GAMBIA-L Archives

The Gambia and Related Issues Mailing List

GAMBIA-L@LISTSERV.ICORS.ORG

Options: Use Forum View

Use Monospaced Font
Show Text Part by Default
Show All Mail Headers

Message: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Topic: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Author: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]

Print Reply
Subject:
From:
"Ousman K. Kinteh" <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 25 Jun 2001 02:33:01 -0700
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (485 lines)
Colley
Marvelous piece again.I can't wait to see your next article.
Once again,God saved you to tell the true colors of the "Alibaba and the six
thieves"
  Peace!!!!


>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT
>Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 19:27:56 -0700
>
>COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT
>In my last piece I explained how after two days of
>confusion at the State House following the immediate
>takeover that the so-called coup organizers finally
>came together and formed a ruling military council
>with Yaya given the leadership role as the most senior
>officer among them. Still guided by their order of
>seniority Sabally, as I said, got the number two
>position, followed by Haidara, then Singhateh and
>Yankuba in that order.
>However, for those of us within, there was no question
>about who was really in charge. Singhateh was no doubt
>the man calling the shots with unprecedented
>arrogance. Of course there was crazy Sana battling for
>equal recognition or rights, acting on his erratic
>whims, though with a dangerous bond with the new
>defense minister. Most of the arrests and detentions
>of officers to Mile Two Central Prisons were
>orchestrated by Singhateh and Sabally, although the
>physical apprehension of those detainees was largely
>carried out by the "Mighty Sabally" aided by Haidara
>and their guards. Sabally in addition showed little
>respect for Yaya, just as Singhateh at that initial
>moment demonstrated none at all to their new chairman
>either. As for Sabally he had maintained his
>disrespect for Yaya for the entire six months he had
>served as vice-chairman of the AFPRC or up to the day
>he was arrested on the 27th January 1995.
>It did not however take Yaya too long to realize that
>potential enemies surrounded him. For a while it
>appeared as if he was lost in survival plans. But
>then, the US ambassador Mr. Andrew Winters came asking
>for the coup leader to speak to Sir Dawda by phone. It
>was the very day Yaya got elected as chairman of the
>AFPRC. Mr. Winters did not specifically ask for
>Singhateh, but the head of the military government.
>Yaya as a result was certain that he was the person
>the Ambassador wanted to talk to Sir Dawda until
>Singhateh told him to forget about going and left with
>Mr. Winters.
>This particular incident in the development of the
>whole coup episode told a lot about how the success of
>those clowns in seizing power was merely luck and
>nothing of the sort of great leadership they later
>tried to sell to the gullible Gambian masses. Nothing
>was properly planned or executed.
>Anyhow, it was after this embarrassing encounter with
>Singhateh that Yaya started to forge his personal
>defense scheme. Yaya was definitely not pleased with
>that treatment. So no sooner had Singhateh left with
>the ambassador to speak to Sir Dawda than Yaya began
>to surround himself with guards he trusted. And it was
>interesting to note that he got the bulk of these men
>from his former gendermarie colleagues. The men they
>were suppose to fight were suddenly turned into
>dependable allies within Yaya's inner security circle.
>Soon he put it to his new guards that soldiers
>carrying weapons were not to be allowed near him
>especially around his room upstairs. (After his
>appointment, he immediately moved upstairs and
>occupied Sir Dawda's main bedroom). His guards, now
>headed by Musa Jammeh strictly enforced the order from
>Yaya on every armed soldier except on Singhateh and
>Sabally.
>Anyway in their presence, Yaya was still very cautious
>in the manner he dealt with them. Perhaps he was aware
>of the intentions of these key players in the coup to
>have most of the officers executed later. I'll get to
>that later.
>Before forgetting this important point, I thought it
>historically necessary to mention the special role
>played by Major Malick Njie (Army Doctor) at those
>first critical days of the coup. Although he was just
>from course in Nigeria and was on his leave, he
>managed to respond to the invitation to the State
>House. For two days he also stayed around to see how
>he could help stabilize the situation. With his
>medical background therefore he was assigned with the
>special task of ensuring that the Royal Victoria
>Hospital was fully operational plus all the medical
>centers affected by the coup outside Banjul. For three
>days he tirelessly moved from one affected medical
>facility to the other until everyone of them was back
>to full operation. On the fifth day, when he came to
>give the council members a situation report on his
>achievements, Sabally and Haidara arrested him and
>took him straight to death row. It was a very cowardly
>and treacherous act.
>However by the 25th of July, things started to look
>hopefully stable. The soldiers' uncontrolled and
>dangerous driving in the city had considerably
>dwindled. There were negligible problems here and
>there which in the final analysis made the coup a
>relatively peaceful event. One sergeant was arrested
>for robbing a Mauritanian shopkeeper in Brikama at
>gunpoint. Another corporal was also arrested for
>trying to steal the engine of a Mercedes Benz parked
>at the former Secretary General's residence at Fajara.
>There was also a civilian arrested wearing military
>uniform pretending to be a soldier and extorting money
>from commercial drivers around Soma. He was a seasoned
>criminal who had traveled all over the world and could
>speak all kinds of languages, local and foreign. A
>weapon in his hands would have been too deadly. And
>finally there was one soldier who out of excitement or
>whatever, accidentally shot him self on the foot. It
>was not very serious anyway. Apart from those isolated
>incidents, the country quickly began to return to
>normalcy by the 25th of July.
>At that moment Captain Mamat Cham was so pleased with
>General Dada's assistance that he recommended for the
>Nigerian General to be invited to the State House for
>more help. The idea was communicated to the general,
>which he readily accepted but requested for a vehicle
>to be sent to get him. But at the last minute when
>Captain Cham was about to dispatch a vehicle to get
>him from Fajara, Singhateh vetoed the idea.
>Anyhow, later that day, Captain Cham had a bigger
>responsibility of helping the council members choose
>civilian ministers for the new cabinet. Apart from Mr.
>Bakary Darbo who was selected out of  sincere respect
>and confidence most of the AFPRC members had for the
>former Finance Minister, I really didn't know the
>criteria used to select the others including my very
>self.
>All I knew was that a special meeting to select the
>ministers was again conducted upstairs by the room
>occupied by Yaya. Captain Cham was present. And I was
>made to understand that he, Captain Cham recommended
>the appointment of Fafa Mbye as minister of justice
>and also Mr. Mawdo Touray as chief protocol officer.
>Like previous missions outside, Captain Cham was the
>officer who went to meet most or all the prospective
>ministers at their home to seek their consent for
>their formal appointment. On his return he reported
>everyone's acceptance of the appointments except that
>of the candidate from the PDOIS party. They rejected
>the offer on the basis that the coup was undemocratic
>and was against the principles of their party
>doctrine.
>However, it was Singhateh who informed me of my
>appointment as minister for trade and industry. He
>told me that the decision to give me that position was
>derived from their strong confidence in my ability to
>offer a valuable contribution to the course.
>Up to that moment nothing of serious importance could
>be attributed to the reason why the PPP government was
>overthrown. And that was evident in the manner the
>former top executive members of that government were
>treated in comparison to how the GNA senior officers
>in particular suffered the misdirected stupidity and
>anger of the fools. There was nothing logical in
>arresting the officers who had nothing to do with
>their success or failure or their purpose of
>overthrowing the government. Speaking to Yaya about
>trying to stop Sana was useless. He would express his
>dissatisfaction with Sabally's actions in the absence
>of the vice-chairman, but as soon as Sana surfaced
>with more names of officers he just arrested, Yaya
>would commend him for a job well done. It was hard to
>understand when the whole madness would end. Some of
>us were however hoping that by the time the new
>government became fully operational; they would put
>Sana in his place and allow civility to prevail. We
>did not know that Sabally after all had gotten into
>something too much for his midget head and that only
>by applying his maddening rules of the game against
>him would he be finally tamed. It was done on the 27th
>of January 1995. That was the day Yaya and Singhateh
>came together at last and dragged Sabally and his
>friend Haidara by the tails straight to death row as
>well. We gave them a warm welcome that day.
>Anyway, as the general situation indicated in the
>beginning, there was nothing of significance that the
>AFPRC government could say were the serious crimes
>committed by the PPP government towards the Gambian
>people to warrant the coup. And until those kangaroo
>courts were created as commissions of enquiry boards
>to implicate the Gambians they simply hated, there was
>still little for them to say. In the process, the
>crude oil saga was dug out giving them their first
>anti-PPP ammunition that boosted their public image.
>With 420 million Dalasi said to have been involved in
>what the commission reported as "embezzlement of
>public funds", Yaya started calling Sir Dawda and his
>government "Dirmos…! Dirmos…! Dirmos…! (Well, time has
>proven to all of us that when looking for the biggest
>Dirmo of the century, missing Doctor Dirmo Yaya Jammeh
>leaves you with nobody better qualified for the
>crown). The fact that he was caught red handed on a
>crude oil corruption saga coupled with all kind of
>racketeering-blood diamond, arms trafficking
>etceteras- not in Dalasi but millions of dollars was
>enough to drag him out of State House straight to
>death row.
>Anyhow, the fact of the matter was that we were poorly
>armed with good reasons for the coup. Yet we were
>appointed ministers and expected by all means to
>justify our positions or actions to the Gambian
>public.
>The following day however, the other ministerial
>positions were formally announced over Radio Gambia.
>That evening, I did not stay too late at the state
>house. For the first time since the coup I decided to
>go home and spend the night with my family. Before
>leaving I spoke to Yaya at the balcony by his room. He
>even asked me to make sure that I reported for duty
>early the next morning since it was supposed to be the
>day for the swearing in of the newly appointed
>civilian ministers. We were very close indeed,
>providing us with the opportunity to talk about a lot
>of things. He treated me with respect and I thought he
>was a genuine good person. We even discussed the
>urgency for him to look into getting a wife since he
>was without one at the time. He agreed that it would
>be his top priority before long. And he definitely had
>someone in mind around Brikama.
>Oh, by the way, I think the 26th of July was the day
>IGP Pa Sallah Jagne returned from Dakar. He was among
>those who joined the America vessel with Sir Dawda and
>his family. Upon his arrival, Sabally and Haidara
>arrested and chained him to Mile Two Prisons.
>A week or two later Lamin Kaba Bajo also returned from
>Dakar. Within weeks he was appointed Commissioner
>Western Division. Too hard to reason out!
>I slept at home that night but Captain Cham spent the
>night at his usual room at the state house.
>  The following morning I drove myself from my house to
>the State House. I did not have any driver or guards.
>Few soldiers had come to me asking for whether they
>could become my guards but I turned their offers down.
>I did not feel the need for guards anyway.
>It was about 8:00 a.m. when I drove into State House.
>There were a lot of soldiers standing around with a
>hand full of officers as well. The most senior officer
>was Lieutenant Ebrima Cambi.
>Interestingly, Lt. Cambi was one person Yaya wanted to
>see arrested They had had personal problems before
>regarding an army vehicle that Lt. Cambi forced Yaya
>to ground on the orders of Colonel Akogie. When I
>first heard him talking about arresting Lt. Cambi I
>was lucky to talk him out of it. After that I called
>Lt. Cambi and warned him to be careful of his
>activities before he was arrested. Anyhow by the
>morning of the 27th of July all arrests plans for the
>lieutenant seemed to have been forgotten. Weeks after
>he was nailed down. He was the last officer to be
>arrested around the middle of August.
>As expected when I alighted, Lt. Cambi called every
>person on the ground to attention before he saluted
>me. I saluted back and told him to stand everybody at
>ease and carry on. Typical military rituals!
>I walked into the building, took the stairs straight
>up to Yaya's room. The area was unusually quiet. There
>was only one guard around, Corporal Mballo Saidykhan.
>He was a former member of the presidential guard. I
>was really surprised to hear from the corporal that
>Yaya was still sleeping since he went to bed last
>night. After being so particular about timing that
>morning for the  swearing in ceremony of the new
>cabinet ministers, it was surprising that he was still
>in bed. I later added one and one and figured the
>whole thing out. Yaya just did not want to meet me
>because of the conspiracy they had hatched against us
>the previous night.
>I walked across the corridor and ran into Singhateh.
>When I spoke to him, I noted some degree of arrogance
>and rudeness in his voice. He walked away from me.
>  Down the hallway there was the room occupied by
>Sabally and Haidara. They were in a cheerful mood
>until they saw me walking in. I even tried to joke
>with them but by their reaction they showed me that I
>was not at all funny to them. I took a seat on one of
>the chairs in the room; they both got up and left the
>room. It was now clear to me that something had
>seriously gone wrong.
>Captain Mamat Cham was in the next room. I was
>slightly relieved when I saw him. He was nice and
>spoke to me just like before, although I found him
>talking to some civilians about the current situation.
>Among them was Mr. Bolong Sonko who was the chosen
>minister of external affairs.
>There were also officials from the Gambia Ports
>Authority with reports of emergency international
>monetary transactions that were to be attended to
>ASAP.
>Anyway I was able to get Captain Cham to talk to me
>one to one at the back of the room. I asked him what
>had happened the previous night after explaining to
>him my strange encounters in the last ten to fifteen
>minutes. At first he insisted that nothing unusual
>happened but when I pressed him further to think about
>everything that had happened last night, he talked
>about Singhateh's rude behavior.
>According to the Captain at around 3.00 a.m.,
>Singhateh woke him up from his sleep and told him to
>vacate the room and go to a smaller one because, by
>appointment he was his senior as the minister of
>defense. Asked what he did, Cham said that he accepted
>without argument and moved to the other room. After a
>short while, Singhateh came back to him and informed
>him to go back to the room he was asked to leave. He
>went back, and that was the last time he saw or spoke
>to him.
>"Do you know that Yaya is still in bed?" I asked cham.
>He did not know and was equally struck by the unusual
>lateness..
>It was barely five minutes later when a soldier walked
>in, saluted me and asked me to answer the
>Vice-Chairman downstairs. That was very unusual again.
>Whatever Sana had wanted to tell me out of the
>ordinary he could have said it when I met him with
>Haidara minutes ago.
>I left Captain Cham to attend to his civilian guests
>and went down the stairs to the lower floor. Sana was
>outside the building waiting for me. He asked for
>Captain Cham.
>"He is upstairs", I said.
>The same soldier was sent back up to get him.
>In the meantime I asked Sabally what was going on.
>"Nothing serious', he said. " I just want to show you
>and Captain Cham something".
>When the captain came down, Sana offered to ride with
>me in his vehicle while Cham joined Haidara.
>As the convoy was about to Leave State House, Dr.
>Malick Njie arrived to give his report about the job
>he had been doing in the hospitals and clinics. Anyway
>he was asked to join us in one of the vehicles behind'
>Driving through Independence Drive in a state of
>deafening silence in the vehicle I soon noticed
>something that further bothered me. Ahead of us I
>noticed an overloaded pickup vehicle with soldiers
>armed to the teeth. It was trouble staring at me
>directly in the face.
>For a moment I thought we were going to Yundum until
>the convoy branched off to Mile Two Prisons. The
>vehicles came to a screeching stop at the center of
>the yard, by the admin office. Within seconds we were
>surrounded by soldiers pointing their rifles at us as
>Sabally said the words: "SIR, YOU ARE UNDER ARREST".
>"For what?" I asked.
>"You are just under arrest sir"; he repeated the same
>words.
>I turned around and saw that we were four in number:
>Major Malick Njie, Captain Cham, ASP Aboubacarr Jeng
>(police officer who was helping in the documentation
>of our activities since day two of the coup) and
>myself.
>I told Sabally to inform my family about the arrest
>and detention. He would not even talk back. He simply
>waved at us with his weapon to move into the prison
>enclosure-death row to be more precise.
>It was unimaginable but more reasonable than trying
>anything foolish just be shot by that imbecile for
>nothing.
>As for the prison officers who received and searched
>us, they took everything they considered illegal to
>keep in the cells; they behaved as if we were serial
>killers already sentenced to die within few hours.
>They took everything from me from my wristwatch to my
>belt and even my shoelaces.
>Then they put us in cell rooms about nine feet long
>and five feet wide. It had one wooden bed placed on
>concrete slabs with one dirty blanket spread on it.
>There was a small window opening to the outside at the
>upper part of the wall. Call it the superhighway for
>the all the mosquitoes in that swampy area. Not a
>single documentation of our names, the time we came in
>or why we were there was done. There were no
>cautionary statements from anybody. We were just like
>bunch of animals herded into a slaughterhouse.
>Beside the extremely bad food served, we were for
>almost two weeks not allowed to leave the cells for
>anything, showering or even breathing fresh air
>outside. We were locked up 24/7.
>When some detainees later got sick, and Haidara whose
>ministry was in charge of the prisons, was asked about
>taking them to the RVH, he made this statement:
>"Anyone who is sick should never be taken to any
>hospital, and if he died he would happily take the
>responsibility of burying that person.".
>Well what goes around comes around. When he got sick
>after being tortured for two weeks, the doctors begged
>Singhateh to let him be evacuated to the RVH but the
>then Vice-Chairman vetoed it without sympathy or
>remorse. He died that same week.
>It was the darkest period in the political history of
>the Gambia and I hope and pray that the appearance of
>these monsters would be the last ever seen in the
>Gambia.
>You see, in the GNA, we were simply ordinary Gambians.
>We had had our differences, argued among ourselves and
>sometimes even threatened each other. But that was all
>about it. We did not for once imagine that smiling
>colleagues in our midst were capable of even
>considering hurting us let alone murdering us in cold
>blood. Some Gambians attribute great importance to
>peoples' names. So the name Haidara was after all very
>much respected and often honored as originating from
>good Muslims background ( the Sheriffs) who would
>rather save lives than waste them for no good reasons.
>Perhaps that was the reason why God did not wait for
>too long to stop this man whose actions were ungodly
>and too inhuman for the Gambia.
>As for Sana, his crazy life has though crumbled;
>nonetheless I still think we are yet to see this
>devil's last deplorable end.
>I still wonder what would have happened if I had spent
>the night of the 26th of July at State House and how I
>would have reacted to Singhateh if he had treated me
>in the manner he rudely treated Captain Cham. I was
>throughout with the impression that Edward was a nice
>simple gentleman, respectable and could never consider
>hurting any person much more his fellow officers in
>the GNA. He was so likable that I believe I was among
>those who gave him the name high speed.
>Anyway after our arrest and detention 2Lt Alagie
>Kanteh was briefly appointed spokesman of the council.
>Few weeks after his appointment, he was arrested. He
>was the first person who warned us in the jail about
>Singhateh's serious intention to have all detainees
>executed. According to Kanteh, since Singhateh visited
>Sierra Leone where he had a special meeting with
>Captain Valentine Strasser, he had been going around
>with the strong commitment that the best solution to
>our cases was to put us before a firing squad and kill
>us all.
>With all that, some of us were still doubtful about
>the ability of such a nice-looking person to even
>think of that evil thought.
>But on the 6th of September 1994 at about 2:00 a.m.
>the entire AFPRC members paid us a horrible visit at
>the prisons; it as the day we saw Singhateh's true
>colors.
>I will deal with that next time.
>However thank god that we all survived the evil
>intentions of those devils. After all if we were
>executed some Gambians may have pretty well tried to
>justify it in every way.
>
>
>Ebou Colly.
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
>Do You Yahoo!?
>Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail
>http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
>Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
>You may also send subscription requests to
>[log in to unmask]
>if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your
>full name and e-mail address.
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------

_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask]
if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

ATOM RSS1 RSS2