Burama, 
Thank you for your response. I will adhere to your wish and
address you as you demanded. The uncle reference is as a result of a customary
difficulty from my part to address people I know are older than myself by their
literal names. But I respect your decision and will put that aside. 
For a start, you asked that I reference your draft “working
paper”. I ask that you please share the exact portion you referring because it
appears it is a different paper from the “the plan” that you sent out when I
asked for specifics. That will save me time because it will be very difficult for
me to peruse through the bulk of your writings. 
Burama, yes you are right about the focus of my agenda that
it is concentrated firstly on the removal of Yaya. Yes, it is my view that the
existence of Yaya at the helm of our affairs is THE primary impediment to the building
of democracy in the Gambia. You on the other hand said you are concerned with
the institutionalization of democracy and because of this you concluded that me,
and you have different problems. But I do not think our problems are much different,
only difference I see is our focus and approach in the interim cause of things.
And no, I do not think a SWOT analysis is a worthless exercise. My take is that
our general station in this struggle for the establishment of democracy and its
future institutionalization in the Gambia is already known. And I think I have
given a few indications and examples in that regard. 
The picture I was alluding to when I shared with you in my previous
posting about the disregard and contempt with which our laws and agreements are
honored with in Banjul, was the state of public lawlessness in that country
championed by Yaya himself. That is why any serious attempt to nurture
democracy in the Gambia must first concentrate on his eviction from No: 1
Marina Parade. It is my view that our constitution – the supreme law of the
land, contains a very good collection of rules, regulations and ways and means
to building a stable democratic republic. But as Tocqueville, that genius of an
observer who closely studied the ways of governance in the United States stated
about the reasons for the uphold and flourishing of democracy in the United
States, the customs of the people stood at the top in relation to their laws and
a favorable natural setting. But for the purpose of this discussion, I can say
that we have the laws that could have placed us in a good governance stead, but
because of poor customs to democratic norms and values, good laws are useless
in the face of bad customary practices. This may appear to be leading to your argument
for what you term an approach towards democratization, but essentially, the
lesson to be drawn from this is that the conditions favorable to the nurturing
of democracy must be in place for a people to be able to get accustomed to its
norms and values. And for us to arrive at that important point Yaya must be
booted out of power. Everything else will be in a favorable clime to germinate
and develop henceforth. 
Burama, you also said that I did fail to indicate how Yaya
is to be removed. That is not entirely correct. I have indicated my view on how
Yaya is not be engaged and eventually removed through legitimate means by a union
of the forces both on and off the ground. Should I restate it in other ways I will
say that through the leverage and power accrued from such a union, Yaya could
be compelled to effect electoral reforms and with or without such reforms, could
even be defeated in the polls. I am aware of your position regarding Yaya having
a hand in refereeing the elections through the IEC. But that is not an entirely
accurate picture of the electoral system in the Gambia. The major problem of
the system however outdated or archaic is in the registration process coupled
with the intimidating and electioneering machinery of Yaya that is largely
dependent on state power and resources. And this is still why you hear and the
reason behind the call for a united front of the opposition forces. A counter
force that is capable of taking on Yaya in his own game. When such a force is
in place Yaya will be compelled to act responsibly while at the same time the opposing
forces will garner strength and the leverage to demand and negotiate for
favorable electoral conditions. Under this general condition, either Yaya will
be removed outright or put a check through an opposition parliamentary
majority. And for the other options, whenever Yaya wants to play funny, the right
of self defense should be utilized. So to answer your question about my place
in this whole equation, my response is that I am already partisan and will be a
party in such a grand affair doing part in both strategically and financially. And
when the situation necessitates utilization of self defense, I assure you that I
will be in the forefront with my colleagues. In the meantime, creating the
necessary conditions is what is of fundamental importance. 
Thank you, 
Nyang 



On Friday, March 14, 2014 10:29 PM, Burama Jammeh <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
  
Mr. Nyang
>
>
>First, let me do some house keeping - my name is Burama and not uncle Burama. Not a big deal but next time I prefer to be reference by my name
>
>
>You made good counter arguments. Hopefully Gambia will have the opportunity weigh all these views and positions and adopt one that best serve their interest
>
>
>You seem to suggest that “The REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT of Yahya is the agenda or should be. My proposal is about institutionalizing democracy. For me Yahya is a problem but NOT THE PROBLEM. Because we are looking at the problem differently, naturally we will draw different conclusions. This is partly why I argued to have a discuss to adopt a name definition of the problem from where we do SWOT. You seem to think thats a worthless exercise after 20 years - but me and you have different problems. An indication there exist differences.
>
>
>More importantly you failed to state clearly how do we remove Yahya. The home based opposition you mentioned couldn’t do it the last 20 years. You still carry hope they will? Am also suspicious you don’t seem to have a role for yourself in the equation - how so?
>
>
>What is National Democracy Vision……….please reference my draft 'The Working Paper’. The subject of that document is the kind of fight I think worth fight
>
>
>The composition of The National Face - can be all those living in Gambia or outside or a combination. The SWOT should inform us what will likely work better. Again you have to understand am coming from what I defined as the problem. If you see Yahya as the problem naturally your answer is to get rid of him. I see a deep and societal problems
>
>
>Couple or 3 times in the body - you state you and I  know (meaning me & you)…….not sure how do you know I also know. I don’t think that’s a good way making a case.
>
>
>My challenge to you - TELL US DO WE REMOVE YAHYA? WHAT ROLE DO YOU ENVISION FOR YOURSELF IN THAT PROPOSED PLAN?
>
>
>Thanks for sharing your views
>
>
>Burama
>
>
>
>
>On Mar 14, 2014, at 9:34 PM, Modou Nyang <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>Uncle
Burama,  
>>It is a debt
of promise on me to come back to this topic. I thank you for your patience. Just
to let you know I did juggle with the thought of how to go about responding to
your proposal or bullet point action items. My interest in this is how we can
converge at some point and agree to what needs to be done practically to remove
Yaya and build democracy in the Gambia. Finally, I decided to make it easy for
myself by narrowing the discussion and concentrating on the main points raised. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>First of
all, uncle Burama, you talked about the importance of a SWOT analysis to
ascertain our strength and weaknesses amongst those of us who have taken a
differing position to those that side with the Professor in Banjul. This
analytical exercise is very important but it is my view that after two decades
of plotting and planning against the professor even with little success, we are
not short of knowledge of our strength, weaknesses, opportunities and as wells
as the threats lurking large and ready to annihilate us once and for all. It is
my belief that we already know our station in this long and strenuous battle.
As a segment of the Gambian population opposed to Yaya’s ways and means of
governance, we know what we are capable of and what our limitations are, and both
the opportunities available to us and the dangers to those opportunities as
well. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Looking at
this further, you will agree with me that the very reason behind the call for
opposition party alliances is as a result of their weakness when singly contrasted
against Yaya’s APRC party. This weakness of the opposition parties is manifested
in multiple fields and forms. Structural weaknesses coupled with meager or
non-existent financial resources are a major malady plaguing the opposition
parties just as the dearth of available, experienced and willing personnel, not
to mention the limited intellectual and technical knowhow vital for the
effective running of such type of organization. 
>>
>>
>>
>>Therefore, my conclusion on
this aspect is that the opposition parties – the most organized groups among
the plethora of anti Yaya groupings, are so weak to the extent that they find
it very hard to operate effectively as they would have wished. There are no
other groups within the Gambia that are close to the level of the organizational
and public support base as the opposition parties. We can buttress this fact by
highlighting the total absence of a single dissenting voice within the Gambia other
than those we occasionally get from opposition party officials, offering
differing views to that of Yaya and his cohorts. I am inclined to single out the
Gambia Press Union out of that fold but even then, we all know the limitations
and the dynamics that limits the GPU to its traditional and professional
responsibility to journalists alone. Every other remaining group that would
worth a mention is stationed outside the shores of the Gambia and away from the
reach and bounds of the Professor. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Uncle
Burama, this now takes me to your phase one proposal. (Readers may refer to the
document as shared here by Burama Jammeh) You are proposing the putting
together of a “Comprehensive National Vision”, to my understanding, by a body or
organization that will be stationed outside of the shores of the Gambia and peopled
by Gambians living outside of the Gambia. And here I am forced to pause and ask
this question: what sort of a National Vision could a group of people
converging abroad propound on the behalf of a people? Under whose mandate and
representation? I am not convinced that it is the Gambian people that would be
represented in such a gathering that would give it a carte blanche to proclaim
a “national vision”. This fact poses a grave difficulty and limit to the kind
of organization that you are advocating for. This scenario then places us in
the situation of an organization like CORDEG. And if a conference in the manner
of your calling is to be held we are only going to be presented with a like
body with the only possible differences to be in their composition, agenda and
other less significant issues. But on the main, and this is what is most
significant, such a body will only be an organization that will operate outside
of the Gambia and lacking, in the significant sense of it, the legal and
legitimate mantra to speaking on the behalf of the Gambian people. I know this
is controversial but it is besides my main concern, yet good enough to put to
check or restraint that language as captured in Phase 2 of your proposal – the
setting up of a “National Face of The Struggle.”  To cut it short and lay this point to rest,
let me just say that a “national Face of the struggle” can and will only be
home-based if it is ever to be taken seriously and capable of delivering the
desired goods. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Now, I take
it that your proposed national conference will be similar to what has already
happened and has led to the creation of CORDEG. Logistics and agendas might
have been different but on the main an organization would have been borne out
of it just like we have in CORDEG. The direction and or agenda of the
organization might also be different which is also important but based on what
you’ve shared with us in the proposed plan, this body which might be CORDEG for
the sake of visualization to help our
discussion, would “formulate project/program proposal that will be sold to the
International community for funding”. Uncle Burama, both me and you know that
the “international community” are always ready and available to meet groups and
even individuals who have something to say about a country especially one that
is seen to be tyrannical and undemocratic. But whether overtly or covertly
these meetings are just that, meetings, funds might be provided to fund travels
and other logistics. But after all, such an organization and its
representatives unless they find themselves on the ground if not opting to rely
on the use of the force of arms to effect change, to organize and agitate for
change through legitimate means, the whole exercise leads to naught. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Essentially,
uncle Burama, you must be aware that those forming governments, once they gain
the mandate to lead and govern, they signify the legitimate entity in the eyes
of the people including the “international community”. This fact is arguable
because this supposed sovereign status, respect and recognition is sometimes flouted
but understandably, we might agree even without saying it out loud, that we
know the conditions that result to the disregarding or flouting of such
established protocols by the very “international community”. The relation
between Yaya and the EU presents a good example to cite here. Even after Yaya’s
smearing of its name in Banjul, the EU would still commit to disbursing funds
to Banjul (against the wishes of anti Yaya activist) after prior threats to cut
such an important line of benefit to Yaya and people. This is enough lessons
for us on some of the dynamics of inter-governmental relations and protocols. On
the other hand and this is very important, among the plethora of anti Yaya and
his government, opposition party supporters included as well as other
activists, there is hardly a uniformity of vision (vision as implying ways and
means to an aim).  Hence the problem of
having a singularity of vision is going to present another difficulty and limit
even if the body that emerged out of the proposed conference – say CORDEG,
comes with its own as agreed to by those who formed it. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Therefore,
uncle Burama, as a segment of the Gambian population both home and abroad that
are opposed to Yaya and his government, we hold to differing visions as to how
to go about executing a plan to get rid of Yaya. There are multiple of visions
and missions in this our struggle, hence, I will argue, that at this moment
what is viable is for a us to converge at a point and agree to a limited plan
of removing Yaya and render the field to an open and equal contest by any and
all interested, and leave the formulation of a national vision to them. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Uncle
Burama, I am in agreement with you on phase3 regarding mobilization and
sensitization of diaspora Gambians as well as the “international community” on
the plight and condition of our national governance. Demonstrations and
protestations to show our displeasure and other actions are also tangible
points. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>On phases
4and 5, with the opposition parties aside, we are sure to conclude that any memoranda
and or communiqué will not be welcomed in either Banjul or its representative
houses abroad. Or on the other hand, our letters may be received and even
acknowledged and that is it. Maybe i will have to sight examples to convince
you on this. First, take our laws as an example. Our constitution can be
referred to as a communiqué or vision plan submitted before Yaya and he swore
to adhere to its language and conform to its vision. Take this other example,
the communiqué between Yaya’s party and the opposition parties in 2006 that was
brokered by Obasanjo. We all know how Yaya has disregarded those two
undertakings he had appended his signature and agreed to adhere to. Therefore,
there is no indication that it will be different next time even so when the
protagonists are an organization based outside of the Gambia. It is important
to note here that I am conscious of your concept of political “leverage” and agree
that such a potent tool is required in dealing with situations and individuals in
the fashion of Yaya. But I do not think that we can attain such a desirous position
in the fashion you are proposing or even if it will it is only for the long
haul. I will share in my conclusion what I think will put us in that position
in a rather much quicker and effective way. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Phase7 of
the proposal is reliant on a conditional clause but even then like I mentioned
above, we only have the opposition parties to partner with in Banjul in our
struggle against Yaya and his government. And Phase9 is dependent upon the
success of prior agendas hence is inconsequential. On Phase 10, I must say, is
a great way to morph an organization and refocus its lenses on a lasting cause
and agenda. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Uncle
Burama, in conclusion I will reiterate and expand on why I say that our best
way at this moment is to limit our plans to removing Yaya and setting the field
open while leaving the task of envisioning a mission to the emergent
representatives that will sprung out of such open and free contest. Because,
any other organization other than the home-based opposition parties that is
invested in the interest of effecting change in Banjul will either have to find
its way to the ground in Banjul and legally conduct its affairs to attain its
aim, or else seek the route of forcibly and violently achieving it wishes. There
is also another option and that is for such organizations like the one you are envisioning
and similar in fashion to CORDEG, the role of facilitating, negotiating and
mediating with the ground forces and that is what is what is tenable at the
moment. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>“How do we
bring down Yaya”, you have fervently and insistently asked uncle Burama. My
answer is this. Because the opposition parties are the only viable forces on
the ground that have the legitimate power to organize and agitate for change in
the Gambia as I have highlighted above; that opposing organizations based abroad
would have to set shop on the ground and do as the existing opposition parties
are now doing or possibly a little bit more and different if they are ever to
be able to bring the change they clamoring for; that these organizations are
not willing or even able to use force or violent means to remove Yaya; then the
only viable option is to side and strengthen the available forces – the opposition
parties, by helping and facilitating their combination of resources and power
to confront Yaya. Yes, uncle Burama only through the combined force of the anti
Yaya camp – the opposition parties and those of us outside the Gambia, would we
be able to gather the much sought after and needed political leverage that you and
us all, are fervently clamoring for. You might argue that the union of opposition
forces is not the means to an end in our democratization efforts and desires
and you will be right about that. But equally, you may not be oblivious of the
reason why even after a number of failures to arrive at an acceptable formula
for such union most of us are still basing our hopes more on such a plan as our
surest means to toppling the professor. One of the major reason and arguably so,
could be because we are yet to attain a full or total opposition alliance. The closest
we have been in that project was when we had NADD. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Now, why do I
think an all opposition alliance working in partnership with diaspora Gambians is
what will present us the political leverage we so desire? To cite examples I can
bring up the period of NADD. It was the political leverage of the allied forces
of the opposition that brought the influence of the Commonwealth thorough former
Nigerian president Obasanjo, to go to Banjul to simmer tensions between Yaya
and the opposition. That was political leverage and it was lost after the split
of NADD. Going by this analogy, one can tell how such a power and leverage could
have been utilized to force Yaya on the table to talk on every important issue
ranging from electoral reform to the decoupling of the ruling party and its use
and reliance on state material and resources. Uncle Burama, this is authentic
political leverage and its power could be extended to the level of rendering
the country ungovernable as well as the use of the right of self-defense whenever
Yaya trampled upon their rights. This is authentic political leverage I repeat,
and it is the way we need to go and remove Yaya and build democracy. It is only
then that the morphing of the type of your organization will pick up and make
it its agenda that never again will another Yaya be bred into our public life. 
>>
>>
>> 
>>Thank you.  
>>Nyang  
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