an awareness that democracy has failed to take
roots in most parts of Africa because its basic premise has been founded on
an erroneous conception. With the involvement of the broad masses of
peasants allied to other subordinate social groups in the urban centres,
democracy can have meaning in its only pertinent historical
conception--government for, by, and with the people. It is in this sense
that Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau added to our knowledge of the
prerequisites for the transformation of man and society. The liberation war,
which can be defined as the conscious making of history by the people ,
especially the peasants, encompasses all the ingredients necessary for the
building of a democratic society. The war liberates not only the land, but
also the mental obscurantism that entraps the peasants in stagnation and
backwardness. By the logic of historical determinism, it makes subjects of
those who are the determining factors in the transformation of the
nation-state. Reflecting on the liberation war in Guinea-Bissau and how the
transformation in the consciousness of the people led to the conception of
the necessity for new structures to enhance the democratic participation of
the people, an observer of the process comments:

For the leaders, unavoidably, this meant accepting that the solving of the
‘national question,’ the problem of building a  national consciousness or
individualist divergence, must always depend on solving the ‘social
question,’ the problem of meeting the material and cultural needs of
everyday life. Out of this necessary acceptance(and those who refused it
were lost) there came the practice of their revolutionary theory: the
immensely difficult promotion, in liberated zones, of a new social-cultural
system based on the democracy of village committees.... A new type of state
could thus emerge in embryo even while the wars continued.17

In actuality, the defining components of democracy in a multi-ethnic society
should be social justice and popular participation. The framework for
national integration must embrace first and foremost the mobilisation of the
people through an identification of their interests and how these interests
are intrinsically bound up with the modernisation and development of the
nation-state.

PART THREE

Two case studies--Liberia and Sierra Leone

Liberia and Sierra Leone are relevant case studies in the light of recent
developments in those states. Both nations have been ravaged by civil wars
initiated by men who are from that category of déclassé elements so common
in Africa because of the stagnation and paralysis of many of the new states.
It is common knowledge that in the absence of coherent social, economic and
political tenets for transformation, societal dislocation ensues and thus
fertile grounds are provided for elements with dysfunctional social
behaviour which is criminal by nature.

The brutality of the civil wars in both countries and the total lack of
remorse for the kind of methodical genocide carried out point to one
defining characteristic: both civil wars are the result of criminal banditry
and the key perpetrators are men who suffer from chronic neurosis which
manifests itself in a perverted obsession. What is tragic is not that these
elements exist in society but that because of the inability of certain
social sectors to involve the people in genuine democratic transformation,
these men with their pathological deliriums are allowed to destroy society.

In Liberia, the manipulation of ethnic differences and the social snobbery
which was endemic to the stratification of an ascriptive hierarchical
structure, bedeviled the state for many decades. Between 1971-1979, the
Tolbert administration tried a half-hearted process of social mobilisation
by appealing to the disaffected sectors of the society with mere slogans.
There was the "mat to mattresses" exhortations; the total involvement for
higher heights" incantations; and the "wholesome functioning society"
acclamations; but these were empty phrases in a society chronically
lethargic and immobilised by deep social cleavages. Added to this fantasy
was the attempt to define an ideology for development. It became known as
"humanistic capitalism," which in reality was the expression of the ultimate
contempt the ruling social sector had for the vast majority of the people.
Tolbert’s "humanistic capitalism" was conveyed as the giving of charity to
those who were the most exploited and dehumanised by the process of social
and political exclusion. After decades of political suffocation and economic
deprivation, made all the more offensive by the high surplus exported by the
Firestone Rubber Company and the two Mining companies (under American,
Swedish and German control), the partial reformism of the Tolbert years
appeared as mere chimera.

Failing to address the national question which in Liberia specifically
centred on the exclusion of the majority of the people from any meaningful
role in the State and their domination by a social caste still welded to the
anachronistic values of the plantation aristocracy of the southern United
States before and during the period of the Confederacy, the Tolbert
administration engaged in political chicanery. As for the social question,
it was nowhere on any agenda. Then followed a period of rapid decline as the
world market for rubber and iron ore shrunk. Addicted to that form of
development that marginalises the rural areas and thus the peasantry, the
Tolbert administration stagnated in contradictions of its own making. This
marginalisation of the peasantry and the neglect of the rural areas, coupled
with the downturn in the sale of rubber and iron ore accelerated the mass
exodus from the countryside. Here was the scenario for the eruption of the
crisis of April 1979. This was followed a year later by a coup d’ etat.

In the case of Sierra Lone, the negotiations for independence ended with a
truce between the three dominant social sectors in the state: the Northern
chiefly elements composed of the Temnes, the Limbas and the Korankos; the
Southern chiefly elements composed of the Mendes and the Sherbros; and the
westernised Creoles of the Western area (where the capital Freetown is
located). The truce between the three social sectors necessitated a
political arrangement whereby the Creoles would serve as the ballast. The
North and the South being equally matched, the Creoles, although in the
minority, became the final arbiters of which region held power at any point
in time.

From 1961 to 1967, the Western area cast its lot with the chiefly elements
from the South who were dominant in the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).
The politics of ethnicity was upgraded to an act. At no time in its history
did this Party address the social question which would have disentangled the
people of Sierra Leone from the firm grips of the tribalised social sectors.
By 1967, the impotency of the SLPP in the face of mounting economic problems
(which are endemic to societies entrapped in the vortex of neo-colonialism),
coupled with the marginalisation of the people and the absence of any form
of ideological rationale which could justify the difficulties, led to the
rejection of the SLPP by the Western area. Interestingly, the Party won
overwhelmingly in the South which was its ethnic base. With power about to
fall to the North, southern elements in the army seized power. This was
followed by a counter-coup led by elements from the North and the Western
area. A subsequent counter-coup led by Northern elements gave power to the
northern based All People’s Congress (APC). From 1968 to 1992, the APC held
power. The political reality was that the North dominated the political
arena.

The country was saddled with ethnic animosity as various groups of southern
politicians and a few of their northern allies were disposed of by the APC.
By 1992, the economy of Sierra Leone was in shambles. From a self-sufficient
rice producing country (rice is the staple food) with diamonds, rutile and
bauxite, it declined and was classified as the second least developed
country in the world.18 The same pattern of neglect of the rural areas and
the marginalisation of the people led to general disillusionment. The
nervous reforms of the government carried out from 1990-1992 with the help
of the World Bank were too little and too late. In April 1992, there was a
coup d’ etat led by elements from the South. In continuation of the ethnic
politics carried out by their civilian predecessors, the southern elements
co-opted a Creole from the western area to head the new military government.

In Liberia, the military coup attempted to address the national question but
could not place the social question on the agenda as the leadership lacked
an understanding of this issue and the US government was inclined to oppose
any social transformation that would bring into question the brazen
exploitation of the country by American multi-national corporations. Without
addressing the social question, the military regime could find no
justification for its long stay in power. Thus caught in the same
contradictions as the Tolbert administration, the military government turned
to terror and tribalism for survival.

The limitation of the Liberian people’s outlook and the crudity of the
methods used to elicit conformity prompted them to accept that the old order
was preferable despite its negative tendencies. This was a typical reaction
of people who accept repression and exploitation from those they perceive as
their "superiors," but automatically reject the same from those they
consider their social equals. This psychology no doubt explains the
durability of colonialism in the pre-history of Africa. In the context of
the paralysis of the state under the military regime and the tribalisation
of politics, a rebel war was unleashed by déclassé elements who now saw an
opportunity to plunder on their way to state power. Thus, in Liberia, the
terror of the military regime was opposed by the banditry of lumpen
elements.

In the case of Sierra Leone, the rebel war was started as an act of revenge
for some Northern elements who had been physically eliminated in the power
struggle. It soon developed into banditry because it had no social base.
Terror was unleashed to elicit conformity. The elections conducted in 1996
to undermine the rebel war took the same pattern of ethnic alliances as in
the past. The Southern based SLPP won with help from the Western area. The
North was defeated, not so much from internal division, but because those
who presided over the conduct of the elections were Southern elements from
the military. The results were accepted because the people were determined
to undermine the ruthless and unpopular rebels.

The rebel wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were both non-ideological simply
because they had nothing to do with the transformation of society. They were
both conducted for plunder. They both destroyed the fragile institutions of
moribund states. They both were led by men with no history of engagement in
mass political activities. Tragically, both of these men were given some
semblance of respectability because the international community could not
distinguish between wars of national liberation and banditry.

What is clear in both countries is that the people want democratic
participation which can only come with the ending of anarchy and
lawlessness. The defeat of the bandits in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG in 1998 led
to the establishment of the rule of law. The building of democracy in that
multi-ethnic society will come with the solving of the social question.
Democracy cannot be an imposition. It has to be willed, called for and
enthroned by the people and those who lead them. What happened in Sierra
Leone recently was the decisive enthronement of the rule of law. In the case
of Liberia, there has been a tragic mishap wherein criminality was
legitimised through an electoral farce that saw victims of mayhem,
brutality, and terror being threatened with serious consequences if they did
not vote for a rebel leader. In Liberia, an entire people were held hostage
and the end result was the rewarding of evil.

Both Sierra Leone and Liberia are linked by history. For them peace is
indivisible. There cannot be peace in Sierra Leone as long as there is no
peace in Liberia and vice versa. Interestingly, the rebel leaders understand
this all too well and thus they have assisted each other in the tragic
occurrences in their respective countries. It is the responsibility of those
who believe in democracy and popular participation in both countries to
ensure that the factors of destabilisation must be neutralised. After this
must come the social mobilisation of the people in both countries and their
united efforts in building institutions which negate the factors of
ethnicity and thus place before history the social question of the
attainment of justice, equality and an end to crude exploitation.

-------------------------------------------------------

N*ote: The Evolution of Democracy in Multi-Racial Societies is a  paper
presented at the International Seminar on Democracy and Democratisation in
Africa, organised by the Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity, Abuja,
Nigeria, 15th--17th April 1998. The author is a former Foreign Minister and
ex-Minister of Education of Liberia.*

*Footnotes*

1. Quoted in Colin Legum, ‘The Nature of Pan-Africanism’ in P.J.M.
McEwan(Ed.)

Twenty Century Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),

p.445.

2. The analysis of social formations in Africa which is germane to an
understanding

of the roles of various social forces in the international configuration of
power

can be found in Samir Amin, Class and Nation, Historically and in

the current crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).

3. This is an apt description given by Stanislav Andreski in The African

Predicament (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), p.65.

4. The assertion of Chief Awolowo was that "Nigeria is not a nation; it is a
mere

geographical expression," Quoted in Jimi Peters, The Nigerian Military

and the State (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), p.49.

5. Robert I. Rotberg, "African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion," in Peter
J.M.

McEwan and Robert B. Sutchliffe, The Study of Africa (London: Methuen

& Co. Ltd., 1965), p.423.

6. James Coleman, ‘Nationalism in Tropical Africa’ in Peter J.M. McEwan &

Robert B. Sutcliffe, Op. Cit., p.181.

7. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Paris: Francisco Maspero,

1961), p. 131.

8. Basil Davidson, Africa in Modern History (London: Penguin Books,

1978), p.378.

9. For a study of the foreign forces which created Idi Amin, see Mahmood

Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (Africa World Press,

Trenton, New Jersey, 1984).

10. Basil Davidson, Op. Cit., p.374.

11. Samir Amin, Op. Cit., p.138.

12. Ibid.

13. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic

Books, Inc. 1969), p.73.

14. The quotation is Karl Deutsch’s. See James Coleman, ‘Nationalism in
Tropical

Africa’ in Peter J.M. McEwan and Robert B. Sutcliffe, Op. Cit., p.180.

15. Ahmed Sekou Toure, Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution

(Conakry: Patrick Lumumba National Printing Press, 1978), p.67.

16. West Africa Magazine (19-25 January 1998), p.60.

17. Basil Davidson, Op. Cit., p.354



*©  alhajikromahpage.org <http://www.alhajikromahpage.org/index.htm>*
*http://www.alhajikromahpage.org/alhajievolutionfahn.htm*

-- 
www.suntoumana.blogspot.com


¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤
To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface
at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html

To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l
To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to:
[log in to unmask]
¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤