----- Original Message -----
From: "Lisa Toro" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 8:44 AM
Subject: Fw: [Mwananchi] Re: Museveni, Kabila Settle Out of Court/Democracy
in Africa: No Time to Forsake


>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Chifu <[log in to unmask]>
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 5:15 AM
> Subject: [Mwananchi] Re: Museveni, Kabila Settle Out of Court/Democracy in
> Africa: No Time to Forsake
>
>
> > --- In [log in to unmask], "Edward Mulindwa" <mulindwa@l...>
> > wrote:
> > > People
> > >
> > > This is how much influence Western countries have on Africa and
> > like wise they must be held responsible for the deaths we have in
> > Africa. Surely Uganda invaded Congo, surely we have lost more than 4
> > million people in Congo, surely Uganda Government officials have
> > looted minerals from Congo. And the only right thing we had to do was
> > to take Uganda Government to the court, at least for the sake of
> > those who died. But Museveni and Kabila spend a  week in Washington,
> > and the case get with drawn from the court, what exactly happened
> > between the administration and Museveni and Kabila? And what about
> > those who lost their lives? For the best we would have got from their
> > lives is to find out if any body was wrong and we change that system.
> > Today we can not do it, thanks to Washington, And you wonder why Kony
> > is in the Bush?
> >
> > *********
> >
> > Em,
> >
> > Don't you think that it is better to settle or let peace prevail then
> > innocent being killed? your arguments weak. I got the forwarded
> > article below and I am sharing it with you. Food for thoughts...
> >
> > Democracy in Africa: No Time to Forsake It
> >
> > by Joel D. Barkan and David F. Gordon
> >  Reprinted with permission from Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.4
> > (July/August 1998).
> >
> > Africa's mixed record of democratization, including the emergence of a
> > large number of hybrid regimes committed to effective governance and
> > real economic development but not Western-style democracy, has led
> > some analysts and foreign policymakers to question the wisdom of
> > promoting democracy as a core theme of U.S. Africa policy. Lately,
> > the focus has been on the leaders who have come to power in Central
> > Africa and the Horn--Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of
> > Eritrea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and
> > Laurent Kabila of the former Zaire (Dan Connell and Frank
> > Smyth, "Africa's New Bloc," March/April 1998).
> >
> > Attention has focused on these five because upon taking power all
> > inherited economic basket cases, and some the legacy of civil war.
> > What sets this group apart is not their newness or cohesiveness as a
> > bloc, but what they are against. All are committed to sweeping away
> > the failures of the past, including the political class associated
> > with those failures. All want to assert African control of the
> > continent's destiny, and thus reject a deferential attitude toward
> > outsiders and their advice. All are also impatient with leaders of
> > neighboring states who do not share these objectives and whose
> > regimes threaten their own. The conventional wisdom about the new
> > leaders is that all have embraced economic reform, reestablished
> > political stability, and reduced human rights abuses, but
> > have resisted multiparty democracy--a strategy that has achieved
> > dramatic results. In this view they deserve, and indeed have
> > received, the support of the international community because they are
> > committed to putting their own houses in order.
> >
> > Not So New
> >
> >  On closer inspection, one finds considerable variation among the
> > chosen five. The so-called "new" leaders of Africa are not all new.
> > Museveni has been in office for more than a decade; Meles and Isaias
> > are approaching seven years. None plans to retire anytime soon. With
> > respect to economic reform and the establishment of a strong free-
> > market economy, all are pragmatic and have given up most of their
> > earlier commitments to Marxism. Only Museveni, however, has delivered
> > a comprehensiveset of economic reforms. The others still distrust
> > capitalists.
> >
> > Are these regimes really stable? Only Isaias governs a truly stable
> > country with  broad-based political support. While Meles and Museveni
> > have brought peace to their countries, they have not yet secured
> > legitimacy among large sections of the population. Kagame rules a
> > country that remains at war. Kabila has yet to reestablish a national
> > political system for Congo, and there are doubts about whether he has
> > the ability or the inclination to do so. Ethiopia and Uganda have set
> > up decentralized structures of governance to manage ethnic conflict
> > more effectively, but whether power will devolve to subnational
> > governments remains to be seen. The new leaders' attitudes toward
> > democracy also differ. Uganda has held free and fair elections--
> > although the candidates could not run as representatives of political
> > parties--in which Museveni was returned to power and a new parliament
> > was elected. Elections in Ethiopia have not been free, while
> > Eritrea is for practical purposes a one-party state.
> >
> > Democracy: It Works The new leaders do believe, as conventional wisdom
> > has it, that economic development must precede democracy. They reject
> > the view that democratization and development are mutually
> > supportive. Yet the African countries with the highest long-term
> > growth rates have been Botswana and Mauritius, which also have the
> > longest records of democratic rule. More recently, positive growth
> > has returned to Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa, where the
> > resurgence of democracy has been strongest. Growth is also positive
> > in C=F4te d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Malawi, where democratic
> > transitions are still at an early stage. Africa's worst performers
> > during the 1990s--Kenya, Nigeria, and the former Zaire--are cases not
> > of failed democratization but failed authoritarian rule. The views of
> > the new leaders not withstanding, the clear lesson from Africa is
> > that economic renewal and democratization go hand in hand.
> >
> > For U.S. policy, the implication of this relationship is that
> > countries in different stages of democratic transition must be
> > treated differently. African regimes can be divided into four
> > categories. First are a handful of states with strong and potentially
> > enduring commitments to both free-market economies and democratic
> > governance but that are not yet consolidated democracies. In this
> > category are Benin, Botswana, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia,
> > and South Africa. Second are those that have demonstrated a modest to
> > strong commitment to macroeconomic reform and have embarked on
> > democratic transitions by holding multiparty elections or have
> > carried out a significant degree of political liberalization.
> > Included in this group are Burkina Faso, C=F4te d'Ivoire,
> > Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
> > Third are those that have embraced macroeconomic reform but seek to
> > promote development without democracy. In this group are Burundi,
> > Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Niger, and Rwanda. Fourth are those
> > that either resist both economic reform and democratic rule or are
> > unable to exercise authority across their territory due to civil war
> > or state collapse. In this group are Angola, Cameroon, Congo,
> > Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.  The challenge for the
> > United States is to maintain a clear and consistent commitment to its
> > foreign policy goals in Africa while calibrating them for each
> > category of states. These goals, as articulated during President
> > Bill Clinton's trip to Africa earlier this year, are essentially
> > three: economic reform and sustainable development via Africa's
> > integration into the global economy, improvement on human rights and
> > progress on democratic transition, and reestablishment of political
> > stability and effective governance in war-torn states, particularly
> > in Central Africa.
> >
> > The challenge is particularly difficult via-=E0-vis the hybrid
> > regimes in the second and third categories because of their diverse
> > mix of policies. Virtually all of these countries are better off
> > economically and politically than they were at the beginning of the
> > 1990s. Several, including Ethiopia and Uganda, have had dramatic
> > improvement in their growth rates. None, however, is a consolidated
> > democracy, and in some progress toward building democratic
> > institutions has been painfully slow.
> >
> >
> > These hybrid regimes are brittle because few have established strong
> > institutions to sustain their economy or polity. They will either
> > evolve into more democratic regimes or slip back into the
> > authoritarian rule that characterized Africa throughout the 1980s.
> > Such a return to authoritarianism would risk state collapse and civil
> > war.
> >
> > Challenges of Consolidation
> >
> > Consider these realities in the hybrid states of the Great Lakes and
> > the Horn, which are high priorities for the Clinton administration.
> > With the northern third of Uganda fertile ground for rebellions,
> > Museveni must incorporate the people of the region into the nation in
> > the same way he reached out to the Baganda by restoring the kingdom
> > of the country's largest ethnic group to consolidate his regime in
> > the south. After nearly 12 years in power, he must also build
> > institutions that will facilitate a  smooth transfer of power to a
> > successor.
> >
> > In Ethiopia, Meles must likewise craft appropriate mechanisms--perhaps
> > via that country's nascent federal structures--to bring the alienated
> > Amhara and Oromo, the country's two largest ethnic groups, back into
> > the political process if long-term stability is to reign.
> >
> >  In Rwanda, prospects for stability turn on whether Kagame's Tutsi-
> > based minority regime can deal with the Hutu majority politically
> > rather than militarily. After the genocide, the rural areas are now
> > nearly 95 percent Hutu, which makes successful counterinsurgency
> > operations almost impossible without an effective political
> > component. This may ultimately require the country's partition into
> > regions designated for each ethnic group. But if the minority regime
> > continues to rely on a purely military option, it will result in more
> > carnage and, ultimately, collapse.
> >
> > Similarly, in Congo, Laurent Kabila may have filled a vacuum at the
> > center, but his regime must either reach an accommodation with
> > regional political elites who command extensive followings in Kivu,
> > Kasai, and Katanga or become the victims of its own hubris. Indeed,
> > many observers have already concluded that this will be Kabila's fate
> > and no longer include him in the "new leader" group.
> >
> > The bottom line is that in none of these cases is long-term stability
> > or prosperity likely without a more liberal and inclusive politics,
> > in which diverse interests bargain for, share, and possibly alternate
> > power with each other. Democratization, in short, is in the self-
> > interest of those in power.
> >
> > The Rawlings Precedent The question, then, is whether the United
> > States should continue to urge democratization for the good of these
> > nations and leaders, or whether it should ease up in order to
> > maintain harmonious  short-term bilateral relations. While broadly
> > cooperating with these regimes, the United States should still
> > maintain a dialogue about the need to deepen the democratization
> > process. Consistent with the Joint Declaration of Principles signed
> > in Entebbe in March by President Clinton, Meles, Museveni, and
> > Kabila, the issues to be addressed might include strengthening the
> > rule of law, increasing government transparency and accountability,
> > making decentralization meaningful, developing an independent media
> > and civil society, and ensuring genuine electoral competition no
> > matter what the political framework.
> >
> >  In looking at how to approach the new leaders in the Great Lakes and
> > the Horn, U.S. policymakers should review their experience in dealing
> > with a similar figure in West Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. In the
> > late 1980s, Rawlings, who came to power through a military coup in
> > 1981, undertook a tough economic reform program with the support of
> > the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United States
> > strongly supported this effort but continued to encourage the
> > Rawlings regime to move to a more open and broad-based political
> > system, echoing the views of Ghana's strongly democratic middle
> > class. In the early 1990s, Rawlings established a multiparty system,
> > but the first elections, held in 1992, were not seen as legitimate by
> > large segments of the population. In response, the United States,
> > while continuing to back Rawlings, began to explore means of bringing
> > the Ghanaian opposition back into the political process. This led to
> > a large multiyear effort by the Agency for machinery in Ghana,
> > which held its second elections in 1996. While the results were quite
> > similar to the first, the elections achieved broad legitimacy and led
> > to the active participation of the opposition in parliament and a
> > broad and open political debate. By maintaining a steady policy of
> > engagement with a dynamic new leader but not losing sight of the
> > importance of political reform in sustaining economic policy reforms,
> > the United States played a positive role in Ghana's evolution.
> >
> > Critics of U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad argue that the
> > U.S. national   interest is not served when foreign policy objectives
> > are defined in moralistic terms rather than on the basis of concrete
> > interests. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the main U.S. interest in
> > Africa is the peaceful development of African states so that they are
> > no longer islands of instability and poverty that require U.S.
> > assistance or intervention, but partners in trade and full members of
> > the international community. Achieving these goals depends on the
> > continued promotion of democracy as a core element in U.S. Africa
> > policy.
> >
> > Joel D. Barkan is Professor of Political Science at the University of
> > Iowa and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
> > David F. Gordon, until this summer, was Senior Fellow at the Overseas
> > Development Council.
> >
> >
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