The Nature of the U.S. Military Presence in Africa

http://www.nationofchange.org/print/22511

By Sam Graham-Felsen

On July 12th, TomDispatch posted the latest piece in Nick Turse’s “changing
face of empire" series: “Obama’s Scramble for
Africa<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175567/tomgram%3A_nick_turse%2C_america%27s_shadow_wars_in_africa_/>.”
It laid out in some detail the way in which the U.S. Africa
Command<http://www.africom.mil/>(AFRICOM) has, in recent years, spread
its influence across that continent,
establishing bases and outposts, sending in special operations forces and
drones, funding proxy forces on the continent, and so on. As last week
ended, TomDispatch received a “letter to the editor” from Colonel Tom
Davis, director of the U.S. Africa Command Office of Public Affairs,
disputing in some detail a number of Turse’s points. (Colonel Davis also
sent a copy of the letter to the Nation
Institute<http://www.nationinstitute.org/>,
which supports this website.)

As readers know, it’s quite possible to write this
editor<http://www.tomdispatch.com/contact/>.
I read everything that arrives at TomDispatch with appreciation and answer
when I can. There is, however, no “comments” section, nor a place for
letters to the editor at TD.  In this case, however, I found the obvious
time and effort AFRICOM took to respond to the Turse piece of interest and
so, today, we’re posting Colonel Davis’s full letter, and a response from
Turse. After all, whatever highlights the changing U.S. military position
in Africa, about which Americans know remarkably little, seems well worth
the time and space.

Two things remain to be said: first, beneath the detailed critique and
response that follows lies an obvious difference of opinion that seems
worth highlighting. Like a number of other TomDispatch writers, I believe
that the U.S. military should not be responsible for Planet Earth; that it
is not in our interest for the Pentagon to be dividing the globe, like a
giant pie, into six “slices” covering almost every inch of the planet: U.S.
European Command, or EUCOM (for Europe and Russia), the U.S. Pacific
Command, or PACOM (Asia), CENTCOM (the Greater Middle East and a touch of
North Africa), NORTHCOM (North America), SOUTHCOM (South America and most
of the Caribbean), and AFRICOM (almost all of Africa).  Nor should the U.S.
military be garrisoning the
planet<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175568/tomgram%3A_david_vine%2C_u.s._empire_of_bases_grows/>in
the historically unprecedented way it does.  This imperial role of
ours
has little or nothing to do with “defense” and creates many possibilities
for future blowback. Instead, it seems far more sensible to begin to shut
down or cut back radically on our vast array of global bases and outposts
(rather than, as in Africa, expanding them), and downsize our global
mission in a major way.  AFRICOM would obviously disagree, as would the
Pentagon and the Obama administration, and the results of that basic
disagreement about the role of the U.S. military in the world can be seen
in what follows.

Second, one of Colonel Davis’s criticisms below is of a passage in my
introduction to Turse's piece. “[O]nly the other day,” I wrote, “it was
revealed<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/mysterious-fatal-crash-provides-rare-glimpse-of-us-commandos-in-mali/2012/07/08/gJQAGO71WW_story.html?hpid=z1>that
three U.S. Army commandos in a Toyota Land Cruiser had skidded off a
bridge in Mali in April. They died, all three, along with three women
identified as ‘Moroccan prostitutes.’”  The Colonel questions the accuracy
of that word “revealed,” since his command had issued a brief press
release<http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=7819&lang=0>on April
20th stating: “Three U.S. military members and three civilians
died in a vehicle accident in Bamako, Mali today.”

In the *Washington Post* piece I linked to, however, reporter Craig
Whitlock identified the three “military members” as “U.S. Army Commandos”
and those three “civilians” as “Moroccan prostitutes” and raised the
following questions: “What the men were doing in the impoverished country
of Mali, and why they were still there a month after the United States
suspended military relations with its government, is at the crux of a
mystery that officials have not fully explained even 10 weeks later.” It
seems to me that, if you compare the press release to the later article,
“revealed” is not too strong a word.  With that, let me turn the
proceedings over to Colonel Davis and Nick Turse. *Tom*

*The Nature of the U.S. Military Presence in Africa *
*An Exchange between Colonel Tom Davis and Nick Turse*

FROM:  Colonel Tom Davis

Director, U.S. Africa Command Office of Public Affairs

Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany

TO:  Mr. Tom Engelhardt, Editor

Dear Mr. Engelhardt,

We read the recent article “Secret Wars, Secret Bases, and the Pentagon’s
‘New Spice Route’ in Africa” with great interest. It is clear the author,
Nick Turse, conducted a great deal of research, including reaching out to
us, and we welcomed the opportunity to highlight U.S. Africa Command’s
mission and activities.  However, there were several inaccuracies and
misrepresentations that we would like to address. My hope is that you,
through your publication, will correct the record.  As a thought provoking,
responsible, and professional journalist, I know that you would want to
ensure all reporting was based on facts, not innuendos or misperceptions.

Below are the items U.S. Africa Command would like to address:

*“They call it the New Spice Route”: *This was a term used informally by a
few of our logistics specialists to describe the intra-theater
transportation system, primarily land shipments from Djibouti, which
provides logistical support for U.S. military activities in Africa. The
network is officially called the AFRICOM Surface Distribution Network.
However, to call it a “superpower’s superhighway” is very misleading.  The
U.S. military cargo transported along these different transportation nodes
represents only a mere fraction -- i.e., a handful of trucks per week
intermixed among the thousands of others -- of the total amount of fuel,
food, and equipment transported along these routes each day.

*“Fast-growing U.S. military presence in Africa”: *While* *the size of the
U.S. military footprint in Africa has increased since the creation of U.S.
Africa Command in October 2008, to call it “fast-growing” is an
exaggeration. At the end of October 2008, there were about 2,600 U.S.
military personnel and Department of Defense civilians on the African
continent or on ships within the command’s area of responsibility.  The
number today is about 5,000, more than half of which represents the service
members who serve tours at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, with the remainder
serving on a temporary basis ranging from a few days to a few weeks.  Much
of this change is attributable to an increase in the number of exercises
and military-to-military engagement programs in order to better enable
African nations and regional organizations to strengthen their defense
capabilities. On a much smaller scale, it also reflects a modest increase
in the staff sizes of DOD offices resident in U.S. embassies, which average
just a small number of staff members.   But even 5,000 personnel -- about
the military population of a small Air Force Base in the U.S. -- spread
across an area that covers 54 countries and major portions of two oceans
can hardly be called a “scramble for Africa.”

In our view, this is very positive, and testament to our desire to be a
security partner of choice in Africa. It reflects an increase in military
assistance engagement activities -- all of which are requested and approved
by the host nation.  While we work to advance the security interests of the
U.S., we are together addressing what are clearly shared security interests.

*“The U.S. maintains a surprising number of bases in Africa”: *This is
incorrect.* *In the lexicon of the U.S. military, the word “base” implies a
certain size, level of infrastructure, and permanence.  Based on this
widely accepted definition, other than our base at Camp Lemonnier in
Djibouti, we do not have military bases in Africa, nor do we have plans to
establish any. We do, however, have temporary facilities elsewhere in
Africa that support much smaller numbers of personnel, usually for a
specific activity.  In all cases, our personnel are guests within the
host-nation and work alongside or coordinate their activities with
host-nation personnel.  Some of these locations are fairly well developed
while others are more austere.

For example, approximately 100 U.S. military advisors are dispersed among
four nations in Central and East Africa providing advice and assistance to
the national militaries working to end the threat posed by the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). We currently have small teams in Obo and Djema in
the Central African Republic, Dungu in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Nzara in South Sudan, and Entebbe in Uganda. In each location, we
are working alongside the national militaries, helping to reinforce their
efforts and strengthen collaboration and coordination, not conducting our
own operations.

Similarly, there are humanitarian work sites in Ethiopian towns such as
Humble, Hulla, and Dube, where Seabees and other U.S. military personnel
have assisted in the past or are currently assisting with drilling wells,
providing medical and veterinary assistance, or constructing schools and
health clinics.

Finally, Thebephatswa Airbase in Molepolole, Botswana, is staffed and
operated by Botswana Defence Force personnel (BDFP). There is no permanent
U.S. presence on the airbase, nor has there ever been.  The U.S. has
partnered with Botswana for previous exercises at Thebephatswa Airbase and
much of SOUTHERN ACCORD, a major bi-lateral exercise in August, will be
conducted at Thebephatswa.

We also currently have warehousing privileges at Mombasa International
Airport in Kenya, which includes the storage of equipment and rations. U.S.
personnel do not manage the warehouses; the daily activities and running of
the warehouse are handled by local nationals hired by the Embassy and
funded by AFRICOM.

*“100 to 200 U.S. commandos share a base with the Kenyan military at Manda
Bay”: *This is also incorrect.*  *U.S. military personnel* *deployed to
Manda Bay are primarily Civil Affairs, Seabees, and security personnel
involved with military to military engagements with Kenyan forces and
humanitarian initiatives. Simba was established in 2004 to provide support
to U.S. military engagements with the Kenyan Navy.  Its primary mission is
to provide base/life support services to U.S. military personnel who are in
the area for training and engagement activities with the Kenyan military,
including maritime engagement and civil-military efforts.

* “The U.S. also has had troops deployed in Mali”: *To clarify,* *prior to
the coup, the U.S. military had a longstanding military partnership with
Mali.  For several years, we had small teams regularly travel in and out of
Mali for training activities with the Malian military; this includes
conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF).

At the time of the military seizure on March 22, U.S. Africa Command had a
small number of personnel in Mali who were supporting our
military-to-military activities.  Military assistance to Mali was suspended
immediately following the seizure.  U.S. government personnel from many
agencies, including DoD, remained on stand-by in Bamako as negotiations
continued toward a return to democratic, constitutional, civilian rule.
Because of the continued uncertainty surrounding the outcome and
consequences of the seizure, and the fact that military engagement had only
been suspended, our personnel remained in Mali to provide assistance to the
Embassy, maintain situational awareness on the unfolding events, and assist
in coordination between U.S. Africa Command and the Embassy.

The U.S. State Department terminated foreign assistance to the government
of Mali on April 10.  The Department of Defense's Defense Security
Cooperation Agency received a memorandum from the State Department dated 19
April notifying the DoD of the coup designation and the termination of all
military assistance programs.  Upon receiving this notification from State
Department, we began arranging the departure of personnel and equipment
from Mali.  All U.S. military personnel who were in Mali supporting
military-to-military engagement activities have since departed Mali.  Only
those Department of Defense personnel regularly assigned to the Embassy
(such as the Defense Attaché or U.S. Marine Corps guards) remain.

Also, the introduction to the story states it was recently “revealed” that
three U.S. soldiers were killed in an accident in Mali in April and that
“This is how we know that U.S. special operations forces were operating in
chaotic, previously democratic Mali.” The fact is we issued a press release
a day after the soldiers were killed, and the Associated Press, Xinhua, and
AFP ran stories on the incident.  It must be noted that the activities of
U.S. military forces in Mali have been very public.  We have published
stories, fact sheets, and photos on our website, and Malian, U.S. and
international reporters have covered these activities for some years.

*“Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces are engaged in missions
against the Lord’s Resistance Army”: *While our forces live and work
closely with African security forces, our focus is on enabling their
ability to better conduct command and control, planning and coordination.
 Special Operations Forces are not directly involved in the African-led
operation to remove the threat of the LRA. The mission for U.S. forces in
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR),
and South Sudan is to advise and assist local forces to better enable them
to conduct their operations.  As a matter of fact, in April 2012, we
organized a four-day press event in Uganda and CAR, providing 18 local and
international journalists’ access to cover the African-led counter-LRA
mission.  This visit resulted in extensive worldwide coverage of the story,
which clearly articulated our advise and assist mission.

*“And that’s still just a part of the story”: *Yes, we’ve trained Ugandan,
Burundian, and Djiboutian troops supporting the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM).  As part of the C-LRA media trip mentioned above, we also
brought the media to visit the AMISOM train-up efforts -- all taking place
at a Uganda People’s Defense Force base outside Kampala, Uganda. This visit
also resulted in extensive worldwide media coverage. We’ve also trained
Senegalese and Rwandan troops supporting the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),
as well as peacekeepers from nearly a dozen other African countries.   We
apply the resources that we do have to help countries willing to contribute
to multinational efforts like AMISOM or UNAMID so that they can continue
their operations. Our engagement in this realm is in support of a State
Department-led peacekeeping training program, which has trained more than
200,000 African peacekeepers from 25 African nations over the years.
 Recently we’ve seen positive results in Mogadishu, not only as a result of
the U.S. support, but more importantly, because of the brave men and women
of the AMISOM troop-contributing nations.

Like every Geographic Combatant Command, we have an exercise program with
nations within our area of responsibility.  We currently have 14 major
bilateral and multilateral exercises that have been conducted or are
planned for 2012 and as many in 2013. As you probably know, many security
issues in Africa are best addressed multilaterally.  Exercises are a
critical engagement opportunity that not only allow for improvements to
interoperability, but also foster greater regional cooperation and
integration.

We also conduct some type of military training or military-to-military
engagement or activity with nearly every country on the African continent.
This is part of our effort to enable African nations to increase their
defense capabilities.   These activities are requested by the host nation
and cleared by the U.S. embassies.  Many are well covered by local press
and highlighted on our website.

*“Next year, even more American troops are likely to be on hand”: *The 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division will not deploy to Africa.
Instead, the brigade acts as a single source to provide U.S. Army personnel
to support activities already tasked to our Army service component, U.S.
Army Africa.   Previously, the requirements were distributed across the
entire U.S. Army.  Under this new construct, these same requirements will
be filled from a single unit allowing personnel from this brigade to
establish a level of expertise on the African continent.  This change will
not increase the number of Soldiers on the continent, but simplifies our
internal processes for identifying Soldiers to support existing missions.

We must note that reports that leap to the conclusion that “3,000 Soldiers
will deploy to Africa” are inaccurate. Small teams -- whose numbers
typically range from 3-12 -- would be drawn from this unit to conduct
deliberately planned engagements, training events, and exercises. Once or
twice a year, to support a large-scale exercise, they may send a few
hundred.  This process is evolving.  But, when their missions are complete,
they return home.  This can be compared to the SPMAGTF-12 cited in the
article, whose Marines are not only doing great work for Uganda and Burundi
and other partner nations, but also America, Americans, and American
interests.

*“Mercenary cargo carriers to skirt diplomatic clearance issues”: *The
choice of words is interesting and unfortunate.  This is only one example
where somewhat inflammatory language is used to make a point but at the
expense of the credibility of the report.  What exactly is a mercenary
cargo carrier?  Federal Express, DHL, Ethiopian Air, and other reputable
air cargo companies we use to transport material?  The choice to use
contract carriers is based exclusively on cost and efficiency.  And, to be
very clear, we are always required to obtain diplomatic clearance and
complete all customs formalities. It would be highly inappropriate and
unethical to attempt to “skirt” country clearances. To do that would be an
egregious violation of our values.  In fact, since these actions appear to
constitute criminal activity, we would be appreciative if Mr. Turse can
provide us specific details, documents, or other evidence, in order to
provide our Criminal Investigative Command (CID) a basis of information to
start an investigation.  To be perfectly clear, AFRICOM does not condone
this type of behavior, anything you can do to provide us the needed
evidence would be appreciated.

*“Emergency Troop Housing”: *All of the military construction projects you
outline are included in the Defense Authorization Acts of FY 2010 and 2011
and are a matter of public record.  However, the 300 additional
Containerized Living Units (CLUs) are being built for people already living
at Camp Lemonnier, either in tents or in other substandard housing, not for
new arrivals.

We appreciate Mr. Turse contacting us for information and running our input
in the final article.  He followed up with us with a list of questions that
required much more time than the one business day he gave us to answer.
 It took several days to conduct the research necessary to answer his
questions; unfortunately, he chose to publish the story prior to receiving
the answers, which he knew we were working on.  If he had waited, we would
have provided the information requested, which could have better informed
his story.  It takes time to gather information about locations in seven
different countries.

*See **Tom Engelhardt's
response*<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175574/tomgram%3A_u.s._africa_command_debates_tomdispatch/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+tomdispatch%2FesUU+%28TomDispatch%3A+The+latest+Tomgram%29>
* here.*

Finally, I would encourage you and those who have interest in what we do to
review our Website, www.AFRICOM.mil <http://www.africom.mil/>, and a new
Defense Department Special Web Report on U.S. Africa Command at this link
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2012/0712_AFRICOM/<http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2012/0712_africom/>
.

This article was published at NationofChange at:
http://www.nationofchange.org/nature-us-military-presence-africa-1343407618.
All rights are reserved.


-- 
-Laye
==============================
"With fair speech thou might have thy will,
With it thou might thy self spoil."
--The R.M


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