Hi!
   The recent coalition victories in Jarra and Bakau, coupled with the
recent announcements by Yaya Jammeh stating that no opposition will win
against him and that developments slated for the next ten years will be
greater than developments seen in the last, have made me think about the
political situation in Gambia and the possibilities for the coalition in the
2006 elections. Whilst the momentum gathered by the coalition these past few
months might give a feeling of invincibility, can one truly conclude that
the few victories can be used to gauge their possibilities come 2006? Can
the opposition win the 2006 elections? In order to answer this question, one
needs to look at various factors.

The first set of factors will look at the APRC's possibilities and
advantages that might hamper the coalition's efforts. It is important to
look at the APRC as a viable force to be reckoned with and not just a party
on its way to losing the 2006 elections. Many people have the tendency to
conclude that just because Gambia is going through tough times, the days are
numbered for the APRC. Whilst this might be a consoling sentiment, it is not
rooted in reality. What is rooted in reality is that the APRC, despite all
its failings is still a powerful force in Gambian politics privileged with
many resources. In looking at the advantages of the APRC, one needs to first
of all look at the party's position as a party in power and all the benefits
incumbency entails especially in African politics. One of the most important
benefits is control of the media. Even if the government does not
deliberately try to manipulate or tilt television, radio and newspaper
coverage in its favour, the mere fact that government ministers, officials
or the president himself, carrying out their normal public functions, get
more media coverage, disadvantages the coalition. This will give them the
opportunity to sell their platform and achievements especially if there are
projects that are launched or finished around election time. Things will get
worse regarding the media if the government decides to manipulate the public
media in its favour. This will give it the lion's share of television, radio
and to a large extent print media. The coalition's ability to spread its
programs will thus suffer.

Another important advantage the APRC has as a party in power is the vast
resources of the state at its disposal. This includes both financial and
material resources. Whilst it is in the letter of the law not allowed to
take money from national coffers to finance the election campaign of any
individual party, the APRC included, what is to stop the inclusion of such
financing being entered as miscellaneous expenditure in some ministry or
parastatal somewhere? What is to stop heads of parastatals from making
"donations" as was done for the tenth anniversary of the A(F)PRC ? Money
aside, the other resources of the state such as transportation, fuel etc.
can be used to a great advantage. Whilst the coalition will need to hire
transport and stand for the cost unless supporters provide such, the APRC
has the advantage of using public transportation to transport its supporters
around the country to attend rallies and beef up support. Private
individuals and corporations that have a vested interest in seeing the
continued control of the APRC are also a source of revenue and resources for
the ruling party. These individuals or corporations might in some way want
to preserve the status quo to protect their investments or might want to get
contracts and other opportunities. They might then reason that being seen to
be supporters and contributors will increase their chances or protect their
investments.

The APRC can also engage in less subtle activities to increase its chances.
It can use the law and security services to hamper the coalition's efforts.
One of the most devastating of such tactics would be to stage a security
scare such as a coup attempt, declare a state of emergency and postpone the
elections. This has been done several times in other African countries.
Another tactic would be use the law to disqualify certain individual
politicians. Yet another tactic would be gerrymandering where constituency
boundaries would be redrawn to suit the APRC and increase its chances of
getting more favourable results. Raw harassment of and brutality against
candidates and supporters and the rejection of permits for rallies by the
coalition can also be used with devastating consequences for the coalition.

Given the homogeneous nature of the Senegambia people and the porous border,
unqualified voters from Senegal (especially Casamance) can be furnished with
Gambian papers and used as a tipping block wherever the APRC feels
threatened. This was lamented over during the previous elections when the
opposition charged that residents of Casamance were smuggled into the
country to vote despite the fact that they were not citizens.

Yet another tactic would be to annul the election results if the opposition
is seen to have won on election day or just afterwards. This has happened in
such places as Algeria where the military stepped in to cancel the results
when it became obvious that Islamic candidates were on the verge of winning
the elections. This has however tragically led to a civil war with
devastating consequences.

All these methods and many more, at the hands of the APRC prove that it will
be foolhardy to think that the APRC can be easily defeated. With so much to
lose, the party will predictably fight tooth and nail to stay in power.

Having looked at the factors surrounding the APRC as a viable player in the
2006 elections, let us now look at the coalition. Despite the fact that the
coalition is the underdog in terms of resources and finance, many realities
on the ground favour it. The deteriorating economic situation, the level of
insecurity and the general sense of apathy can, if properly harnessed, bring
about positive results. It is worth pointing out however that just taking
these things for granted can result in a terrible shock for the coalition.
This is because the same situation was prevalent in the previous elections
but due to among other things, the opposition's failure to make practical
use of it, the result was disappointment for them.

***********************************TO BE CONTINUED**********************

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