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From:
Burama Jammeh <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and Related Issues Mailing List <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sun, 6 Jul 2014 02:00:39 -0400
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Modou

You sound like Bursma.........Surely not taken away any credit.

Burama

On Sunday, July 6, 2014, Modou Nyang <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> *Gambian Diaspora: A Return to the Drawing Board or a Plunge into the
> Abyss *
> Modou Nyang
> We may be far from the end to the accusations and counter accusations of
> what led to the split within CORDEG. What is not yet heard from the feuding
> parties is the underlying reasons or motives that informed their decision
> to call it quits. The brouhaha is sickening, no doubt, and it sure carry’s
> the venom capable of killing this body that has the promise to serve as the
> rallying point for Diaspora Gambia democracy forces. However, there are
> more important questions to be asked and issues to be straightened if the
> survival and relevance of the Diaspora pro-democracy group is to be
> ensured.
> That GDAG, a leading proponent among the trio of the pro-democracy groups
> that ushered in the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in the
> Gambia (CORDEG) into the consciousness of Diaspora Gambian politics, could
> walk away from what they helped to build and still could not clearly
> articulate its reasons for doing so, is rather intriguing.
> But for a moment let us forget about the freeness or the lack of it in the
> election of CORDEG’s executive. I wish the process was not based on
> competitive elections rather, on a consultative nature focused on the
> geographic representation of the politically active Diaspora Gambians. This
> would have given it a true civil society representative nature that could
> legitimately talk and act on behalf of the Diaspora Gambian people. The
> other things like the opening of a bank account, registration of the
> organization and the internal politicking or frictions among the players
> could have been easily handled by the mature minds among the grouping.
> However, what is of significance and this is where the fundamental issues
> that underpin the relevance and or effectiveness of CORDEG, is its outlined
> mode of operation in the quest for political change and democracy in the
> Gambia. To this end CORDEG’s outline of strategy and tactic is as blurred
> as Lamin J. Darboe put it and at worst unrealistic. And this is what needs
> to be addressed if Diaspora Gambians are to become useful and effective
> players in the Gambia’s political evolution to a democracy.
> Detestable as the reference to the term “restoration” in the name of
> CORDEG is, - for there existed no democracy in the Gambia that needs
> restoring in the first place, nonetheless, what is worth fighting for are
> the crunchy nuts that are to help in the erection of a viable foundation
> for CORDEG laid on clear terms and purpose; A durable foundation that is to
> play a vital role in the bridge building process of a grand coalition of
> the democratic forces both within the Gambia and its Diaspora.
> When the clamor for a pro-democracy conference in Dakar, Senegal subsided,
> Raleigh, North Carolina several months later, turned out to be the rallying
> point for the politically active Diaspora Gambians. Speeches were delivered
> and passionate debates ensued. At the end a communiqué was issued calling
> for a steering committee and promising to craft a policy that would help
> coordinate a unity of purpose among Gambia’s pro-democracy forces. To their
> credit a steering committee came into being leading to the election of an
> executive committee a few months later and the birth of CORDEG.
> But to the keen political observer the flaws and contradictions in the
> setup to the establishment of CORDEG’s executive were clear and imminent.
> Alarm bells were ringed and people contacted to highlight the problems but
> business continued as usual. Those that made their concerns public were
> dismissed or at best ignored.
> Fundamental to the flaws and contradictions within the setup that gave
> birth to CORDEG were its insistence on co-opting the opposition parties
> into its fold and followed by the erection of a gigantic superstructure
> that aimed to encompass even the main players when it comes to effecting
> political change in the Gambia. Consciously or unconsciously, the
> architects of CORDEG pursued this formula that is only expected of
> political novices. It was certain that the project was headed for failure
> unless its course was redirected. And to cap it all, a vision and mission
> of CORDEG was propounded clearly mimicking a government or opposition party
> white paper with clear emphasis of governance, economic and even
> agricultural policies.
> For starters, CORDEG can only be a civil society organization unless and
> until it chooses to follow the process and register as a political party in
> the Gambia. As a civil society organization CORDEG’s mandate could not be
> more than articulating and championing the aspirations of Diaspora
> Gambians. It cannot and should never venture into the business of
> formulating financial or agricultural policies for the Gambia not so when
> it is even absent on the ground.
> The Raleigh Accord that spelled out the objectives of CORDEG despite being
> ambiguous itself, chose to side with the political players on the ground in
> the pursuit of reforms vital to the predictability of political change and
> the nurturing of democracy. This is what is reasonable and attainable
> between citizen groups and political parties who plan to work together for
> the betterment of their country. But as it appeared there were other
> motives in play, all sorts of posturing and positioning became the order of
> the day albeit being hundreds of miles away from the battleground.
> However, and introspectively, it is still not too late to chart a new
> course and refocus CORDEG. It may be a harder task trying to walk the
> opposition parties into an alliance, but it is easier championing the
> desire of Diaspora Gambians for enfranchisement. Furthermore, a partnership
> with the opposition and other interest groups both national and
> international on a pro-democracy agenda captured on the urgent need for
> electoral reform, will not only ease the internal squabbles and render
> desolate the intense positioning, but will earn CORDEG the respect and
> trust of its partners as well as influence and leverage among both ruling
> and opposition parties.
> An agenda for the enfranchisement of Diaspora Gambians will not trigger
> any lobbying for positions of secretary generals or chairmanships rather;
> it will engender tremendous interest and impact among the growing Gambian
> populations outside of the Gambia for the cause of democratization and
> development. Demands for the respect of the civil liberties and freedom of
> the citizenry would only add to its political clout and respectability.
> For the politics of alliance building among political parties, it is
> better leaving that in the hands of the parties themselves. Politics is not
> as simple a formula as the common sense one-plus-one. The most that civil
> society groups like CORDEG can ask as bonafide partners is to insist on a
> seat at the negotiating table to act as an arbiter and or mediator to
> resolve misunderstandings and bridge differences. Attaining that status or
> position becomes easier when especially a body like CORDEG becomes the
> initiator of such mediations. The choice is out in the open and waiting to
> be made. Cut to size the overzealous ambitions and focus attention to clear
> and reasonable goals that are within our bounds.
>
>
>
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