<<www.sundaytimes.co.za/2002/07/07/insight/in01.asp>>

Holding hands, wielding a stick


The challenge for the African Union will be to unite the continent while
censuring undemocratic members, writes Eddy Maloka

The inauguration of the African Union is an important landmark in the
continent's postcolonial history.
There are, however, lessons to be learnt and challenges that the new
institution will have to face.

The development of the AU is a product of two processes.

The first was the realisation across the continent that the mandate and
institutional orientation of the Organisation of African Unity needed to be
transformed in the light of post-Cold War challenges. It is common
knowledge that the OAU was essentially a vehicle for pan-African unity and
the coordination of the struggle against colonialism.
At the same time, the OAU charter put excessive emphasis on the security
and sovereignty of states, as well as the principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of member states. Partly as a result of this, the OAU
was incapable of tackling the proliferation of coups and authoritarian rule
on the continent.
Equally important is that the OAU is institutionally not best positioned to
tackle decisively the challenges of peace and security, development and the
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights.
The AU, however, will be founded on the pan-African principle of unity, but
will be different from the OAU in its strong emphasis on popular
participation and human security, as opposed to security of states.
Not only will the "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes
of governments" be one of the principles of the AU, it will also be
informed by a nuanced notion of sovereignty and non-interference in the
internal affairs of member states.

The union will have the right "to intervene in a member state pursuant to a
decision of the assembly [of heads of state and government] in respect of
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity".

Member states will be able "to request intervention from the union in order
to restore peace and security".

The envisaged Peace and Security Council will be the mechanism to implement
these provisions.

The second process that led to the development of the AU was the review of
elements of the 1991 treaty establishing the African Economic Community,
popularly known as the Abuja Treaty. It envisaged the creation of an
African Economic Community through six phases, over a period of 34 years.

However, the treaty was informed by the European Union's economic model of
integration; political organs such as the Pan-African Parliament were to be
established towards the end of the six-phase process.

It was at the OAU Extraordinary Summit of 1999 in Sirte, Libya, that this
model was revisited, and more emphasis was placed on the political
dimension of Africa's integration exercise.

Thus the treaty's six-phase schedule and the timetable for the
establishment of the AU's political organs were revised.

The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act at the OAU summit in Togo in 2000
was the culmination of this process.

But what are the challenges the AU will have to confront?

First of all, it will have to create an institutional environment for the
promotion of its objectives and principles as outlined in the AU
Constitutive Act.

The new organisation, and understandably so, has inherited the OAU's
principle of inclusivity. All countries on the continent, with the
exception of Morocco, are members - and this includes states whose
governance record and practices are inconsistent with the objectives and
principles of the AU.

The dilemma here is whether such member states should be excluded from the
union, as is the case with the New Partnership for Africa's Development
process, or if there should be a window period during which such member
states can institute necessary reforms that will align their countries with
the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act to which they are signatories.

Compliance with the objectives and principles of the AU will require not
only political will on the part of leaders, but also the cooperation of all
member states, especially those whose records and practices are
incompatible with the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act.

Indeed, according to the latter, "any member state that fails to comply
with the decisions and policies of the union may be subjected to other
sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with
other member states, and other measures of a political and economic nature
to be determined by the assembly".

The second challenge that the AU will have to confront is to put into
operation oversight organs provided for in the Act.

The decision of the Lusaka summit of 2001 included identifying the
establishment of executive organs ( the assembly, executive council,
permanent representatives' committee and the commission) as a priority, and
this is understandable.

However, the speedy establishment of the Pan-African Parliament, the Court
of Justice, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (for civil
society representation) will give more substance and political weight to
the union.

The African Commission on Human and People's Rights will also need to be
incorporated into the AU without delay.

With these oversight organs in place, the union will be more rooted and
probably better positioned to ensure compliance with the objectives,
principles and decisions of the organisation.

Civil society and African MPs will have to play an active role in
strengthening the proposed peer-review mechanism and compliance with the
code of conduct that African leaders are committing themselves to within
the Nepad framework.

Finally, the AU will have to be resourced adequately with finances and
personnel. Far more than the OAU's budget of $30-million (about R300-
million) will be required.

This means that all member states must pay their dues to the union or face
the consequences of the Constitutive Act.

The union is a comprehensive institutional response to what the continent
will need to do if the realisation of the African century is to become a
reality.

As with all institutions, political will and mass participation will give
it the subjective edge that will be required for success.


Maloka is the chief executive officer of the Africa Institute

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